The book caused a slight stir in India, because it claims that soon after the 26/11 siege of Mumbai, the then ISI chief, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha, had told Haqqani at his official residence in Washington that “the people involved in the attack was ours, but it was not our operation.”



“A provocative and controversial history, revealing the depth of the links between the Army and Islamic radicals” says the back page blurb attributed to the BBC. But it is a lot more than that.

Haqqani, by virtue of having served as ‘adviser to four Pakistani Prime Ministers’, had insider access to the highest echelons of government there. In this book, he argues that it is Pakistan’s pathological obsession about parity with India which keeps alive the intense enmity between the two nations, and exposes the perfidies of that nation through some fascinating insider insights, anecdotes, and historical detail.

In a chapter on the nuclear issue, he quotes a ‘depressed’ brigadier who believes India should be nuked, swearing that he doesn’t mind if his own children get wiped out in the Indian retaliation.

He also quotes the infamous AQ Khan, the ‘father’ of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, as saying that Pakistanis and Indians were essentially different because ‘We are Muslims, they are Hindus. We eat cows, they worship cows. That we lived on the same land and spoke the same language does not make us the same people.”

Kashmir, says Haqqani, is not the cause of conflict between the two states, but rather a symptom of it. And “the strong belief in the righteousness of Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir has never been accompanied by a coherent strategy or a well-considered endgame to get it.”

On the face of it, this book guarantees that Haqqani will not get a hero’s welcome if he ever returns to Pakistan.

But a deeper reading reveals a disturbing, if not downright sinister subplot.

A few excerpts are needed to understand this:

On the nuclear issue: “India, singleminded in its quest for global power status, has never been willing to discuss, let alone make any concessions on nuclear issues that could dampen the nuclear competition in the subcontinent…” and “India, intent on seeing itself in global rather than regional terms, seems willing to ignore the dangers inherent in possession of nuclear weapons by two bitter neighbours.”

On Kashmir: While Pakistani has been reacting ‘emotionally’, without a real game plan, “India has been more deliberate in each move on the strategic chessboard. It has made and violated promises as part of a considered blueprint…whether by force or by consent, India has gradually integrated the Kashmiri population into the Indian nation.”

On the fallout of Partition: Despite Gandhi’s belief that Pakistanis needed to be won over, “Nehru and his powerful Home Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel, however, treated Pakistan more with the disdain that Mughal emperors showed towards their renegade provinces…” thus sparking resentment and concerns over Indian intentions in Pakistan.

It gets far more overt in the final chapter, titled ‘The Space for Friendship is Shrinking’.

“In recent years, India and Pakistan are increasingly resembling each other in rage, resentment, and public displays of religion,” avers Haqqani. “Differences between a ‘secular India’ and a ‘semi-theocratic’ Pakistan are still obvious but they are looking a little less pronounced.”

The ending clinches it. “The Pakistani Poet Fehmida Riaz in her poem ‘Tum bilkul hum jaise nikle’ (Turned out you were just like us) reflects the wistfulness of secular Pakistanis who, while working for Pakistan to overcome its religious passions and fury, have ended up having to see India become more like Pakistan.”

In other words, while denouncing Pakistan for constantly seeking parity with India, Haqqani subtly manages to do just that.

I am sorry, Mr Haqqani, but ‘hum bilkul aap jaise nahin hain’. We are not like you at all.