If Western publications are to be believed, being a member of the Communist Party in a communist country entitles to you a long and luxuriant list of privileges. When Western journalists talk about life in a communist country, one can often hear that some type of goods were “only available to party members” or some resort was “built just for party members,” as if those members were a kind of modern-day priesthood, eligible to assorted perks by the virtue of their status alone.

Such statements can produce only smiles from people who actually lived in such countries. We knew well that party membership was an important privilege, but it was never as simple and straightforward as many Westerners might think.

The one-party system was a feature of all communist states. Some of them, including North Korea, also had a small number of non-communist parties that were usually just political decoration with no political clout whatsoever. At any rate, the communist party (sometimes under somewhat different name) was the major locus of power in those countries.

Theoretically, all citizens could apply for party membership. But in practice, there were major restrictions and quotas to ensure that the party would not become too large and would maintain a desirable social composition. For example, in the Soviet Union, until its demise, government quotas ensured that workers and farmers constituted a significant part of the party membership. As a result, blue collar workers enjoyed significant privileges when it came to party membership and were accepted into the party when they requested the privilege. At the same time, white collar workers had to compete for the chance – the latter coveted membership much more than their blue collar peers.

… it seems that the party has over 4 million members, some 16 percent of North Korea’s total population

In many regards, North Korea is similar to its East European and Soviet peers. Like other communist countries, it has one ruling party, but the ratio of party members to total population is unusually high. As North Koreans do, they have not published any statistics on party membership since 1980. However, it seems that the party has over 4 million members, some 16 percent of North Korea’s total population. To put things in comparison, the membership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union peaked 19 million in 1990, making only 6.5 percent of the total population. The membership of the Communist Party of China is has reached almost 90 million. However impressive, it is still 5 percent of the country’s total population.

A PREREQUISITE

As stated above, in the communist country party membership itself was not actually a privilege. On the contrary, a party member has to deal with a number of additional, rather troublesome duties that can be quite time consuming. North Korea is no exception. Even now that the indoctrination system has disintegrated somewhat, party members still have to participate in official meetings three times per week. Party membership per se does not make them eligible for any additional salary or larger food rations. It would be surprising had it been otherwise: a group which includes about a third of all work-age citizens cannot be seen as an elite group almost by definition. Nonetheless, it is an open secret that North Koreans do what they can to acquire membership of the Korean Workers Party (KWP), as the North Korean equivalent of the party is known. But why?

The reason is simple: In North Korea, as well as in other communist countries, party membership is a necessary prerequisite for any kind of career advancement. In North Korea this principle is taken to the extreme. No managerial position can be occupied by anyone who is not a party member. All military and police officers are also KWP members by definition. This means that every upwardly mobile North Korean has to first consider ways to enter the party, because otherwise, all attempts to get any promotion above very basic level are liable to be fruitless – and in most cases, promotion itself does not entitle the candidate to party membership (which should normally be acquired independently and beforehand). In essence, a person who is not a KWP member is bound to spend his/her entire life as a part of the non-privileged majority of North Koreans. The same fate befalls many party members too, but unlike their non-party peers, they do at least have some theoretical chance of rising up the social pyramid.

The average male goes to the military, and most soldiers eventually become party members

Children of the top elite are accepted into the party almost automatically. But for a majority of humble folks, the path to membership begins with military service, which lasts about 10 years (shorter for females, whose service was voluntary until recently). As a rule, a North Korean who completes his or her military service without major problems is given a coveted KWP membership card upon discharge from the military. This might be a reason why the share of party members in North Korea is so high compared to other communist countries. The average male goes to the military, and most soldiers eventually become party members. The requirement is to serve reasonably well, without getting into any serious trouble.

This means that a recently discharged soldiers has some chance of becoming a minor official once he returns home. Better still, he may be able to get a “recommendation” for admission into a college. Such a recommendation is even more difficult to get than party membership, and admission to a college can be highly valuable in career advancement. As North Korean professors are well-aware, former conscripts are not great students. But this is not what they are there for, they are there to acquire skills that will allow them to get some kind of managerial job upon completion.

DECLINING RETURNS

For those who were unable or unwilling to engage in social ladder climbing, party membership is probably quite burdensome. KWP members have to attend indoctrination sessions twice a week, and additionally undertake weekly self- and mutual criticism sessions. They also usually have problems with dodging labor mobilizations. Nonetheless, most of them are still proud of their standing within the North Korean system.

The desire to join the KWP made military service very popular in North Korea – at least, this was the case until the Arduous March. While in other communist countries where party membership was not that popular, people often paid bribes and cheated to avoid military service, but in North Korea, money, connections and sometimes even sexual favors were used to ensure that family members would be drafted.

Admittedly, things have changed in the last decade or so. The popularity of military service has decreased significantly – largely because party membership is just not as attractive as it used to be.

There used to be no alternative career path. Until the 1990s, if you wanted success, you had to become an official, and the only way to get into this privileged group was to first join the military and then join the party. Now, however, the booming private economy gives people attractive alternatives. A successful merchant, working independently or as a part of a family enterprise, by his mid-20s can make as much money as the average official in his 40s – sometimes even more. As one North Korean recently remarked: “everything is messy nowadays, sometimes a party secretary can be seen riding a bicycle near a rich entrepreneur from the same unit driving a luxury car.”

No wonder, therefore, that North Korean youngsters are less interested in party membership now. However, this does not mean that the interest has gone completely: it merely diminished.