One of the characteristics of the presidential elections in Lebanon is that they pass by on the surface of political life unnoticed, without having the slightest role in shedding light on the fundamental challenges facing the country. The upcoming presidential elections lack any electoral programs and discussions, which are supposed to accompany elections and determine priorities and propose solutions.

There are no campaigns and no official candidates. The constitutional time frame for the election of the Lebanese president started on March 25, and no candidate has yet officially presented his candidacy for office in accordance with democratic rules and customs. On the contrary, the more the election date approaches, the more cautious potential candidates are, as if they are awaiting a sign from abroad. They avoid any media appearance, and if they ever do appear in the media they smooth the edges and remain careful not to make any mistake that might undermine their image as a candidate of consensus. In other words, the closer we get to election day, the more paralyzed political action in the country becomes and the discussions on contentious issues decrease. Thus, this pivotal moment of democratic life is slipping right through the hands of Lebanon.

Since the outbreak of the civil war in the mid-1970s, and despite the signing of the Taif Agreement, this small country remains unable to restore all the elements of its sovereignty, especially the exclusivity of arms to the Lebanese legitimate military forces. Lebanon remained an arena where regional powers settle their differences at the expense of the state and its institutions. This constituted the basic obstacle that prevented the regulation of constitutional action, including the election of the president of the republic. But truth be told, the country is not taking advantage of the constitutional time frame, despite the nature of the parliamentary system based on pluralism of sects and affiliations. This step would have helped strengthen the social contract and consecrated national unity, by referring to the people as the source of authority to identify their collective options.

The current Lebanese constitutional order is inherited from the French. When Lebanon was under the French Mandate, it adopted the constitutional order of the French Third Republic, which collapsed in 1940. Under this constitution, the French National Assembly — consisting of the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate — used to elect the president. It is worth mentioning that the French Constitution was amended twice, and today the French president is elected directly by the people, which is a fundamental reform for the sake of the consolidation of democracy. The Taif Agreement, which was signed in 1989, introduced fundamental constitutional amendments mostly focusing on the redistribution of power between sectarian institutions and components. Ironically, it maintained and even consecrated the presidential electoral system. This was probably done to consecrate the parliamentary nature of the republic, because any measure to refer to the people’s will used to be seen as a deviation toward a presidential regime and a consolidation of the Christians’ position at the expense of other sects.

In brief, the presidential elections are more like a consensual process reached by the heads of parliamentary blocs, i.e., sect leaders. Most importantly, the regional powers sponsoring these leaders have the final say. Therefore, the election of or the consensus on a president through a regional electoral event is primarily subject to the regional give and take or consensus.

Therefore, doors are wide open for all influential regional powers to play a role in the Lebanese political scene and in the process of electing a president. The role of these powers may vary in size, according to the existing balance of power. The election of President Michel Suleiman in 2008, for example, was the outcome of a Syrian-Saudi settlement with a US blessing. Qatar, Egypt and France each played the role of mediator in this process. However, today, the dispute reached its peak due to the repercussions of the Syrian crisis on the internal Lebanese scene, as the Syrian and Lebanese files became correlated. Therefore, there is no doubt that the process of electing the president will be subject to the evolution of the conflict in Syria.

If the presidential elections are to be held, they will likely be the outcome of an Iranian-Saudi settlement in which the International Support Group for Lebanon (ISGL), which will be meeting in September in New York, will have the primary mediation role. Iran has taken over Syria’s role. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 and for decades now, Syria had the leading role in deciding the names of Lebanese presidents. The countries that attended the ISGL — most notably the United States, France, Britain and even Russia — will have a facilitating or protecting role. Interestingly enough, Egypt recently joined the ranks of the parties playing a role in the Lebanese presidential elections; this was expressed by its Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy during his visit to Lebanon last week. It seems that Egypt is seeking, through the Lebanese scene and presidential elections, to restore its regional position by joining the club of parties that get a say in choosing the Lebanese president, as the presidential elections in Lebanon have become a classic regional electoral process.

The question today is whether the diplomatic actions that facilitated the formation of the Lebanese government in the recent period will continue with the same momentum and lead to the election of a president. The answer depends on the costs to be borne by this or that party. There is no doubt that the formation of the government in Lebanon — which was delayed for 10 months — took place concurrently with a regional setting in which Iran wanted to open up to the West and deal positively with various issues, showing goodwill to prove its credibility as a partner that signed the framework nuclear agreement and seeking a broader partnership in other regional files.

Iran was required to bear a high cost in Syria, i.e., the acknowledgment of the results of the Geneva I conference. But, in the context of the Lebanese internal affairs, the cost — which is the weighty return of March 14 forces to power — seemed acceptable and Iran accepted the offer. Moreover, the spread of radical terrorism that is mainly targeting the Lebanese Shiite stronghold helped reach the proposed settlement. Therefore, it was necessary to bring back the moderate Sunni forces to the forefront and assign the army to fight terrorism.

However, now that the pace of terrorist acts is reduced and the party allied with Iran has achieved some gains on the battlefield in Syria and on the borders with Lebanon, it seems as if the settlement realized two of Hezbollah’s objectives. On the one hand, it weakened terrorism inside Lebanon and removed its pressure on the party’s strategic stronghold, and on the other, it maintained Hezbollah’s freedom of military movement inside Syria, which is a priority for the party’s strategy as pointed out by its officials on various occasions. The election of, or consensus on, the president of the republic — if held on schedule before May 25 — will be subject to this settlement. Based on the foregoing, it is required that the next president restore the former capacity of moderate Sunnis. He must not pose a challenge to the March 14 forces, and he must be committed to fighting terrorism and turn a blind eye on Hezbollah’s participation in the war in Syria. It may be possible to find a president who meets these requirements, but meeting the requirements for establishing a real republic is another question.