The basic argument all these writers make is the same: A shutdown, while unpleasant, would be less unpleasant than the default that would likely ensue if Congress doesn't raise the debt ceiling by mid-October. Why would shutting down the government make a default less likely? The idea seems to be that once House Republicans realize how badly the public is reacting to the chaos they've caused, they'll see the error of their ways, dispense with the theatrics, and start acting sane.

"As Republicans' poll numbers collapsed and they hemorrhaged blood all over Washington," Scheiber writes, Boehner's call for more sensible action would gain legitimacy. "The demoralized conservatives will realize they’re out of moves — at least in this particular battle — allowing Boehner to raise the debt limit a few weeks later with little drama. There will be no debt default, and no conservative coup in the House."

This is certainly possible, but it seems unlikely. The majority of House Republicans already want to prevent a shutdown and a default. But there's a small group that insists on defunding Obamacare as an ultimatum, and they are not likely to be placated by a little government shutdown. Many believe that the government shutdown of 1995 either didn't hurt Republicans politically or only hurt Republicans because they gave in rather than standing firm. Some also believe that the supposedly catastrophic consequences of hitting the debt ceiling are overblown, like Representative John Fleming of Louisiana, who recently told Politico, "Technically, it’s not possible to default," and if the debt ceiling is reached, "nothing happens." (Confronted with economists' predictions of large-scale catastrophe, Fleming told the New York Times, "Economists, what have they been doing? They make all sorts of predictions. Many times they're wrong.")

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on Friday dubbed these intractable Republicans "the weird caucus." To their opponents, they appear unreasonable, but what they really are is very, very sincere: They truly believe that, by committing to do anything to block a law they see as disastrous, they're standing up for what's right. That's not going to change because the Republican Party's poll numbers, already in the toilet, slip a little more, or because their constituents complain about closures of national parks. The Republicans who care about those things are already willing to pass government funding and debt-ceiling bills. But there aren't 218 of them.

The idea that a shutdown will somehow convert these holdouts is a version of the "break the fever" theory that Obama espoused during his campaign: that once he was reelected, antagonistic Republicans would see which side the public was on and agree to compromise. That didn't happen; if anything, they redoubled their efforts to thwart him, egged on by outside groups.