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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000178 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS TO DOE FOR NNSA STATE PASS TO DHS FOR CBP, ICE E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION TAGS: PREL, PINR, ECON, PREF, KN, KS, CH SUBJECT: PRC/DPRK: NEW NK BORDER FENCING; INSPECTIONS AND FLOOD AID; SMUGGLING AND BORDER SECURITY; BANKING REF: SHENYANG 128 Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN. REASONS: 1.4(b)/(d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent PRC inspections of cross-border PRC- DPRK traffic through Dandong show no change. One Western NGO recently shipping flood-related medical aid to North Korea encountered rather "strict" PRC customs requirements that slowed the shipment by several days. North Korea has started to fence several kilometers of its border near Dandong, but the activity is actually part of a larger project that began two years ago, according to local residents, who also report that both sides of the border have tightened in recent months. Evident now in Dandong are indirect signs of an official acknowledgement of the cross-border smuggling that persists in the area. On the financial front, the status of previous PRC prohibitions-- at least nominal--on cross-border banking with North Korea has become less clear during the second half 2007. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) Poloff traveled along the southern end of the PRC- DPRK border September 11-12, including to Dandong, a strategic thoroughfare opposite Sinuiju, North Korea; Donggang, a county-level port city roughly 40-45 kilometers south of Dandong; and Hushan, a small locality along the Yalu River approximately 20 kilometers north of downtown Dandong. CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC: INSPECTIONS, MILITARY EXPORTS? --------------------------------------------- ------- 3. (C) Dandong Land Port had--compared to previous observations over the past year during the same time of day and time interval--a somewhat sluggish feel to it on the morning of September 11 during a ninety-minute observation. Between 1000 and 1040, Poloff observed approximately 30-40 large, closed-container PRC trucks depart China for Sinuiju; the vast majority, whose cabs many drivers had stuffed with bags of clothing, sported pre-clearance tags and were subject to no visible inspections as they processed out. Customs officers appeared to enhance their vigilance as inbound traffic from Sinuiju entered Dandong. Between 1040-1130, Poloff observed PRC customs officers stare into the cargo holds of many (and climb into the cabs of some) of the 50-60 mostly large, empty North Korean container trucks--mostly newer Japanese models--that entered the land port. Chinese business partners greeted many of the incoming North Korean drivers, passing them cell phones while shouting directions. 4. (C) Parked, queued next to the customs warehouse within the land port were eight army-green Jiefang-model First Auto Works (FAW) military cargo/utility trucks. Rounded, army-green tarpaulins enclosed the rears of seven of the two-ton vehicles, all of which appeared to have been somewhat dated but newly refurbished. Poloff observed that what was likely a decal/logo on the drivers' doors had been painted over. None of the vehicles bore plates, nor were any visibly marked for export, as Poloff had seen in the past with military vehicles similarly queued for eventual passage into North Korea. INSPECTIONS AND FLOOD AID: ONE ANECDOTE --------------------------------------- 5. (C) A staffer at the Dandong branch of the Spiritual Awakening Mission (SAM), a Christian medical NGO focused on North Korea and China, on September 11 told Poloff of his recent experience with PRC customs inspections during the process of sending the DPRK humanitarian aid--in the form of medical supplies--in response to the recent flooding. Three weeks ago, SAM received a formal request from DPRK authorities, after which the group promptly assembled 10,000 small medical kits packed with basic medicines and first-aid supplies. DPRK authorities claimed that the country had roughly 5000 clinics nationwide, to which SAM targeted two kits each. (Each kit, SAM hopes, will last several months.) SHENYANG 00000178 002 OF 003 6. (C) The SAM staffer reported that PRC customs was quite "strict." Even though the PRC authorities had been invited to observe the packing process at SAM's base, they required the shipment to be deposited at a warehouse at Dandong's rail station for a period of three days, during which the goods would be inspected before being transported by rail to the DPRK. The staffer complained, moreover, that the PRC authorities would only permit SAM to send Chinese-made supplies, even though the quality is inferior to that of Western medicines. Chinese customs officers, he said, opened some of the kits to verify that the contents were, in fact, Chinese-made. North Korean customs officers are equally strict in certain respects, the staffer also noted: they will accept Chinese or, preferably, U.S. medical products, but absolutely no such South Korean products. He recounted, for instance, one experience in which SAM had donated South Korean-made vitamins and other high-quality ROK medical products as humanitarian aid, only to have them refused at the North Korean border because of their origin. NEW NORTH KOREAN BORDER FENCING: SOME PERSPECTIVE --------------------------------------------- ---- 7. (C) North Korea has started fencing several kilometers of its border near Hushan, outside of Dandong proper. The fencing thus far is limited to several kilometers, mostly around the perimeter of Yuchi Island--a small DPRK-held island in the Yalu River that abuts Hushan--and consists of roughly six-foot-tall vertical concrete posts (not "T" shaped as on the Chinese side) strung with wire. Poloff on September 12 observed at least 25-30 North Korean soldiers, in shirtsleeves and small groups, ploddingly stringing wire between the fence posts. Very little wire at present has been strung on any of the posts, and even after the task is completed, the porous border will continue to be easily traversable just a short distance away in either direction from where the fencing ends. 8. (C) Four Hushan locals who regularly interact and have traded with the nearby DPRK border guards offered some perspective on the fencing. The North Korean side started erecting the fence posts a month ago, the riverside residents confirmed. But they told Poloff that the project--visible quite literally from their "backyards"-- actually started two years ago. It initially focused on building a concrete or cement retaining wall/dam, onto which the fence posts were recently installed. The North Korean soldiers involved with this project, the locals said, are engineering troops, and they plan to fence nearly all of Yuchi Island. THE BORDER TIGHTENING? ---------------------- 9. (C) Security along the border has become "more strict" on both sides of the border in recent months, according to the same locals. Until recently, for instance, North Korean border guards posted just across the Yalu River would regularly interact with these same Hushan residents (albeit cautiously), even within view of their superiors. Now the nearby North Korean border guards "won't dare" if their superiors are around, locals told Poloff, citing the recent example of a North Korean border guard-"friend" whose superior officer locked him in his guard post after he caught him interacting with Chinese across the river. On the Chinese side of the border, Poloff continued--at least anecdotally--to encounter an increasingly more visible People's Armed Police (PAP) presence. On September 12 alone, Poloff spotted at least seven PAP patrols, mostly in jeeps containing 3-4 soldiers, roving the border both north and south of Dandong (though not in the city proper). 10. (C) Not-so-subtle signs of official acknowledgement of the cross-border smuggling occurring in/around Dandong is now evident in downtown Dandong for the first time in a year of Poloff's regular visits to the area. On a number of the docks that dot Dandong's riverside promenade were strung red banners calling for an end to various and sundry SHENYANG 00000178 003 OF 003 "illegal activities." Summing up the exhortations most comprehensively was one which read: "Strictly combat smuggling, alien smuggling (toudu), drug smuggling, cross- border fishing and other illegal activities." Other banners focused solely on drugs, while still others specifically mentioned the use of riverfront boats in illegal activities. A similar sort of publicity drive was evident in Donggang several months ago (see reftel), but few signs of the campaign remained when Poloff visited again on September 12. On a number of boathouse walls on the road between Dandong and Donggang, Poloff still saw a few tattered, handwritten posters that called for an end to alien smuggling and other types of similar illegal activities that are typically conducted using the many riverside boats in this area. BANKING WITH THE DPRK VIA DANDONG --------------------------------- 11. (C) The status of previous--at least nominal--official PRC prohibitions in Dandong on renminbi-denominated financial transactions involving North Korea has become less clear in recent months. Staff at the Bank of China's Dandong branch told us on September 11 that they still would not process remittances for North Korea because of "sanctions." But one staffer also said that such transactions could now be processed at the Dandong branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) through an account held there by the DPRK Guangxiang Financial Co., Ltd. (Chaoxian Guangxiang Jinrong Shehui in Chinese). When asked about this arrangement, staff at Dandong's ICBC initially denied the account, but told us when pressed that one needed to ask one's North Korean business partner since "they would know what to do." (NOTE: Online reports suggest that Guangxiang may be an arm of the DPRK's Korean Trade Bank (Chaoxian Maoyi Yinhang). Its listed address is 1602 Huiyou Garden, Dandong Development Zone; its phone ( 86)0415-3127485. END NOTE.) 12. (C) The Bank of China's Shenyang branch confirmed by telephone on September 14 that prohibitions on business with the DPRK remain in place. The international business department of ICBC's Shenyang branch, however, told us the same day that it could process a transfer of funds to the DPRK, though only via Hong Kong and not in renminbi. By contrast, the Shenyang branch of China's Merchant's Bank told us that it, like the Bank of China, cannot process remittances for North Korea because of "U.S. sanctions." WICKMAN