Three additional aspects of this latest test are notable. It took place at night, simulating the operational conditions North Korea would actually use in a wartime scenario; it may have relied on a new ICBM variant that North Korea hasn’t tested before; and it may have used a mobile missile launcher, making it basically impossible for the United States to strike or to threaten to strike a test site. In short, North Korea’s missiles are increasingly sophisticated, increasingly survivable, and functionally capable of putting the entire U.S. homeland at risk.

From a strategic perspective, this latest test is not a game-changer. Since 2006, North Korea has had a nuclear capability that poses a threat to U.S. allies and bases in the region. Its first two ICBM tests this summer demonstrated that it could very nearly strike the entire United States—it was only a matter of time until the full continent came into range. Moreover, experts have long believed that North Korea was unlikely to surrender its nuclear weapons or long-range missiles. Most observers believe that Kim Jong Un has sought nuclear weapons to deter the United States from toppling his regime. His regime would therefore continue to develop both programs until they were sophisticated enough to threaten the United States—not because it intended to start a nuclear war, but because it wanted to deter the United States. By this logic, an operational North Korean ICBM capability has been long in the making.

What this third test does lay bare, however, is a fundamental flaw in the Trump administration’s approach to Pyongyang. Since the early days of his presidency, the president has sought the total and complete disarmament of North Korea. At the very least, he and his advisers have resolved that North Korea should not gain the ability to strike the United States with a nuclear weapon. But because few expect North Korea to denuclearize, Trump’s objective strikes many as impossible.

Alongside these maximalist goals, top administration officials have also routinely threatened the first-use of American force, presuming this would stop North Korea from completing its nuclear and missile programs. Trump’s “fire and fury” comments, for example, suggested that the United States might strike North Korea in retaliation for mere threats. He and his advisors have also repeated their belief that the North Korean leader is irrational, undeterrable, and suicidal—a logic which, if sincerely believed, would seem to make U.S. military action inevitable. Importantly, this case for preventive action is premised on the idea that the United States and the world are “running out of time” to halt North Korea from acquiring these gravest of capabilities. According to this narrative, it would be better to strike North Korea now rather than face its most sophisticated capabilities later.