Thanks to western sanctions and the Kremlin’s bans on foreign imports, Russia’s economic prospects look gloomy. In September, inflation reached a three-year peak, and could exceed 8 percent by the end of the year. Sliding crude oil prices, growth stagnation, capital flight, and the recent devaluation of Russia's sovereign debt to the second-lowest investment-grade rating leave little room for optimism. The current climate will ultimately increase social instability—indeed, it is already showing signs of doing so. And despite the arrogant speech Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered at the Valdai Discussion Club, an invite-only gathering of prominent journalists and policymakers held in Sochi last week, he has real reasons to worry.

It’s trivial to point out that Russia, ranking 127 out of 177 countries in Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, is an extremely corrupt country (in fact, TI estimates likely understate the reality). Putin’s kleptocratic system, brilliantly described by Karen Dawisha in a new book (which Cambridge University Press refused to publish earlier this year), has redistributed hydrocarbon profits in exchange to both the so-called core elites (people from the closest pro-Putin circles) and mass constituencies (through pay increases for public sector employees who constitute about 70% of Russia’s middle class, ISRAS estimates) in exchange for unquestioned loyalty. As various kleptocratic schemes evolved under Putin’s rule in the last decade, Russia has fallen about 50 places on the CPI index.

Putin’s main problem is that the system he built up is almost entirely based on material reimbursement. Personalistic regimes like the one he has built sustain the loyalty of their supporters almost entirely through access to material rewards, and they are extremely vulnerable to economic catastrophe. Unlike other political systems, neopatrimonial states have no alternative methods of ensuring support. In institutionalized autocratic systems like China, loyalty can be exchanged for partial power-sharing; in ideological systems like the USSR, moral commitment to ideological values and ideals may sustain elite loyalty. But in a political system built on corruption, the redistribution of capital is the primary method of getting and keeping political support.

For most of the previous decade, the Kremlin enjoyed a continuously expanding economy and increasing resource inflows; Putin had no problem buying the loyalty of the elites while maintaining the support of the Russian populace. So long as the economy was soaring, average Russians remained loyal to the authorities. But things started to change as early as 2011, when Boris Nemtsov, a Russian opposition leader, remarked, “Everyone is unhappy with Putin, save perhaps his closest friends.”