Sergey Lavrov just delivered a devastating critique of Russophobia

Sergey Lavrov has been freed. In delivering a blistering defense of Russia’s role in European history and his nation’s ability to shape the post-Cold War global order, the Russian foreign minister just hit back at the West’s ingrained Russophobia that has historically prevented Washington and Europe from viewing Russia as an equal player on the world stage.

“There are also those, both in Russia and outside of it, who believe that Russia is doomed to drag behind, trying to catch up with the West and forced to bend to other players’ rules, and hence will be unable to claim its rightful place in international affairs.”

Not so fast. In an article for Russia in Global Affairs magazine (English-language version here), Lavrov points to over 1,000 years in which Russia has played a pivotal role in European and global history, including the formation of Kievan Rus, the invasion of the Mongol Horde, the Napoleonic invasion of Russia and Russia’s epic roles in World War I and World War II.

In short, says Lavrov, “History doesn’t confirm the widespread belief that Russia has always camped in Europe’s backyard and has been Europe’s political outsider.”

So if Russia has always played such an important role in shaping the future of Western civilization, why has the West consistently treated as Russia as an inferior, backwards upstart?

Blame Russophobia.

Starting nearly 500 years ago, ever since Russia claimed the mantle as the rightful successor to the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the West has been afraid of what Russian greatness might mean. Lavrov writes: “The European countries had apprehensions about the nascent giant in the East and tried to isolate it whenever possible and prevent it from taking part in Europe’s most important affairs.”

Lavrov is not alone here. Prominent historian Walter Laqueur, in his 2015 book “Putinism: Russia and Its Future In the West,” also suggests that Russophobia — “the fear of Russia and all things Russian” — has been an important historical factor in Russia’s development. For the West, Russophobia meant an irrational fear of any new surge in Russian power or ambition. For Russia, it became a way to rationalize the nation’s besieged fortress mentality, leading to a form of reverse Russophobia that he calls “Zapadophobia” (fear of the West). You’d be paranoid, too, if you thought dark forces had continually worked to circumvent, discredit or contain you throughout history.

Throughout his book, Laqueur works through a number of well-known historical examples of Russophobia, settling on the year 1839 when early symptoms morphed into a full-fledged disease:

“The tradition of seeing in Russia a barbarous (or at least semibarbarous) country despite what Peter the Great tried to do goes back to the early 19th century and the publication of the so-called Testament of Peter the Great — which was a forgery by a Polish writer in France. The classic work in this field as the Marquis de Custine’s Russia in 1839… […] Custine became the author of the famous phrase about Russia being an absolute monarchy, a system mitigated only by assassination. He was particularly annoyed by the constant and all-pervasive government spying. The Russian people (he wrote) had been turned into a nation of mutes and automatons… its mentality was one of slaves.”

And that’s what Lavrov has picked up on in his article for Russia in Global Affairs — that this irrational Russophobia of the Western elites has regained momentum as a defining media narrative in Western capitals. And, with the power and reach of the Internet, this media narrative can have an immediate, far-reaching and devastating impact on Russia’s future relations with the West:

“Next year Russia will mark the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Today there is the need to develop a balanced and objective assessment of those events, especially in an environment where, particularly in the West, many are willing to use this date to mount even more information attacks on Russia, and to portray the 1917 Revolution as a barbaric coup that dragged down all of European history. Even worse, they want to equate the Soviet regime to Nazism, and partially blame it for starting World War II.“

Lavrov’s essential fear is that Russophobia will lead to a new containment strategy updated for the post-Cold War era, one that sees Russia as a reconstituted Soviet Union, once again bent on global domination. He quotes George Kennan, the architect of the West’s original containment policy, who recently called NATO expansion to Russia’s borders “a tragic mistake.” Lavrov is also quick to point out that the Cold War did not end in victory or defeat — it was the choice of the Russian people:

“There is no substance behind the popular belief that the Soviet Union’s dissolution signified Western victory in the Cold War. It was the result of our people’s will for change plus an unlucky chain of events.”

Lavrov’s solution to the current global standoff of how to view Russia’s role in the world today is a policy of inclusion and cooperation that will treat Russia as an equal and respected partner of the West and a bridge between East and West:

“Russia is not seeking confrontation with the United States, or the European Union, or NATO. On the contrary, Russia is open to the widest possible cooperation with its Western partners. Moscow believes that the best way to ensure the interests of the peoples living in Europe is to form a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific, so that the newly formed Eurasian Economic Union could be an integrating link between Europe and Asia Pacific. We strive to do our best to overcome obstacles on that way, including the settlement of the Ukraine crisis on the basis of the Minsk Agreements.”

So, on the one hand, you have Russia, which sees itself as unique and important and a major player in the world. And, on the other, you have the West, which views Russia as not part of Europe, as “the other,” as inadequate and as insincere in its efforts to integrate into the world order.

As Lavrov suggests, the ball is now in the West’s court. It can continue to view Russia as the enemy, or it can accept that Russia has a rightful and historical role to play in solving difficult foreign policy issues around the globe.

UPDATE: The full English-language text of the Lavrov article can be found here on the website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.