In April 2013, RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) released a report detailing the outcome of a busy 2012 for the coalition government in the Gulf. It reported that David Cameron had agreed to a ‘Joint Defence Partnership’ with the UAE on the back of negotiations for the sale of Typhoon fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman. These developments came after a visit by the then Defence Secretary Philip Hammond to Bahrain which resulted in the signing of a Bahrain-UK defence cooperation agreement. Then in December 2014, the British press began to report on a deal being reached between the United Kingdom and Bahrain, whereby Britain would gain a new naval facility capable of servicing the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers. The Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, stated that this was part of the United Kingdom’s renewed long term commitment to the Gulf . This was given backing by comments made by his predecessor Phillip Hammond, the current Foreign Secretary. Hammond asserted that as the US pivoted towards the Asia-Pacific, the US’ European partners, particularly France and Britain, would have to take up additional responsibilities in the Middle East and North Africa. These events led some to herald these developments as Britain’s return to a previously abandoned concept in British foreign policy terminology: ‘East of Suez’.

‘East of Suez’ to this day remains a complex term which has heavy association with Britain’s imperial past and the debate over Britain’s role in the post-War world. In its most simplistic form, East of Suez denoted a broad set of defence commitments to British territories, interests and states that Britain was obligated to protect through agreements, east of the Suez Canal. This policy relied upon extensive facilities in Aden and Singapore and some 80,000 personnel to support the British armed forces in reacting to crisis in places such as Kuwait, Borneo and Jordan. The reasons behind the decision to terminate this policy by the Wilson government provoked considerable debate. The conventional explanation focuses on the pressure on the Pound which led to a series of reductions in defence spending under Healy’s guiding mantra that defence policy should reflect “value for money”. There are also, however, other explanations. One of the main focuses of the policy was Britain’s commitment to the Malaysia during its Confrontation with Indonesia. When this campaign ended in 1966, however, the justification for a significant British presence in South East Asia became devalued. In the Middle East, the announcement that by 1968 Britain would withdraw from Aden also impacted upon the policy’s relevance. These developments coincided with controversial defence decisions such the scrapping of the CVA-01 carrier programme which impacted upon the future capability of the armed forces to carry out this policy.

In announcing the end of East of Suez by 1971 in November 1967, the Wilson government had ostensibly put the question of Britain’s role in the world to rest when it ceased Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role and moved towards a European and NATO focus. However, this narrative is simplistic. It primarily ignores Britain’s continued, if not more nuanced, role in the Middle East. The Royal Navy, for example continued to actively patrol the region and to this day the Middle East remains the second most frequented region by Royal Navy vessels. It also ignores Britain’s willingness to uphold the existing order in the Southern Gulf against the encroachment of communism, as demonstrated by the deployment of the SAS in support of the Omani Sultan until 1975. Of course, Britain’s role in both wars against Iraq cannot be ignored in this narrative. Therefore this illustration of retreat by Britain from the Gulf to the Atlantic world disregards that while the rhetoric might have been abandoned, Britain retained its traditional state relationships in the Gulf and that Britain’s activity in the Middle East simply evolved.

If we were therefore to accept that the termination of ‘East of Suez’ existed mainly in the realms of the rhetorical, how do these recent events fit into this picture? In exploring this it is important to recall that 2014 was a turbulent time in British defence and foreign policy. The British armed forces ended their combat mission in Afghanistan and the Army’s withdrawal from Germany continues apace. Therefore what appears as a time of retrenchment could actually be a time of flexibility as Britain’s commitments come closer into line with its means. The RUSI report noted that these initiatives are all part of reinvigorated and ‘smart’ British presence in the Middle East. Smart, in that it avoids the sluggish Imperial-style commitments of the past and takes on a far more flexible appearance predicated on training facilities, the ability to rotate forces and on the whole avoid a large scale commitment of forces.

The news of a Royal Navy facility in Bahrain builds upon existing Royal Navy infrastructure which exists in the form of its United Kingdom Maritime Component Command in Bahrain. The RAF also operates facilities in both Qatar and the UAE. Furthermore, Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards when discussing the then new multi-national Joint Expeditionary Force spoke of elements of the JEF playing a role of “reassuring and deterring in the region”. To lend further weight to this, he highlighted the utility of Royal Navy’s upcoming carriers in providing a range of policy options for the British government and the army’s deployable brigades potentially developing working relationships with partners in the Gulf. Perhaps the boldest of his assertions was that “Should the need arise for another Libya-style operation, we will be prepared.”. Therefore Britain’s attempts to reinvent its presence in the Gulf places much stock on cooperation with regional partners and on lighter presence which emphasises flexibility.

However, no matter how ostensibly ‘smart’ these plans may be, the concern that the RUSI report noted when it said that these initiatives would be “large enough to ‘get us into trouble’ but too small to get us out of trouble once it starts.” remain plausible. Indeed, Hammond was perhaps too forward in his assurance to those attending the Manama Dialogue when he stated: “Your security is our security”. This claim comes at a time when the Gulf faces continued internal sectarian divisions and a regional sectarian competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. With such assurances to the Gulf States, Britain will effectively be tying its security to a volatile Gulf with commitments that may lack the teeth to deter violence in the region but may be enough to drag Britain into potential quagmire. There is also uncertainty revolving around the Britain’s ability to provide the effective means necessary to back these initiatives. Despite the presence of new challenges in Eastern Europe through growing violence in Eastern Ukraine and the Middle East through sustained violence in Iraq and Syria, it is unclear as to whether Britain will continue to devote 2% of its GDP to defence spending as required by its commitments to NATO. In addition, the country goes to the polls on the 7th of May with defence taking the back foot as an election issue. Whatever the outcome, it remains to be seen if this new found ‘smart assertiveness’ will come into practice following the SDSR of 2015.