I am not saying that Morozov does this. He is thoughtful and clearly racking his brain to find ways to better the world. But his dismissiveness of the ways in which the Internet can be part of a challenge to authoritarianism and promote citizen empowerment leaves the argument unbalanced and misleading. In the current politico-cultural context, this lopsidedness fits too smoothly with elite cynicism and disdain for change.

All this is not to say that Morozov does not make many excellent points. For example, his criticism of the U.S. State Department's push for "Internet Freedom" as a tool for promoting U.S. interests, err, democracy, is clearly on-target; I think the Wikileaks saga has settled that debate.

A large chunk of the book is devoted to pointing out that the Internet can be used to strengthen the trifecta of authoritarianism: surveillance, censorship, and propaganda. Your social media imprint can implicate you much more easily than an army of secret police. It is possible to selectively censor the Internet (though I think this only goes so far). And most importantly, the Internet opens new channels for state propaganda as well as state-sponsored and corporate astro-turfing. While all these points are true, I do think Morozov underestimates the ecological effect of the Internet in potentially undermining the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. Crushing of dissidents individually may certainly help an authoritarian regime remain in power in the short term, but too much repression, coupled with an unhappy citizenry that is able to share their displeasure with one another, can hollow out a regime's legitimacy, ultimately crippling its capacity for repression, as there is almost no purely coercive regime. In other words, while increased capacity for surveillance may be a very real threat to individual dissidents, broadening the repressive apparatus often ultimately backfires, especially under conditions with lower barriers to collective action and information diffusion, both of which are promoted by the Internet.

Distraction can also be an ally of authoritarian regimes. As Morozov points out, the vast amount of entertainment available on the Web can be depoliticizing and demobilizing. This is also true, but also only up to a point. Entertainment can only go so far if a regime is unable to provide the basic foundations of legitimacy, which almost always includes the necessities for life and often extends to freedom and personal autonomy. Still, capitalism's immense capacity to trivialize and commercialize everything, including dissent, is indeed worrisome and highlights the importance of strengthening the non-profit, non-commercial infrastructure of the Internet.

Most of my divergence with Morozov about what is actually in the book come in his discussion of slactivism and social media. Yes, online petitions and "like" buttons do not work to bring about social change. Everyone has figured that out and I really do not see anyone substantive on the cyber-utopian side arguing that they are that important. I believe this has become is a convenient strawman allowing the literati (like, say, Malcolm Gladwell) to proclaim, "I'm too sophisticated for lolcats."