In the most exciting Round of 16 Champions League fixture, the changes Pep Guardiola made to his tactics were the winning difference against a stellar team performance from Juventus. Following a 2-2 draw in Turin in the first leg, Max Allegri organized his team with the intention of preventing Bayern from finding decisive space where they could attack from. Allegri derived and adapted his match day tactics from those with relatively recent success against Guardiola or recent FC Barcelona teams modeled after Pep’s work, such as Jose Mourinho and Neil Lennon.

Juventus had all the joy early on, as their impressive defensive organization proved to be difficult to break down. They entered halftime up 2-0 on the match and a 4-2 aggregate lead. The first, from Paul Pogba just five minutes in, was a result of confusion among the Bayern back line following a Sami Khedira through ball to Litchsteiner. Juan Cuadrado doubled in the lead twenty-two minutes later, calmly finishing an incisive counterattack spearheaded by Alvaro Morata.

Bayern Munich, who had problems in their positional play throughout the match, got back into the tie with two late goals coming from headers, the second of which in stoppage time by Thomas Muller. Once extra time began, the home side wore down an exhausted Juventus team, killing off the opponent with a pair of goals in minutes 108 and 110.

The starting selection for Juventus was defensively minded. Paulo Dybala and Claudio Marchisio were forced to sit out due to injury, who were subsequently replaced by Alvaro Morata and Hernanes. Mario Mandzukic made way for Alex Sandro for tactical reasons. The formation that they were playing largely related to their location on the pitch and the phase of play, which will be discussed later on in this piece alongside Alex Sandro’s role.

For the home side, Thiago and Juan Bernat made way for Mehdi Benatia and Xabi Alonso. Arjen Robben, who scored in the first leg, was forced to miss the match due to injury and was replaced by Franck Ribery. On paper, the formation could be best described as a 4-2-4, but as with any Guardiola team, such a description is too simplistic. It largely depended on what phase of attack Bayern were in, as at times Bayern were arranged in a 3-3-4, 4-3-3, or even 2-3-5.

Juventus’ Defensive Approach

Allegri’s side operated differently from a defensive standpoint at multiple stages of the match. The cues for which approach to carry out depended on where Bayern were on the pitch and the phase in the attack they were in. Early on, when Bayern were building up in their defensive half, Juventus implemented a high press. Throughout most of the match, the visitors formed a deep block in their defensive third, clogging up space around the penalty area. The Bavarians struggled to penetrate this deep block on the day and needed extra time alongside tactical adjustments to break through Juventus.

High Pressing

In the first half primarily, Juventus utilized a high press when Bayern Munich were building up in their defensive third. The intent behind this was to stifle the German’s ball circulation and force long passes into the forwards, which the Italian champions fancied themselves winning such duels.

Even if Allegri fielded one recognized striker, his team when the high press was implemented fluctuated between a 3-4-3 and 4-3-3. The front three when pressing comprised of Paul Pogba, Morata, and Sami Khedira from central midfield. Andrea Barzagli would push up to fill in for Khedira’s vacated space to form a 3-4-3 shape.

The three forward press is reminiscent of the tactic that Jose Mourinho’s Real Madrid used against Pep’s Barcelona early on their matches. As Barcelona looked to build up in their defensive third, Mourinho sent three forwards up to press Valdes, Puyol, and Pique, with additional lines of support behind them. In the Clasico of December 2011, this press led to a goal inside the first minute from Karim Benzema thanks to an error from Victor Valdes.

For all the differences that Pep’s Bayern and Barcelona have, the underlying principles in build up are largely the same. Both proactively play out of the back with a similar shape more or less, and the involvement of the goalkeeper is key for ball circluation. Allegri hoped to cause the same sort of difficulty for Bayern’s back five (including Neuer) that Barcelona faced when Mourinho was the opponent.

With Neuer’s participation in possession, he was left open in Juventus’ pressing scheme. In Bayern’s defensive third, Juve managed to equal any numerical advantages Bayern hoped to create. In fact, the visitors created their own numerical superiority in midfield at times. When Neuer was on the ball, he often was forced into playing it long because of a lack of quality options. This was partially due to Bayern’s own issues in positional play, but is also a credit to the quality tactics implemented by Allegri. This led to a goal that was disallowed, as a hectic clearance from Neuer was deflected and found Morata, who was incorrectly ruled offside he chipped the goalkeeper with his first touch.

The press that Juventus used was a man-oriented zonal system, as reflected in the movements of Barzagli and Khedira. When Barzagli pushed up he would occupy the right center midfield role as part of a flat midfield four, with his movements varying both on where the closest man was (usually Vidal or Ribery) and the ball. Bonnuci filled this duty sporadically during the match, but it was mainly Barzagli who was impressive in limiting the Chilean’s influence on the match when building.

Khedira, who pushed into the right halfspace when pressing, mainly focused on Benetia in the early stages of the build up. Once Bayern advanced the ball and progressed, then both Barzagli and Khedira would drop off and begin to form their deep block.

Deep Block

Juventus spent the majority of the match in their own half while Bayern had possession. The early Pogba goal aided this tactic, as they could afford to sit back with less risk and invite Bayern to attack and hopefully catch them on the break. This line of thinking eventually put the Italian champions up 2-0, as Cuadrado finished off a surging counter attack from Morata.

The deep block formed was effective as the areas where Bayern targeted in their positional play were very congested because of Juventus’ excellent compactness. Players such as Thomas Muller, Ribery, and Costa struggled to take advantage of mixed positions they created for themselves. Whenever a player was found in such a spot, Juve were quick to recover and pressure, subsequently denying easy access to penetration. They had great success keeping the hosts in front of them, as Bayern had difficulty breaking through lines and getting in behind.

Alex Sandro in the deep block would drop off and become a left back in a 5-4-1, with Patrice Evra pinching inside to form a center back trio. Evra throughout the whole match was conservative, as Alex Sandro provided reinforcements down the left to keep the Bavarian threats quiet.

When the ball circulated wide, the near side winger and full back would push up to pressure the opposition. The fullback and winger on the far side then pinched in to form a temporary chain of four at the back, creating a 4-5-1 structure.

The role of the wingers in this match, particularly Alex Sandro, draws a lot of parallels to the job that Charlie Mulgrew did for Celtic in 2012 in their famous snatch and grab win against Tito Vilanova’s Barcelona. Neil Lennon fielded Mulgrew, typically a center back, as a left sided midfielder in a deep 4-4-1-1, but was instructed to drop back at times and form a chain of 5 at the back, while Miku then dropped to fill his place. This tightened up the midfield and prevented Barcelona from easily combining around the area.

Lennon’s system was not nearly as tactically complex as Allegri’s, but there is a similarity in the function of Sandro and Mulgrew, perhaps indicating that Allegri drew inspiration from that match.

This dynamic defensive system made sure Juventus always were positionally advantaged no matter where the ball was in their half. It led to Bayern playing a lot of Tiki Taka, as in possession lacking purpose that Pep equates to “shit”, not as it is commonly known, any style of play involving possession. While it is well known that the whole purpose of possession in Guardiola’s positional play model is to move the opponent, Juventus in their deep orientation were always a step ahead of the Bavarians, adding to their issues.

Bayern’s Issues in Attack

The biggest problems for Bayern on their attack, modeled on the philosophy of positional play (more information can be found here), arose from their two central midfielders. Xabi Alonso and Arturo Vidal did not put in good performances. They were not speedy in their ball circulation and took up poor positions in relation to their teammates. On the disallowed Morata goal, Neuer can be seen shouting at Xabi Alonso afterwards, berating him on his horrible positioning, as he was directly behind Alvaro Morata, eliminating himself as an option.

Phase 1 of attack was fine for Bayern Munich, but Vidal and Alonso’s midfield performances made it so they were not effective in Phase 2. Vidal and Alonso were at times extremely far apart, as Vidal would occasionally roam and end up twenty plus meters away from Alonso, with no other player providing central access. Plus, Alonso would gravitate to the ball as he characteristically does, rather than remain in his position and let the attack progress through other players. Typically it goes unpunished against weaker opponents, but Alonso’s attraction to the ball made Bayern’s midfield simple to defend.

Due to this lack of progression in the attack, Lewandowski and Muller were not key factors in the first half. Instead, Bayern were forced to rely on Douglas Costa and Ribery’s dribbling to open up the opponent. However, due to Juve’s impressive defensive structure, the wingers were outnumbered and could do little on the ball.

In response, Pep was forced to make multiple changes if he wanted to win the match.

Pep’s Second Half Adjustments

Juan Bernat entered for Benatia at halftime, with Alaba pushing inside to become a center back. Ribery and Costa switched wings at the beginning of the half in an effort to create better 1v1 opportunities, but this did little to solve Bayern’s larger attacking issues. After 15 minutes of similar issues to those just mentioned, Xabi Alonso finally parted for Kingsley Coman, ironically on loan from Juventus.

Juventus’ second half adjustments were like for like, as Stefano Sturaro, Mario Mandzukic, and Roberto Pererya late on entered for Khedira, Morata, and Cuadrado, with the substitutes tasked to the same as the starting folks. They did not hold up to the same standards as the men they went on for, as their defensive cohesion was not the same as in the opening stages of the game.

Mandzukic was a defensive move, as he limited the counterattack potential for Juventus with his lack of pace, and his aerial ability would be beneficial for defending crosses and set plays.

The commentators for this match in the United States kept calling for Bayern to start sending in numerous crosses into the box since their attack wasn’t working. With the introduction of Coman, more crosses were in fact sent into the box.

However, the logic at which the suggestion of crosses likely differs between Pep and Stewart Robson. Robson was likely calling for more crosses into the box because of an ancient British idea that direct play leads to more goals, which Stan Collymore foolishly tweeted out following Muller’s equalizer in the 90th minute. Pep was likely calling for crosses into Muller and Lewandowski because it was the only way to get behind Juve’s stellar defense, since no other method of penetration was working.

It’s important to understand the differences between crossing for the sake of it and crosses as a means of penetration in behind. Due to deep block of Juventus, space in behind was at a premium. Consequently, crossing was a mechanism in which one could exploit that tight space, as it both pins Juventus back if the runs are well timed and generates forward momentum.

Bayern were not hoofing it to Lewadowski as if he were a target man like Peter Crouch, desperately trying to salvage anything. Instead, they were well timed and clever with their movement in the penalty area, reflected in the goals from Lewadowski and Muller in the late stages of normal time. With it being 4-4 after both legs and no tiebreaker, extra time was in order.

Extra Time

Once extra time came around, Juventus began to run out of energy and the game began to open up. Bayern’s constant possession eventually tired Juve out and opened up the vital spaces they hoped to create in the first 90 minutes. Thiago was introduced for Franck Ribery, playing centrally and Douglas Costa moving back to the wing.

Bayern pulled away at the beginning of the second half of extra time, as clever combination play in the box got Thiago on the scoresheet. Just two minutes later after a failed Juventus attack, Kingsley Coman drove forward and fired one past Gianluigi Buffon to score against his parent club and ensure Bayern’s place in the Champions League quarter finals.

Conclusion

Max Allegri’s Juventus put in the most impressive performance against a full strength Guardiola team I have ever seen today. If it weren’t for Thomas Muller heroics in the 90th minute, he would be the talk of the footballing world, and Pep Guardiola would be called a fraud by those who do not understand his way of doing things.

Guardiola showed his evolution as a tactician with his substitutions and tweaks he made to his team. His team displayed an excellent mentality to comeback from this deficit, something that has always plagued Pep in his career. Historically, his teams have struggled to fight back in the Champions League when falling behind. However, today was different

What this match demonstrates is how physically exhausting it is to defend for an entire match. Allegri got everything spot on for his gameplan, his team just ran out of time. If his team were somehow more fit, the result may have been completely different. Just like how Simeone’s Atletico exhausted themselves in the 2014 Champions League final and couldn’t fight back in extra time, the same occurred here. The next problem to solve for managers is not how to win matches without having the majority of possession, but rather how to pace and condition your team so that they can secure victories in extra time or late on in matches if you play in a style similar to Allegri’s against Bayern.

Follow me on Twitter! @AReynolds70

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