Daily Papers

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

Drawing on contemporary pragmatist philosophy and linguistic theories on cognition, meaning, and communication, this paper presents a dynamic, metasemantic-metapragmatic taxonomy for grounding and conceptualizing human-like multimodal communicative alignment. The framework is rooted in contemporary developments of the three basic communicative capacities initially identified by American logician and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: iconic (sensory and perceptual qualities), indexical (contextual and sociocultural associations), and rule-like (symbolic and intuitive reasoning). Expanding on these developments, I introduce the concept of indexical contextualization and propose the principle of "contextualization directionality" for characterizing the crucial metapragmatic capacity for maintaining, navigating, or transitioning between semantic and pragmatic modes of multimodal communication. I contend that current cognitive-social computational and engineering methodologies disproportionately emphasize the semantic/metasemantic domain, overlooking the pivotal role of metapragmatic indexicality in traversing the semantic-pragmatic spectrum of communication. The framework's broader implications for intentionality, identity, affect, and ethics in within-modal and cross-modal human-machine alignment are also discussed.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), particularly those leveraging Chain-of-Thought reasoning (CoT), have opened brand new possibility for Machine Translation (MT). This position paper argues that LRMs substantially transformed traditional neural MT as well as LLMs-based MT paradigms by reframing translation as a dynamic reasoning task that requires contextual, cultural, and linguistic understanding and reasoning. We identify three foundational shifts: 1) contextual coherence, where LRMs resolve ambiguities and preserve discourse structure through explicit reasoning over cross-sentence and complex context or even lack of context; 2) cultural intentionality, enabling models to adapt outputs by inferring speaker intent, audience expectations, and socio-linguistic norms; 3) self-reflection, LRMs can perform self-reflection during the inference time to correct the potential errors in translation especially extremely noisy cases, showing better robustness compared to simply mapping X->Y translation. We explore various scenarios in translation including stylized translation, document-level translation and multimodal translation by showcasing empirical examples that demonstrate the superiority of LRMs in translation. We also identify several interesting phenomenons for LRMs for MT including auto-pivot translation as well as the critical challenges such as over-localisation in translation and inference efficiency. In conclusion, we think that LRMs redefine translation systems not merely as text converters but as multilingual cognitive agents capable of reasoning about meaning beyond the text. This paradigm shift reminds us to think of problems in translation beyond traditional translation scenarios in a much broader context with LRMs - what we can achieve on top of it.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear. In this work, we investigated whether the well-known Knobe effect, a moral bias in intentionality judgements, emerges in finetuned LLMs and whether it can be traced back to specific components of the model. We conducted a Layer-Patching analysis across 3 open-weights LLMs and demonstrated that the bias is not only learned during finetuning but also localized in a specific set of layers. Surprisingly, we found that patching activations from the corresponding pretrained model into just a few critical layers is sufficient to eliminate the effect. Our findings offer new evidence that social biases in LLMs can be interpreted, localized, and mitigated through targeted interventions, without the need for model retraining.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become foundational to modern AI agent systems, enabling autonomous agents to reason and plan. In most existing systems, inter-agent communication relies primarily on natural language. While this design supports interpretability and human oversight, we argue that it introduces fundamental limitations in agent-to-agent coordination. The semantic space of natural language is structurally misaligned with the high-dimensional vector spaces in which LLMs operate, resulting in information loss and behavioral drift. Beyond surface-level inefficiencies, we highlight a deeper architectural limitation: current LLMs were not trained with the objective of supporting agentic behavior. As such, they lack mechanisms for modeling role continuity, task boundaries, and multi-agent dependencies. The standard next-token prediction paradigm fails to support the structural alignment required for robust, scalable agent coordination. Based on this, we argue that two core questions deserve careful examination: first, given that AI agents fundamentally operate in high-dimensional vector spaces, should they rely on a language system originally designed for human cognition as their communication medium? Second, should we consider developing a new model construction paradigm that builds models from the ground up to natively support structured communication, shared intentionality, and task alignment in multi-role, multi-agent environments? This paper calls for a reconsideration not only of how agents should communicate, but also of what it fundamentally means to train a model that natively supports multi-agent coordination and communication.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in robotics, especially for high-level action planning. Meanwhile, many robotics applications involve human supervisors or collaborators. Hence, it is crucial for LLMs to generate socially acceptable actions that align with people's preferences and values. In this work, we test whether LLMs capture people's intuitions about behavior judgments and communication preferences in human-robot interaction (HRI) scenarios. For evaluation, we reproduce three HRI user studies, comparing the output of LLMs with that of real participants. We find that GPT-4 strongly outperforms other models, generating answers that correlate strongly with users' answers in two studies x2014 the first study dealing with selecting the most appropriate communicative act for a robot in various situations (r_s = 0.82), and the second with judging the desirability, intentionality, and surprisingness of behavior (r_s = 0.83). However, for the last study, testing whether people judge the behavior of robots and humans differently, no model achieves strong correlations. Moreover, we show that vision models fail to capture the essence of video stimuli and that LLMs tend to rate different communicative acts and behavior desirability higher than people.