"Imbalances are not solely the result of irresponsible policies. They may reflect deeper weaknesses in economic structures, such as a lack of competitiveness or institutional shortcomings."



This is the lie that lying behind the irresponsibility of specifically the Greek political culture. Weakness of economic structures and institutional shortcomings do not fall outside the responsibility of a sovereign government. The problem is that Greek governments act as if they are not governing a sovereign; as if the participation to the EU and even the eurozone are of higher priority than sovereign responsibility.



It is revealing how SYRIZA government treated the need for a "plan B", the need to take steps for a fall-back currency, in case it could not find a satisfactory solution (which is how Tsipras describes what he is "forced" to defend in the recent anti-Greek deal) for the Greek situation in the euro/EU context.



That is what Paul Krugman emphasised with his statement on the "competence of the Greek government" -- not otherwise "undermined trustworthiness" of the Greek government, as the author misrepresent.



This kind of political establishment --in Greece but possibly also in France, which insisted in "a way out" for the denial of Greek politics, in the recent anti-Greek deal-- finds complacency in proposing federal institutions. The real problem, causing upheaval, is the lack of responsibility of the Greek political establishment and this is meant to manifest itself in soon to come elections in Greece (as soon as the anti-Greek deal fails, which it will).



This is *not* to say that other European political establishments, submitting totally to the "there is no alternative" narration, having left sovereignty claims to populists, are in much better position, against the inadequacy of EU/eurozone political institutions and the superiority of banking institutions and the ECB, to move toward political union.



One reason is because the informal authorities like the "eurogroup", taking life in the beginning of the crisis, were allowed to endure, after or even because of the nature of undemocratic institution formulated

to address the sovereign debt crisis: the ESM. A mix of elected government officials (finance ministers) --especially in the countries where sovereignty is a matter of political establishment responsibility-- is not primarily concerned with European integration aims and decides based on national interests. This is partially admitted by Jean Pisani-Ferry (http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eurozone-reform-possibilities-by-jean-pisani-ferry-2015-07) for EU/EZ governments, but looking only (or deliberately) from an economic perspective, he only finds its influence before the crisis.



The ESM, allowed to follow the ECB's undemocratic structure, which does not have a parliamentary mandate, but a treaty-based mandate only, are both undermining political accountability and control (forget the fairy tales about democratic accountability) by any potential future institution in the EU/EZ. Thus, the EZ is doomed to undemocratic institutions and eventual failure.



What Papantoniou proposes, these federal Europe institutions, are doomed to remain undemocratic, because the ECB governing counsel plus the treaties defining the ECB's mandate, form an undemocratic context of supremacy of currency institutions over political institutions. Much worse is the case with the structure of the ESM, which is only accountable to the German parliament --all otherwise sovereign political establishments, have surrendered their rights to accountable institutions!!!



Although the ESM is accountable to Germany's interests (and will respect at least one country's political interests), the ECB is not and this cannot change! It is the basis of the eurozone; the most fundamental institution, working on the most fundamental treaty rules. In effect, the ECB represents national government interests --not EZ interests-- and is likely to favour either the stronger nations' interests, or a very wide consensus of governments, if such consensus can emerge in absence of any relevant institutions!



This is the mindset formulated behind the eurozone: surrender sovereignty and accountability to the stronger nations. It cannot be changed by dressing it up as a federation. In the case of the Greek crisis, the ECB would still decide in the same way; Greek banks would have to close. This structure of the EZ ***cannot*** and hopefully will not be saved.