Commissioner Brookes and Commissioner Fiedler, and other distinguished members of the Commission: Thank you for your invitation to testify before you today on the topic of China's relations with North Korea. The views I express today are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take policy positions.

United States policy towards North Korea aims at securing verifiable steps toward denuclearization, which China says it wants, too. The U.S. believes that the best way to achieve this is to increase pressure on Pyongyang through targeted financial measures and conditional engagement. Beijing disagrees. It argues that Pyongyang needs security assurances and encouragement for economic reform, and that someday, these might produce a willingness on Pyongyang's part to give up its nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang's nuclear stockpile continues to expand, the North continues to improve its missile delivery systems, the danger of weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) exports grows, and the threat to U.S. allies increases. One year after the Sunnylands Summit and prior to an expected fourth North Korean nuclear test it is important to ascertain whether, and to what extent, China is actually willing to help resolve the North Korea nuclear problem. What are Chinese priorities towards North Korea? Have Chinese perceptions of North Korea changed since the third nuclear test? How does North Korea factor into Beijing's perception of its own security? To what extent does the U.S.-China relationship affect China's North Korea policy? Is there any convergence in Washington and Beijing's strategic goals, priorities and tools for dealing with North Korea? What does this mean for future U.S. policy? After seeking to answer these questions, my testimony concludes that the idea that China can and will compel Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be the basis for a sound U.S. policy.

China's perspective on denuclearization

Following North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013, Western officials and analysts interpreted Xi Jinping's emphasis on denuclearization – including in his Summit meeting with President Obama at Sunnylands – as a sign of a policy shift and greater alignment between U.S. and Chinese national interests.1 Eager to promote the prospect of gains for the United States from better relations with Beijing, Chinese diplomats have sometimes sought to reinforce that impression. But this shift in rhetoric did not result in China's re-ordering of priorities, nor did it translate into measures to press North Korea to denuclearize. 2 While China does not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons, it wants instability on its periphery even less.

From Beijing's perspective, denuclearization is a long-term endeavor, which first requires Pyongyang to receive security assurances that create stability around it.3 Chinese conventional wisdom holds that no amount of pressure will induce Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program without fundamental concessions from the U.S. Even when Chinese analysts4 believe that North Korea's weapon procurement activities threaten to undermine China's strategic interests, many in Beijing believe that North Korea is simply trying to guarantee its security in the face of external threats from the U.S. Therefore, Chinese analysts believe it is up to Washington to address the root cause of the North Korea nuclear problem by easing Pyongyang's security concerns; they say, "The one who ties the knot is responsible for untying it (解铃还需系铃人)."5 The types of concessions include: diplomatic normalization, a peace treaty, and the lifting of sanctions – none of which are likely.6 Without these concessions, Beijing argues that imposing punishing pressure on North Korea to denuclearize would weaken the regime and decrease stability – the proposed solution would make the primary problem worse. Instead Chinese officials have recommended that the U.S. first focus on nonproliferation or a testing moratorium.7

China prioritizes stability over denuclearization because of a vastly different perception than the U.S. of the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea.8 While North Korea's nuclear tests and other nuclear developments are viewed in China as inimical to its national interests and regional security and stability, Beijing does not see North Korea's actions as directly targeting China. Beijing's biggest worries are the possibility of military confrontation between North Korea and the U.S., regime collapse, or North Korean reunification with South Korea leading to a U.S. military presence north of the 38th parallel. Beijing also worries that collapse or Korean unification could lead to unrest amongst the over one million ethnic Koreans in its northeastern provinces, which would be aggravated through a flood of refugees. There are also concerns that a reunified Korea could make territorial claims on China's Yanbian region based on the boundaries of the ancient Korean kingdom of Korguryo, which extends into present-day China. In the minds of leaders in Beijing, support for Pyongyang helps to ensure a friendly nation on China's northeastern border, and provides a buffer zone between it and democratic South Korea, which is home to 28,500 U.S. troops. While Beijing would prefer that North Korea renounce its nuclear program, it can more easily stomach a de facto nuclear North Korea strategically aligned with Beijing than war or collapse. The execution of Jang Song-Thaek, the husband of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's aunt known for his close ties to China, only exacerbated Chinese concerns about the viability of the Kim regime, making it more averse to punitive measures. Beijing has since asserted that the regime is again "stable," the purge having helped Kim Jong-un solidify his position, with an improving economic and food situation.9 Yet Beijing continues to shield North Korea from stronger economic sanctions and other more punitive measures.

China sees the nuclear issue as just one component of its broader bilateral relationship with North Korea10, which is based on a policy of sustaining the country and seeking to integrate it more fully into the world economy.11 Chinese officials describe economic engagement as part of a long-term process that will ultimately alter North Korea's strategic calculus regarding the role of nuclear weapons.12 China believes that its own "opening and reform" experience offers North Korea an example of how such a process increases the likelihood of state and Party survival.

But after three decades of coaxing Pyongyang to implement economic reform, including inviting all three Kims to tour China's special economic zones, there are no signs that North Korea has been willing to undertake structural reforms to spur genuine national economic growth. Kim Jong Il feared that instead of leading to Chinese-style economic growth, reform in North Korea would engender an East German-style collapse. Kim Jong-un has shown himself to be just as resistant to economic reform as his predecessors.13

Promoting economic exchange with North Korea is also integral to Beijing's policy to ensure stability and economic development in its Northeast "rust belt" region of 100 million people, where high unemployment and inequality has been a source of past unrest. In large part due to China, including startling growth in bilateral trade, North Korea's economy continues to show steady improvement since 2009.14

Beijing also arguably maintains an interest in the survival of the North Korean regime for its own domestic legitimacy. As Xi works to bolster the Communist Party's standing through an ambitious anti-corruption campaign and economic reform plans, he would hardly welcome a global spotlight—or worse, Chinese public attention—on the failure of a communist regime next door. Collapse across the border of a government that China fought to preserve at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives, including the son of the PRC's founding leader, Mao Zedong, might cause the Chinese public to further probe its own government, especially at a time when liberal intellectuals have called for political reform alongside Xi's ambitious economic changes. 15

Compounding China's reluctance to turn against North Korea is the growing demand by Asian coastal states for a stronger U.S. role in the region (primarily due to Chinese assertiveness in maritime disputes); and the perceived "fall" of Burma/Myanmar to Western political values (a country which not long ago counted China as its only friend). China doesn't want to be surrounded by countries that have transitioned into Western-friendly regimes. So while the value of North Korea as a military buffer against the U.S. and its allies—in the age of long-range strike capabilities and U.S. naval dominance—can be debated, North Korea's viability is still politically important to Beijing.

Ultimately, as Chinese officials publicly indicate willingness to cooperate with the United States, they privately say that there is not much Beijing is willing or able to do to curtail North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Beijing still does not want—nor does it feel able within the confines of its policy of "no instability" and "no regime change"—to implement punitive measures that might push North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons or to withdraw its economic safety net. Indeed, the belief is that such attempts could decrease stability and make the situation worse.

Beijing's threat perception

Despite longstanding historical and ideological ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, there isn't much affection left between the two nations. North Korea remains highly suspicious of China and resents its larger neighbor the more it depends on it for survival. North Koreans believe Beijing has betrayed the communist cause by turning capitalist and making deals with the West. As a result of this distrust, North Korea doesn't even allow China, a defense treaty ally, to observe its military exercises.

Beijing grudgingly tolerates its wayward neighbor, which it sees as both a strategic liability and an asset—a necessary evil. It perceives the relationship as one between a patron and client where the client is unruly and ungrateful. According to China's hierarchical view of international relations, smaller powers should cede to its will.16 Pyongyang doesn't. But larger geopolitical calculations—in which the U.S. is central—dictate that China's interest in maintaining the North Korean regime and a divided peninsula is not contingent on good relations with Pyongyang.

Chinese mistrust of the U.S. is the primary obstacle to cooperation with the United States on North Korea. China's understanding of American motives is the primary determinant of Chinese decisions about how to evaluate and respond to North Korean threats.17 When China looks at North Korea, it does so through an East Asian strategic lens with growing rivalry with the United States as the focal point. Despite its interests being seriously harmed by North Korean behavior, Beijing believes that Washington and its allies pose a larger threat to China's strategic interests than Pyongyang does. Consensus amongst analysts in Beijing is that the U.S.-led bloc is using North Korea and tensions in the South and East China Seas as excuses to deepen the Asia rebalance, strengthen regional alliances, expand military exercises and move missile defense and military assets to the region. China is increasingly uncomfortable with long-standing U.S. defense relationships with countries around China's periphery (including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan).18 From the Chinese perspective, China-North Korea relations are intrinsically part of Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition in East Asia.19 As long as China continues to view the U.S. with such strategic mistrust and suspicion, a fundamental shift in its policy toward North Korea remains unlikely.

Chinese policymakers believe that Washington's rigid policy towards North Korea and its military deployments and exercises are as much to blame for instability in the region as North Korea's intransigence, and actually exacerbate the threat of nuclear proliferation.20 Following North Korea's sinking of the South Korean naval vessel the Cheonan on 26 March 2010 and the shelling of South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010 China's initial reaction was to dismiss international calls to pressure North Korea and instead criticize the U.S. and South Korea for the military exercises held in response, which it viewed as a more serious threat to both its own and regional security than the North Korean provocations. 21

Many Chinese analysts worry more about another North Korean conventional attack on South Korea than a nuclear test. Not only do they believe that a conventional provocation has a higher likelihood of sparking conflict now than in 2010, but given their belief that the ultimate U.S. aim is to change the regime in North Korea, a provocation could be used by Washington to accomplish this.

Underneath all of this, Chinese diplomats worry that North Korea will turn on them by cutting a deal with Washington, or at least thaw relations, which could lead to a hostile state on the border aligned with the U.S. Especially since the downturn in China-North Korea ties, China is concerned that applying pressure could backfire, with North Korea deciding to use the U.S. or other countries to plot a course independent from Beijing.22 One Chinese analyst said that because of the division of labor in dealing with North Korea where China plays "good cop" to the U.S. "bad cop," there was concern about the reaction Beijing would get if China also turned into a bad cop.23

In part for this reason, China has expended significant diplomatic energy trying to revive the moribund Six Party Talks, which last convened in 2008. While Western diplomats had hoped the process would ensure that China would exert pressure on North Korea to change course, Beijing had different hopes. China prioritized the talks because as Chair, it was guaranteed a central role in setting international policy toward the DPRK. Beijing never expected that the talks would resolve the issue, rather, the process kept negotiations open and lessened the possibility of crises escalating, while allowing Beijing to exert control over the international response by ensuring interaction with and influence over all parties. According to a senior MOFA official, China's primary goal with the Six-Party Talks was to "keep them talking and not fighting." China also used the talks as a forum to blame other countries' policies, South Korean domestic politics or the Japanese focus on the abduction issue, for the failure to rein in Pyongyang.24

Chinese analysts joke that the names of the two top officials responsible for the Six Party Talks, Wu Dawei (武大伟), and Xu Bu (徐步), are homonyms in Mandarin for "no big movement" (无大为) and "slow steps" (徐步). In one decade of the process, the DPRK conducted two underground nuclear tests, four long-range missile flight tests, torpedoed a South Korean naval patrol boat and shelled a South Korean island, without ever losing China's political and economic support.

One of the primary motivations for Beijing to get tough with Pyongyang is concern about U.S. "shows of force" such as B-2 and B-52 flights over South Korea, combined exercises with allies, and missile defense measures. The U.S.' taking these actions has been successful in getting Beijing to agree to limited sanctions and to take other tactical measures following Pyongyang's provocations. But they also reinforce the suspicion that the U.S. is using tensions on the Peninsula as a justification to expand its regional military presence. Given Chinese strategic culture and the perspectives shaping Chinese understanding of U.S. policy, Chinese analysts are prone to interpret American actions almost anywhere in the world as secretly directed against China.25

Chinese experts also view other countries' renunciation of their nuclear-weapon pursuits at the hands of the U.S. as tantamount to regime change and collapse.26 In support of this view, they often cite the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Libya in March 2011. Since the Ukraine crisis, Chinese analysts regularly invoke that case as further evidence that the model of security for disarmament is a failure.27

Moreover, Chinese analysts say that Washington's handling of Ukraine is evidence of the relative weakening of U.S. power. This fits with a general perception in Beijing that a U.S. decline is happening faster than they expected, while China's rise is faster than anticipated.28 As such, China feels more confident in resisting pressure from Washington on North Korea than just a few years ago. This combines with Xi Jinping's more active role in defending Chinese interests around the world than his predecessors. Chinese analysts say that Beijing will continue to challenge whatever constitutes Washington's "red line" in East Asia, hoping to change it gradually by testing American focus and resolve. All of which gives North Korea more breathing room.

At the same time, many in Beijing have come to believe that the U.S. is willing to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea. After President Obama declared a "red line" on chemical weapons in Syria, Chinese strategists speculated about what a similar red line might constitute in North Korea. Their guesses varied from proliferation to miniaturization capability. According to one analyst, "so far the Obama administration has achieved nothing towards the goal of denuclearization. If I were North Korea, judging from the cases of Libya, Syria, or Ukraine, my idea is that that I would still have a 4th or 5th chance."30 Chinese analysts have dubbed "strategic patience" as "strategic ignorance." Yet China is more comfortable living with this than any harder-line strategy, as it gives the appearance that Beijing is cooperating with the U.S. by engaging in dialogue, supporting UN resolutions and publicly rebuking Pyongyang from time to time.

China also tries to make use of North Korean behavior to increase its leverage over the U.S. and ROK and its influence in the UN.31 Chinese strategists regularly question whether the U.S. would consider trading support for regional allies embroiled with China in maritime sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas—China's top foreign policy challenges—in exchange for more cooperation on North Korea.32 If the U.S. continues to try to "contain China," one analyst stated, Beijing will feel less "encouraged" to be tough with Pyongyang.33 With reference to President Obama's April 2014 trip to Japan and the Philippines, another analyst said, "If you really want China to focus on the DPRK nuclear issue you need to be quiet in criticizing China on every single island issue. China has a policy of dealing with those islands with the relevant countries, not with U.S. involvement."34 At the same time, China is so preoccupied with thwarting Japan—with its U.S. alliance—that coaxing North Korea into concessions recedes in comparison as a regional priority.

New tactics, old strategy

Beijing was angry and disappointed with Pyongyang following the space launches and third nuclear test in 2013. Leaders were surprised by the suddenness and volume of Kim Jong-un's threats, especially when compared with his more calculating father. Beijing interpreted North Korea's acts as a "slap in the face" given its efforts at the time to restart the Six Party Talks as well its stern warnings issued to the North not to proceed. Adding to this was fear that the test would invite U.S. involvement, and the fact that the timing couldn't have been worse: during Beijing's once-in-a-decade leadership transition, which saw signs of fierce factional struggles.35 The leadership needed to spend time on domestic issues as opposed to international crises, and it was already in the midst of a major crisis with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Moreover, the third nuclear test took place during the Chinese New Year, the country's most important holiday, when officials try to take their longest vacation of the year.

Beijing therefore felt it had to respond strongly. It issued robust warnings; emphasized the importance of denuclearization; demonstrated solidarity with South Korea; supported tightened UN Security Council sanctions, devoted significant energy to resuming the Six Party Talks, and allowed another vibrant internal debate on North Korea.36 Chinese diplomats openly vented their frustration with U.S. diplomats.37

There were also more open conversations in Beijing about North Korean provocative behavior and how to deal with it. There was a more concentrated search than in earlier years for more effective instruments to restrain North Korea, by exploring different ways of encouraging Pyongyang to fall into line. But no consensus was reached on viable options that might produce results without risking a change to the status quo, which was seen as worse.

In the end, China's moves remained tactical, short-term and reactive, aimed at trying to rein in Pyongyang's provocations and bring it back to talks, as opposed to decisive punitive steps with a view to bringing about denuclearization. These tactical adjustments were termed by analysts as, "meting out rewards and punishment accordingly" (奖惩分明). China's motive was to convey disappointment with Pyongyang in order to deter further provocations, which it believed could drive the U.S. to upgrade regional missile defense deployments and step up military exercises in the region. Western analysts interpreted Chinese moves—especially the more strident rhetoric and internal debate—as a sign that the China was moving closer to the U.S. position. But these were not accompanied by any broader shift in policy or strategic priorities. Chinese analysts explained Xi's sterner rhetoric was due to his bolder and blunter manner: a "change of leadership style rather than policy."38

After reacting to the third nuclear test, Beijing soon fell back on its usual playbook: once Pyongyang walked back its hostile rhetoric, China tried to bury it as quickly as possible by playing up non-threatening DPRK action as a positive step forward. Beijing appealed to the United States to loosen conditions for returning to talks with Pyongyang. President Xi Jinping then angered the U.S. by dispatching Vice-President Li Yuanchao to Pyongyang in July 2013 where he attended North Korea's military parade marking the 60th anniversary of the end of Korean War.39 The presence of such a high-level Chinese official next to Kim Jong-un on the podium inspecting parading soldiers and a missile arsenal while Pyongyang celebrated victory in the Korean War was a potent symbol—especially so soon after the third nuclear test. The decision showed that China's pique over North Korea's actions earlier in the year didn't preclude it from moving relatively quickly again to shore up the bilateral relationship.

Internal debates and the actors who decide their outcome

While the fundamentals of Beijing's North Korean policy remain unchanged, there are a greater variety of views on North Korea now than before. Robust internal debates take place between those proposing a stronger line against Pyongyang and those who support the continuation of substantial political and economic support. Signs of such discussions were evident after the first nuclear test in 2006, with another debate following the 2009 provocations, and again following the 2013 nuclear test. Although many in the West point to these debates as a sign of a policy shift, Beijing's basic strategic calculations remain unchanged. As one high-level Chinese diplomat said during the 2009 debate, "Our mindset has changed, but the length of our border has not."40 The 2009 debate ended with then-Premier Wen Jiabao's "goodwill trip" to North Korea to mark the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic relations on 4 October 2009, when he brought a high-powered delegation with a wide range of opportunities for economic engagement with nary a mention of the denuclearization issue.41

A notable difference between the 2009 and 2013 debates was increased criticism of the U.S. in 2013, with more voices critiquing the Chinese government for permitting a situation in which the U.S. could use North Korea to strengthen its military presence around China.

There are several reasons for the continuing gap between domestic criticism and government policy on North Korea. Space for media, experts and academics to argue has been expanding, especially for those in the 'abandonment school' who are often liberal intellectuals and academics who have more freedom to speak than those directly involved in policy.42

Indeed, despite the increased internal criticism of North Korea, traditional voices and institutions continue to dominate government policy thinking. One institution that exerts significant influence on North Korea policy is the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—whose shared military history with the country and distrust of U.S. military power makes it a supporter of the traditional line. Even though the PLA has frustrations with North Korea—exemplified by the fact that it is not permitted to observe exercises of the Korean People's Army—the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty remains intact. Assuming that recent reports about leaked Chinese military contingency plans for North Korea are real, it is not surprising that they make reference to how North Korean political and military leaders should be given protection from another "military power" (the U.S.).43

The Communist Party of China's (CPC) Central Committee's International Liaison Department (ILD), in charge of party-to-party diplomacy44, has also played a key role in North Korean policy-making.45 While it used to be the main facilitator of relations with North Korea, relations between the ILD and Korean Workers Party have been strained.46 There has also been an attempt to achieve "normal state-to-state relations" by having the relationship managed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).47 The more moderate Ministry is generally relegated to a more subordinate, implementation role, and thrusting it into a more prominent role in relations with North Korea does not seem to have reaped any better results. Officials privately lament that the MFA doesn't have the necessary channels or access, certainly nothing on par with the ILD, making it difficult to engage in effective diplomacy with Pyongyang. All of these actors furthermore operate in an environment characterized by consensus decision-making and bureaucratic inertia.

Finally, frustration with North Korea generally reflects a generational divide, with younger persons taking to the Internet with stark criticism while older, more conservative citizens still dominate policy circles. Given that China's youth overwhelmingly view their neighbor with pity and contempt, one cannot rule out these opinions altering future policy. But for now, there is still a significant gap between how Chinese people feel about North Korea and what their government is willing to do.

Policy tools: economic engagement over sanctions

In addition to divergence in strategic approach, the U.S. and China differ in their preferred tools to promote North Korean nuclear disarmament. Whereas Washington sees diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and deterrence as essential, Beijing sees diplomatic engagement and dialogue, economic cooperation and security assurances as the preferred ways to induce a change of mindset in Pyongyang, which could lead to denuclearization in the long term.

Beijing engages in a balancing act in the UN, supporting sanctions in the hope that they might restrain the U.S. and its allies and encourage North Korea to return to talks; while at the same time negotiating to weaken the sanctions to mitigate damage to the North Korean regime.48 This effort has involved long hours of negotiation over loopholes, clauses limiting the scope of inspections, and carve-outs to prevent disruption to commercial activities and economic linkages.49 Beijing also consistently emphasizes that implementation must be proportionate, moderate and aimed only at bringing the sides back to talks, not at undermining or weakening the regime.50 China's dislike of sanctions partly derives from its own experience of being the object of them.51

China's implementation record has been underwhelming not only throughout the history of UN sanctions against North Korea52, but even after UNSC Resolution 2094 (2013) which Chinese officials privately admitted was the first sanctions resolution they were making a genuine effort to implement.53 According to a Western diplomat, the Chinese implement sanctions "to the letter" but not the spirit of the resolutions.54 In cases where Beijing has taken high-visibility measures—such as issuing of a list of banned "dual-use" exports to North Korea—Chinese diplomats have been subsequently unwilling or unable to provide evidence of implementation, despite repeated requests. And the widely touted 7 May 2013 Bank of China closure of North Korean Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) accounts was more symbolic than substantive. 55 The move had not been ordered by the government, other state-owned financial institutions did not act similarly, and almost all financial transactions were already being undertaken outside major Chinese banks through third countries, Chinese local banks, or by skirting the banking system altogether. Bank of China had previously severed interaction with North Korea in 2005 after the Banco Delta Asia action and meetings with U.S. officials.56 Nor did Beijing interpret the FTB as a target under Resolution 2094, but rather the bank was formally sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury via Executive Order 13382, which froze its assets in the U.S. and prohibited U.S.-based entities from transacting with it.57

With regard to bilateral economic relations, sanctions have driven business more underground in a grey market that is difficult to track. Chinese private firms have been expanding their interactions with North Korean state trading companies inside of China's national economy, improving the commercial well being of North Korean regime elites back in Pyongyang. These Chinese private firms have significantly bolstered Pyongyang's ability to procure dual-use components.58

Recommendations

Because Beijing and Washington have such divergent viewpoints and priorities, there seems little likelihood of achieving common policies toward North Korea. China shares neither the U.S. priority on denuclearization nor its desire to accomplish peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Pressure from the United States is not likely to change the fundamentals of China's policy. The idea that China can and will compel Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be the basis for sound U.S. policy.

The basic choice for U.S. policymakers is therefore between trying to change China's perception of its self interest and attempting to find a more collaborative approach that exploits the advantages of China's engagement efforts and U.S.-led multilateral pressure. It is possible for the U.S. to raise the stakes on Beijing for failing to bring more pressure to bear on Pyongyang. But given the great number of strategically important issues on which U.S. and Chinese cooperation is essential, it would not be wise to push the bilateral relationship to the breaking point in an effort to bring about a fundamental change in Beijing's approach.

Fortunately, it should be possible to get China to do more on the coercive side of the equation while still accepting that Chinese and U.S. approaches to the goal of denuclearization will inevitably differ.

The U.S. should be able to persuade China to act more strongly to deter or respond to any new DPRK long-range missile launches or nuclear tests. Beijing might agree, for example, to some new increment of punishment after any nuclear test, ballistic missile flight-test or space launch. The U.S. could unilaterally complement such Chinese moves by strengthening enforcement of export controls on dual-use items and other targeted sanctions.

U.S. legislation that imposes "Iran-style" sanctions against firms that do business with North Korean entities that have been found to be engaging in the transfer of items and technology that could support North Korea's missile program ballistic missile trade, as well as the banks that makes those business transactions is also possible. Even absent additional legislation, the U.S. has a range of existing measures and authorities that it has not fully implemented against Pyongyang.59 Targeted financial measures are largely self-executing; responses are quick and require little additional official pressure. Banks and businesses become reluctant to engage with North Korea for fear of their own reputation and losing access to the U.S. banking system. The President has the authority to dramatically expand the range of banks and companies deemed of "special concern" for money laundering purposes; this in turn would generate uncertainty for all companies dealing with those entities and banks in particular.

China holds the key to implementing sanctions on North Korea. The U.S. should consider pushing back when China does not deliver on both the letter and spirit of existing sanctions, by more publicly pushing China to enforce sanctions. When the U.S. starts with a list of 40 entities to sanction and Beijing eventually agrees to three, Washington could choose to point out the gap and work with other countries to try to sanction those entities, rather than declare victory. Washington could also increase public criticism of China for permitting North Korea to use its airspace, land border, and waters to transfer illicit items to other countries in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Criticism from the United Nations has not been forthcoming because China manages to consistently block mention of incidents of non-compliance by the UNSCR 1874 Panel of Experts in their reporting on sanctions implementation. Downplaying obstacles has not resulted in better cooperation, and has arguably made the Chinese more comfortable in doing less.

The United States should continue to intensify its military and counter-proliferation activities by stepping up missile defense cooperation and combined exercises with Japan and South Korea. These actions have been successful in getting Beijing to agree to limited sanctions and take other tactical measures following Pyongyang's provocations, but not more.

Another potential route is for the United States to attempt to forge a joint approach with China. If China insists on continuing with its "acupuncture" approach—cutting back on items with military relevance while deepening investments in infrastructure and resource extraction—perhaps the U.S. could accept this in return for stricter implementation of dual-use trade controls. Two tracks have always existed in North Korean sanctions: stopping military and dual-use trade; and punitive measures involving luxury goods, the latter ostensibly with the aim of trying to make it more difficult for Kim Jong-Un to reward his loyalists. This approach has not been successful given that China's preferred approach is to entice the North Koreans into cooperation by deepening economic ties. The options are either to redouble U.S. efforts to attempt to persuade Beijing to engage in a more punitive overall trade strategy—a nearly hopeless goal—or to discuss with it trading stricter enforcement of dual-use export controls and the like in return for a less punitive overall economic sanctions regime.

The United States could expand efforts to get as much information about the outside world as possible into North Korea through multiple channels; radio and internet broadcasting, investments in internet censorship evasion technologies, transmittal of DVDs, CDs, computer thumb drives, and other means. Kim Jong-un fears this more than sanctions.60 More openly seeking regime change—or at least a major change in the regime's policies and priorities—is another potential option.61 While the current approach is aimed at inducing change in North Korea's behavior, many in the U.S government have become convinced that this is likely to be impossible under the current regime. However, shifting to an outright strategy of regime change—an approach that China categorically rejects—would represent a significant shift in the diplomatic framing of U.S. policy towards North Korea. It would have very serious implications for any U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea as well as on the larger bilateral relationship.

The United States should consider supporting limited, targeted engagement with North Korea, carried out by non-governmental organizations and UN agencies such as UNICEF. At the very least, people-to-people initiatives, including the long-delayed reciprocal visit to the United States by the national symphony of the DPRK, should be encouraged rather than blocked.62 Such initiatives serve the purpose of transmitting information to the North Korean people about the outside world. They can also address some purely humanitarian concerns in the areas of public health, child welfare, nutrition, and education. They have the added advantage of enhancing U.S. understanding of the North Korean state and may provide early warning of significant changes in North Korea's policies and priorities.

Finally forging close trilateral cooperation among the U.S., the ROK, and Japan is essential to achieving U.S. objectives of denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Tensions between the ROK and Japan are undermining U.S. security interests in the region as Washington struggles to present a united front in dealing with a nuclear North Korea and rising China. Important steps have been taken in recent months to try to encourage reconciliation between Seoul and Tokyo, but there is still more that must be done to facilitate mutual trust and cooperation between these two vital U.S. allies. And while Washington does not want to be placed in the position of mediating the difficult territorial and historical issues which have undermined relations between the President Park and Prime Minster Abe administrations, neither can the United States afford to allow the current impasse to linger indefinitely.