



17 January 2023

(23-0412)

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**Committee on Agriculture**

**SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 21-22 NOVEMBER 2022**

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT<sup>1</sup>

**1 ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA**

1.1. The Committee on Agriculture (CoA) held its one hundredth and third (103<sup>rd</sup>) regular meeting on 21-22 November 2022 under the Chairpersonship of Mr. Marcel Vernooij of the Netherlands.

1.2. The agenda contained in the convening airgram WTO/AIR/AG/64 circulated on 11 November 2022 was adopted with the following changes:

- Under Agenda item 1 - Review Process:
  - Australia withdrew its question to the Russian Federation concerning its NF:1 notification (AG-IMS ID 103129)
  - The following questions were co-sponsored after the issuance of the convening airgram:

| AG-IMS ID  | SIM # | Specific Implementation Matter (SIM)/Notification concerned       | Question by  | Co-sponsor(s)                                       |
|--|-------|---|--|---|
| <a href="#">103029</a>   | 743   | India's other support for rice                                    | United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Australia          | <b>New Zealand; European Union</b>                  |
| <a href="#">103028</a>   | 767   | India's export restriction measures on rice                       | United States of America, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Paraguay, Australia        | <b>New Zealand; European Union</b>                  |
| <a href="#">103027</a>   | 784   | India's food security policies                                    | United States of America, Japan, Paraguay  | <b>New Zealand</b>                                  |
| <a href="#">103025</a>   | 525   | India's public stockpiling  | United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Australia          | <b>New Zealand; European Union</b>                  |
| <a href="#">103026</a>   | 525   | India's public stockpiling  | United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Ukraine, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Australia | <b>New Zealand; European Union</b>                  |
| <a href="#">103066</a> ,<br><a href="#">103067</a> ,<br><a href="#">103068</a> ,<br><a href="#">103048</a> | 782   | European Union, Norway, Iceland – Prohibitions on access to ports | Russian Federation   | <b>Nicaragua; Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of</b> |
| <a href="#">103060</a>   | 710   | Argentina's export restrictions                                   | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand  | <b>European Union</b>                               |
| <a href="#">103054</a>   | 744   | India's export restrictions on wheat                              | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ukraine   | <b>European Union</b>                               |
| <a href="#">103058</a>   | 729   | Türkiye's export restrictions on agricultural products            | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand  | <b>European Union</b>                               |
| <a href="#">103058</a>   | -     | Malaysia's Table ER:1 notification (G/AG/N/MYS/52/Add.1)          | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan   | <b>European Union</b>                               |
| <a href="#">103023</a>   | 766   | Ecuador's new milk law  | United States of America, New Zealand, Australia   | <b>European Union</b>                               |

- Indonesia requested the addition, under 'Other Business' (item 2G), of a letter<sup>2</sup> that it, together with 13 other Members, wrote to the European Union (EU) regarding the EU's proposal for a regulation on deforestation-free products.

<sup>1</sup> This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice to the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.

<sup>2</sup> Later circulated as G/AG/GEN/213.

- The Chairperson proposed that after the consideration of the item on 'Work Programme pursuant to paragraph 8 of the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity' under 2 B(ii), the remaining items under agenda 2B(ii), (iii) and (iv) would be taken up together in view of overlap across those items.

1.3. Additionally, the Chairperson acknowledged the following written submissions circulated after the issuance of the convening airgram, for consideration under - "Implementation of Ministerial Outcomes" (item 2B): G/AG/GEN/209 by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), G/AG/GEN/210 by the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and G/AG/GEN/211 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

## 2 THE REVIEW PROCESS

2.1. The Chairperson urged Members to provide timely and complete responses to questions raised under the Committee's review process and to submit them through the Agriculture Information Management System (AG-IMS)<sup>3</sup> for interested Members to consult. The Chairperson also referred to the built-in co-sponsoring function of the Agriculture Information Management System (AG-IMS) Q&A facility and noted that around 15% of the questions raised for the meeting had been co-sponsored by at least one Member.

2.2. The Chairperson noted that for the meeting, as of 9 am, 21 November 2022, 48 out of the 146 questions raised had responses available on the AG-IMS. The Chairperson welcomed Members' practice of submitting responses in advance of CoA meetings allowing for deepened exchanges during meetings.

2.3. The Secretariat continued its practice of ascertaining the attendance of Members subject to advance questions prior to Committee meetings. No delegation had informed the Secretariat of their absence at the November meeting.

### 2.1 Matters relevant to the implementation of commitments under the reform programme - Article 18.6

2.4. A total of 54 specific implementation matters (SIMs) were raised at the 103<sup>rd</sup> CoA meeting under Article 18.6.<sup>4</sup> Out of the 54 SIMs, 29 were raised for the first time. Members' responses and follow-up comments can be accessed by clicking on the relevant hyperlinks in column 3 of Table 1 in Annex 1 to this report. This information can also be consulted directly in the AG-IMS using the relevant question ID numbers as provided in that table.

### 2.2 Review of Notifications

2.5. The Chairperson reported that since the previous Committee meeting held on 14-15 September 2022, 94 notifications had been received. Out of those notifications, 16 related to market access, 31 concerned domestic support, 43 related to export competition, 1 concerned export prohibitions or restrictions, and 3 were net food-importing developing country (NF) notifications. Those notifications had been distributed electronically to all delegations and were available for consultation through the AG-IMS.

#### 2.2.1 Notifications in respect of which questions have been raised in advance of the issuance of the convening airgram

2.6. Table 2 of Annex 1 to this report lists questions relating to individual notifications raised in advance of the issuance of the convening airgram.<sup>5</sup> Members' responses and follow-up comments can be accessed directly by clicking on the hyperlinks contained in the table or through the AG-IMS using the relevant question ID numbers.

<sup>3</sup> <http://agims.wto.org/>.

<sup>4</sup> WTO/AIR/AG/64, Section A of Attachment 1. The full version of the questions raised can be found under Section 1 of the compilation document in G/AG/W/226.

<sup>5</sup> WTO/AIR/AG/64, Section B of Attachment 1. The full version of the questions raised can be found under Section 2 of the compilation document in G/AG/W/226.

### 2.2.2 Overdue notifications

2.7. The Committee took note of the Secretariat document summarizing the status of Members' compliance with notification obligations.<sup>6</sup>

2.8. The Chairperson acknowledged Members' efforts to bring their notifications up to date, noting that several Members had submitted notifications covering multiple years since the September 2022 meeting, including:

- Mongolia: Table DS:1 covering the years 2007-2021;
- Pakistan: Table DS:1 covering the years 2012 to 2015, Table ES:1 concerning 2013 to 2020 and Table ES:2 covering 2014 to 2021, and
- Djibouti: Table ES:1 covering 13 implementation years for the period 1995-2019.

2.9. The Chairperson also drew Members' attention to the overall situation with respect to outstanding domestic support and export subsidy notifications for the period 1995 to 2020:

- 931 Table DS:1 domestic support notifications remained outstanding; and
- 935 export subsidy notifications in the Table ES:1 series remained outstanding.

2.10. One question was raised under this agenda item.<sup>7</sup> The concerned Member's response and follow-up comments can be accessed through the hyperlinks contained in Table 3 of Annex 1 to this report or through the AG-IMS using the relevant question ID number.

2.11. Paraguay informed the Committee that its Table ES:1 and DS:1 notifications for 2020 and 2021 had been circulated after the issuance of the convening airgram. Paraguay also thanked the Secretariat for the assistance it received for the preparation of these notifications.

2.12. On outstanding ES:1 notifications, the Chairperson referred to the suggestion made by the Secretariat in its presentation<sup>8</sup> to the informal CoA meeting on 27 October 2022 to allow Members with outstanding ES notifications to announce no recourse to agricultural export subsidies in the Committee in order to fulfil their outstanding ES:1 notifications for the relevant years. The proposed oral announcement of "nil" export subsidies at Committee meetings should be deemed as an additional avenue for Members to fulfil outstanding ES:1 notification obligations along with their existing submission of notifications via the Central Registry of Notifications (CRN).

2.13. The European Union (EU) supported the idea of streamlining export subsidy notifications. It considered that until the elimination of export subsidies in accordance with the timelines in the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, Members should continue to submit Table ES:1 notifications, including in the form of Supporting Table ES:2 by developing country Members for export subsidies under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, in a transparent manner. The EU considered that transparency in the use of Article 9.4 flexibility was also important for discussions within the work programme pursuant to paragraph 8 of the MC12 Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity. The EU viewed the Secretariat's suggestion as a practical way to facilitate the reporting of "nil" export subsidies, but stressed the importance of monitoring by the Committee to ensure that any inconsistent use of export subsidies was not overlooked.

2.14. Costa Rica supported the Chairperson's proposal to facilitate reduction of outstanding ES:1 notifications. Costa Rica also highlighted the importance for the Committee to be able to review the "nil" ES:1 notifications from Members' oral announcements at Committee meetings.

2.15. Switzerland considered that Members with outstanding ES:1 notifications, and who did not apply export subsidies, should submit a "nil" statement. Switzerland expressed openness to consider one "nil" statement covering multiple years if no export subsidies were provided during that entire period. Switzerland supported the idea of Members' announcing non-recourse to export subsidies at Committee meetings; it simultaneously noted that the utility of this avenue in addressing

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<sup>6</sup> G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.47 circulated on 11 November 2022.

<sup>7</sup> The details of the question raised can be found under Section 3 of the compilation document in G/AG/W/226.

<sup>8</sup> RD/AG/96.

outstanding export subsidy notifications would depend on the actual attendance of the concerned delegations at Committee meetings and their capacity to make such 'nil' statements.

2.16. The Secretariat clarified that the proposed new avenue of oral announcement of "nil" export subsidies at Committee meetings only entails a simpler procedure for Members to report non-use of export subsidies. After such announcement by a Member in the Committee, the Secretariat would do the required follow-up with the CRN on behalf of that Member to release the relevant 'nil' Table ES:1 notification.

2.17. In the absence of any objection, the Chairperson announced that, starting with the next Committee meeting in March 2023, a sub-item on "*Outstanding ES:1 notifications - announcement by delegations of no recourse to export subsidies*" would be included under the agenda item on "Overdue notifications" for the reporting of 'nil' export subsidies by Members.

2.18. In closing the agenda item, the Chairperson emphasized the importance of transparency and timely notifications and encouraged Members to fulfil their notification obligations.

### **2.2.3 Notifications subject to review in respect of which no questions have been raised in advance of the issuance of the convening airgram**

2.19. The Committee took note of the 76 notifications circulated before the issuance of the convening airgram on 11 November 2022, including notifications carried over from the September 2022 meeting, but in respect of which no questions had been raised by that date, under paragraph 9 of the Committee's working procedures.<sup>9</sup>

### **2.2.4 Notifications circulated after the issuance of the convening airgram**

2.20. The Committee took note of the 7 notifications circulated after the issuance of the convening airgram on 11 November 2022:

- Paraguay: Table ES:1 for 2020 and 2021;
- China: Table ES:1 and ES:2 for 2020 and 2021; and
- United States of America: Table NF:1 for 2020.

2.21. These notifications would be reverted to for substantive review during the next regular meeting, in accordance with paragraph 9 of the working procedures.

### **2.2.5 Points concerning notifications raised at previous meetings which have been pursued bilaterally: information regarding outcome where the issue involved is one of general interest**

2.22. There were no requests for the floor under this agenda item.

### **2.2.6 Counter-notifications under Article 18.7 of the Agreement on Agriculture**

2.23. No counter-notifications under Article 18.7 were made for this Committee meeting.

## **2.3 Deferred replies to questions raised under the review process**

2.24. The Secretariat document G/AG/W/204/Rev.8 lists questions raised under the CoA review process from 2013 to 2021 where responses remain outstanding. As of 10 November 2022, a total of 129 questions still had outstanding responses from 43 Members for the period 2013-2020.

2.25. The Chairperson urged Members to make dedicated efforts to shorten, and eventually close, the list of pending responses. To assist Members in this endeavour, the Secretariat has introduced a feature in the AG-IMS to generate automatic reminders to Members with outstanding responses.

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<sup>9</sup> WTO/AIR/AG/64, Section C of Attachment 1.

### 3 OTHER MATTERS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE COMMITTEE

#### 3.1 Annual consultation under Article 18.5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, with respect to Members' participation in the normal growth of world trade in agricultural products within the framework of the commitments on export subsidies.

3.1. The Chairperson recalled that Article 18.5 provided for Members to consult annually with respect of their participation in the normal growth of world trade in agricultural products within the framework of commitments on export subsidies. Pursuant to the Committee's Working Procedures, the annual consultation was undertaken at the November regular meetings of the Committee. The Chairperson noted that the main basis for the consultations "within the framework of the commitments on export subsidies" consisted of notifications in the area of export subsidy. These notifications (namely Tables ES:1, ES:2 and ES:3) respectively covered export subsidies, total export volumes, and international food aid. In that sense, Members' compliance with their notification obligations in the export subsidy area were crucial to enable the Committee to undertake the consultations.

3.2. The Committee took note of the Secretariat's revised background document for this exercise.<sup>10</sup> The Secretariat introduced the document which provided data on export volumes and shares in world exports, for selected agricultural products/product groups covering the period from 2011 to 2021.<sup>11</sup> In terms of product coverage, the document covered all 22 products or group of products listed in G/AG/2 for the Committee's monitoring of Members' implementation of export subsidy commitments.

3.3. Brazil welcomed the document and noted that after the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, the focus of discussions should now be on production subsidies given through domestic support as it saw a clear correlation between the share of some Members in global exports of agricultural products and the amount of domestic support they provided to such products. Brazil noted that there was a risk that domestic support could become *de facto* export subsidies arising from excessive product-specific concentration of support, often above *de minimis* levels.

#### 3.2 Implementation of Ministerial outcomes

##### 3.2.1 Bali Ministerial Decision on TRQ (WT/MIN(13)/39) – First triennial review pursuant to paragraph 3 of G/AG/29

3.4. The Chairperson stated that paragraph 3 of the recommendations from the Review of the operation of the Bali Decision on TRQ Administration approved by the General Council at its meeting on 9-10 December 2019 (Annex 2 to G/AG/29) provided for the Committee to undertake reviews of the operation of the Bali TRQ Decision every three years after the conclusion of the 2019 Review. The first such triennial review accordingly commenced in 2022.

3.5. The Chairperson noted that Members could devote targeted attention to the first triennial review and the specific issues that they would wish to consider thereunder only after the successful conclusion, in March 2022, of the discussion on the future operation of paragraph 4 of the underfill mechanism. Based on the discussions on those issues at the informal CoA meetings in June, September, October and November 2022, a draft report of the review was shared with Members in RD/AG/95 dated 10 November 2022; a revised version, incorporating Members' comments on the draft report, was later circulated in RD/AG/95/Rev.1 dated 18 November 2022.

3.6. The Chairperson noted that the Committee had considered the revised draft report during the informal CoA meeting on 21 November. While some Members had indicated their willingness to go along with the revised report in RD/AG/95/Rev.1, the general sentiment among Members was to not rush the adoption of the report at that meeting as they had not had sufficient time to examine the specific ideas put forth.

3.7. The committee accordingly agreed to finalize the review at its next meeting in March 2023.

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<sup>10</sup> G/AG/W/32/Rev.21 and Corr.1.

<sup>11</sup> Except for fruits & vegetables and live animals for which export data was provided in value terms.

### **3.2.2 Ministerial Declaration on the emergency response to food insecurity (WT/MIN/(22)/28 – WT/L/1139)**

#### **3.2.2.1 Work programme pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Declaration**

3.8. The Chairperson noted that paragraph 8 of the Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity provided for the establishment of a dedicated work programme under the auspices of the Committee to examine ways for the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on LDCs and NFIDCs to be made more effective and operational and to consider food security concerns and needs of those countries.

3.9. The Chairperson stated that Members had actively engaged on how to elaborate and implement the work programme in the Committee during CoA meetings from 27-28 June to 21-22 November 2022 with the target to agree on thematic areas and a workplan in order to launch detailed technical engagement on the work programme. The Chairperson stated that during the informal meeting on 21 November, the draft work programme containing the thematic outline and working methods (RD/AG/97 of 15 November 2022) had received broad support across the Membership as the working basis to commence detailed technical engagement under the work programme.

3.10. The Chair also recalled that several Members at the 21 November informal meeting had noted that RD/AG/97 was a good reflection of the collective progress made in the discussions under the work programme. The discussions at that meeting had also highlighted some elements of common understanding among Members on the working methodology, including on the following: a questionnaire was one of the tools to guide and inform the discussions under the work programme; Members, including LDCs and NFIDCs, would regularly provide oral and written inputs and share their experiences in elaborating and implementing the work programme; and international organizations may be invited to support the discussions, as appropriate. Similarly, Members would engage under the work programme with the clarity that the venue of the work programme is the Committee on Agriculture, as provided in Paragraph 8 of the Ministerial Declaration on Food Insecurity.

3.11. With this introduction, the Chairperson presented the draft work programme contained in RD/AG/97 for the Committee's consideration and approval at its formal meeting on 22 November 2022. The Committee approved the proposed work programme in RD/AG/97. The Committee also agreed to establish a single Working Group for the conduct of thematic discussions under the work programme and appointed the current Chairperson of the Committee to coordinate the Group's activities and discussions in his personal capacity. The approved work programme was later circulated as G/AG/35.

3.12. Several Members welcomed the efforts by the Chairperson, and the Secretariat in facilitating an agreement among Members on the work programme. They also welcomed the current CoA Chair to assume the role of the working group coordinator in his personal capacity.

3.13. Egypt welcomed the agreement in the Committee to establish the work programme and hoped that the Committee could deliver a package of concrete and tangible solutions to one of the most significant current global challenges. Egypt believed that the Committee now had the opportunity to prove to the world that the WTO was able to contribute effectively to addressing food security challenges and to deal with similar challenges in the future, including by agreeing on suitable flexibilities to cope with food insecurity as mandated by the MC12 Declaration.

3.14. Sri Lanka thanked Members for their constructive engagement and hoped that all delegations would maintain the same spirit throughout the subsequent thematic engagement under the work programme.

3.15. The Chairperson thanked Members for their trust in him with the task of coordinating the working group in his personal capacity. The Chair also underlined the overarching authority of the Committee on Agriculture in providing the required guidance to the working group and to consider its periodic reports on thematic deliberations. The Chair suggested to hold the first meeting of the working group before the year-end to take up some organizational matters, including the frequency of meetings, the scheduling of thematic deliberations, and to consider possible elements of a



first questionnaire.<sup>12</sup> The Chairperson also noted that the Secretariat would prepare and share with Members a short overview of discussions in the Committee and the progress made under the work programme.<sup>13</sup>

### **3.2.3 Annual monitoring exercise on the follow-up to the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on LDCs and NFIDCs under Article 16.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture**

3.16. After the consideration of the item on the work programme under paragraph 8 of the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity, and as was announced during the adoption of the agenda, the three items under 2 B(ii), (iii) and (iv) were taken up together in view of the overlap across them. The summary of discussions on these three items is contained in paragraphs 3.17 to 3.48 below.

### **3.2.4 Ministerial Declaration on the WTO response to the COVID-19 pandemic and preparedness for future pandemics (WT/MIN/(22)/31 – WT/L/1142)- continuing engagement on 'COVID-19 and Agriculture'**

3.17. The Chairperson explained that the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity under agenda 2 B(ii) sought, in its paragraph 8, to examine through a dedicated work programme how the Marrakesh NFIDC Decision could be made more effective and operational. Under agenda 2 B (iii), the Committee had to undertake the annual monitoring of the Marrakesh NFIDC Decision under paragraph 18 of the Working Procedures of the Committee. Since 2016, and pursuant to paragraph 32 of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, the Committee was tasked to review the provisions on international food aid forming part of the Nairobi Decision within the CoA's annual monitoring of the NFIDC Decision. The Chairperson noted that discussions on international food aid were also an important part of the follow-up to the Marrakesh NFIDC Decision as well as under the paragraph 8 work programme. Finally, the agenda 2 B (iv) dealt with 'COVID-19 and Agriculture' within the overall guidance of the MC12 Declaration on the WTO response to the COVID-19 Pandemics and Preparedness for Future Pandemics. The MC12 Declaration on the COVID-19 pandemic also recognized the negative impact of the pandemic on food security of developing countries, especially the LDCs and NFIDCs among them. For efficient and coherent deliberations on these matters, it might therefore be prudent to take up the three agenda items together. The Chairperson also noted that the content of the written contributions by the observer international organizations also cut across those three items.

3.18. The Chairperson recalled that following the MC12 mandate for the CoA to carry out a dedicated work programme on food security concerns of LDCs and NFIDCs, he had urged all donor Members to submit their Table NF:1 notifications well in advance of the November meeting. Those notifications had always been a key input for the annual monitoring the implementation of the Marrakesh Decision, which is undertaken at November CoA meetings pursuant to the Committee's working procedures. A formal reminder<sup>14</sup> had been circulated to Members on 26 October.

3.19. The Committee took note of the following Table NF:1 notifications circulated since the previous annual NF monitoring exercise:

- Canada: G/AG/N/CAN/152;
- Japan: G/AG/N/JPN/266, G/AG/N/JPN/267, G/AG/N/JPN/268, G/AG/N/JPN/269;
- New Zealand: G/AG/N/NZL/135;
- Russian Federation: G/AG/N/RUS/36, G/AG/N/RUS/36/REV.1;
- Switzerland: G/AG/N/CHE/118; and
- United States of America: G/AG/N/USA/167.

3.20. The Chairperson noted that Table NF:1 notifications by Members were an important contribution to the annual monitoring exercise. Those notifications cover the following information: the quantity of food aid provided to LDCs and NFIDCs; an indication of the proportion of food aid provided in fully grant form or appropriate concessional terms; technical and financial assistance

<sup>12</sup> The first meeting of the working group was held on 7 December 2022. At that meeting, Members finalized a questionnaire on food security needs and challenges of LDCs and NFIDC Members and their utilization of flexibilities which was later circulated as G/AG/GEN/214.

<sup>13</sup> Later circulated as RD/AG/100.

<sup>14</sup> WTO/AIR/AG/63.

under paragraph 3(iii) of the Decision; and other relevant information with respect to actions taken within the framework of the Decision.

3.21. The Committee also took note of a revised background note circulated by the Secretariat on the implementation of the NFIDC Decision, to facilitate Members' consideration of the agenda item.<sup>15</sup> The note sets out the substantive provisions of the NFIDC Decision and provides information regarding their implementation. The Secretariat briefly introduced the document, highlighting the main updates in the revised background note. In the context of discussions under the work programme pursuant to paragraph 8 of the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity, the Secretariat recalled the challenges with regard to the availability of the global food aid shipments data since the discontinuation of the World Food Programme (WFP)'s International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) in 2014; previous revisions of the background note in the G/AG/W/42 series had included data on global food aid deliveries until the year 2014 based on the INTERFAIS.

### 3.2.5 Contributions by Observer International Organizations

3.22. The Internal Grains Council (IGC)<sup>16</sup>, the World Food Programme (WFP)<sup>17</sup>, the Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations (FAO)<sup>18</sup>, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA)<sup>19</sup>, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)<sup>20</sup> presented their written submissions. The World Bank also intervened under this agenda item.

3.23. The FAO referred to its publication "State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022" (SOFI) and noted that the number of people affected by chronic hunger globally rose to 828 million in 2021, about 46 million more than 2020. The challenging food security situation was also reflected in high domestic food inflation in several countries resulting from higher world prices, reduced domestic supplies of some commodities, national macroeconomic difficulties, currency depreciations, adverse weather conditions, as well as near-record high energy and fertilizer prices. The FAO added that due to higher international food prices, the total food import bill of NFIDCs in 2022 was forecasted to increase by 21.7 billion USD from 2021, to 148.1 billion USD, mainly reflecting higher unit imports costs rather than higher quantities. That development was much more pronounced in economically vulnerable regions, increasing fiscal pressure on those countries, generating balance of payments problems and challenging their ability to purchase food supplies on the world market. The FAO considered that persistently high world food, fuel, and fertilizer prices, increasing financial constraints, and soaring food import bills would continue to pose significant challenges for food security and livelihoods in LDCs and NFIDCs. With that background, the FAO recommended the following measures to ensure that world agricultural markets continue to function properly as a reliable source of food and crucial agricultural inputs at country level: (i) keeping food, feed and fertilizer markets open in line with the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity; (ii) increasing market transparency by providing critical, timely and objective data and information; (iii) identifying the needs of LDCs and NFIDCs to enhance their capacity to respond to acute food crises; (iv) increasing productivity and lowering trade costs through public investment in research and development, transfer of technology and innovation, and access to high quality inputs, including seeds, fertilizers and machinery, and finances. The FAO also referred to its actions and initiatives, including, *inter alia*, through technical support and advocacy for financial instruments for LDCs and NFIDCs to access sufficient food (e.g. Food Import Financing Facility (FIFF)), an online 'Fertilizer Trade Tracker' allowing countries to assess import needs/export availabilities, fertilizer 'neediness index' to facilitate access to fertilizers in Africa, and a joint FAO-WTO [report](#) on fertilizers for the G20 Leaders.

3.24. The IICA noted that global food security had been threatened in recent years due to the COVID-19 pandemic, trade restrictions adopted by several food exporting countries, the container crisis and the war in Ukraine. The IICA reiterated its commitment to contribute to the discussions in the Committee under the recently launched work programme pursuant to the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity. It considered that delegations from the Latin American region, comprising both net food exporting and importing countries, should be able to play a proactive part in the Committee's food security discussions. The IICA also briefed the Committee

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<sup>15</sup> G/AG/W/42/Rev.23.

<sup>16</sup> G/AG/GEN/207.

<sup>17</sup> G/AG/GEN/208.

<sup>18</sup> G/AG/GEN/209.

<sup>19</sup> G/AG/GEN/210.

<sup>20</sup> G/AG/GEN/211.



on its technical cooperation activities contributing to food and nutrition security in its 34 Member countries.

3.25. The WFP stated that the world was facing the worst food crisis in modern history triggered by a combination of conflict, climate change and the devastating economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. It noted that the outlook for 2023 was equally alarming where high oil and fertilizer prices would significantly affect the upcoming planting and harvest seasons. The WFP noted that net food importing countries were the most directly impacted by higher global food prices and developing countries among them have the least options to cope with higher costs of essential food imports. In June 2022, the WFP activated a 'Global Corporate Scale-up' to step-up direct food and nutrition assistance to save lives and prevent mortality during the global food crisis. The WFP was targeting to support a record 160 million food insecure people this year; it had thus far procured 3.8 million tonnes of food valued at 2.8 billion USD, a 27% increase in tonnage compared to the same period in 2020. Local and regional food procurement continued to be of high importance given its positive impact on local and regional economies, producers, and food systems. The WFP again thanked the WTO and its Membership for the MC12 Decision to exempt WFP's food purchases from export restrictions, which represented a significant enabler to WFP's timely purchase of food commodities. The WFP also referred to its contribution under the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) and noted that since the conclusion of an agreement on the Initiative, the WFP had procured 330 thousand metric tonnes of wheat from Ukraine intended for distribution to the hungriest in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Yemen. It welcomed the recent renewal of this initiative. The WFP advocated coordination across governments, financial institutions, the private sector and other stakeholders and partners to mitigate a possibly more severe global food crisis in 2023.

3.26. The IGC noted that there should be ample supply of grains across the globe in 2022/23 and the main question would be more about affordability. The IGC highlighted the importance of the Grain Corridor Initiative in stabilizing the global grains market by noting that the wheat price index decreased by 24% in two weeks after the Initiative was put in place. The IGC also highlighted currency exchange movements, stating that the recent appreciation of the US dollar by over 30% against major currencies had appreciated the cost of wheat at destination by about 32%. Trade finance support would therefore be important to avoid a shock contraction of demand in the coming year. The IGC noted its efforts and several activities to better understand trade flow and forecasts in the Black Sea Region for the next marketing year. The IGC considered a possible decline in wheat seeding areas both in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The Black Sea Region's continued retreat from global wheat trade might be worrying for the next marketing year in 2023-2024. The IGC stressed the need for Members to ensure that the Black Sea Region would continue to produce wheat and feed the global wheat market. The IGC also informed the Committee about its coming webinars focussing on trade and logistics in the Black Sea area.

3.27. The IMF noted that it had been supporting countries affected by food insecurity with its full range of financing instruments, policy advice and capacity building as well as by working with partners toward better regional and global solutions. This included efforts to help address pressures on external balances and fiscal situations that resulted from food shortages and elevated food prices. The IMF noted that a temporary Food Shock Window had been approved by the IMF Executive Board in September with a view to providing increased access to emergency financing for those countries that had urgent balance of payments needs associated with the global food shock and for which a full-fledged IMF supported programme was not feasible nor necessary. To qualify, countries should meet the standard qualifications required for emergency financing and demonstrate an urgent balance of payments need associated with the global food shock. The IMF also welcomed the prolongation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

3.28. The World Bank noted that the war in Ukraine, supply chain disruptions and the continued economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic had triggered a global crisis that would drive millions more into extreme poverty, magnifying hunger and malnutrition while threatening to erase hard won developmental gains. High food prices were particularly devastating for the poorest households which typically spend two thirds of their income on food. The war had altered global patterns of trade, production and consumption in ways that would keep food and input prices at historically high levels through to 2024 potentially putting the next planting season in difficulty. The Bank cautioned against applying export curbs on food which could further aggravate supply problems and lead to further rise in food prices and emphasized the need to ensure farmers' and fishermen's access to fuel and fertilizer for the next season. In order to build agricultural resilience against current and future food crises, the World Bank proposed the following action points; i) re-examine governmental

farm support and incentives so as to minimize trade and market distortions by potentially repurposing USD 639 billion of annual agricultural support; ii) accelerating innovation through targeted agricultural research; iii) enhancing transparency and monitoring of food markets (e.g. Agriculture Market Information System (AMIS)) through robust collaboration among governments; and (iv) scale up investments. Referring to typical indebtedness of importing food deficient countries, the World Bank proposed to combine debt sustainability measures through IMF support with investments to improve food security. The World Bank Group, as part of a comprehensive global response to the current crisis, was making up to USD 30 billion available for a period of 15 months, including USD 12 billion of new projects, and USD 18.7 billion of existing portfolio. The Bank referred to its efforts to increase crisis preparedness and response capacity of low-income countries in the context of the twentieth cycle of the International Development Association (IDA20). The World Bank noted that it had been assisting countries to transform their food systems through financing and policy advice to support a green, resilient, and inclusive recovery, and gave the example of a USD 570 million programme in West Africa to improve food system resilience, promote inter-regional value chains and build regional capacity to manage agricultural risks. The World Bank Group and the G-7 presidency were also co-convening a Global Alliance for Food Security which aimed to share best practices to catalyse an immediate and coordinate response to the crisis. Further, the International Finance Corporation had established a global food security platform to respond to the food crisis; a USD 6 billion financing facility would, *inter alia*, finance continued trade flows of vital food supplies to populations in need, and increase the availability of fertilizers and other critical supplies for farmers in vulnerable regions.

3.29. Brazil welcomed the technical analysis and grains market assessment provided by the IGC. Transparency of global markets was essential to appreciate global trade patterns. Brazil stated that international trade was essential to the efficiency and resilience of agrifood systems, and that the WTO should strive to strengthen that efficiency and resilience through disciplines which would reduce the prevailing distortions in the system. Regarding submissions by the WFP and the FAO, Brazil underlined that the current global food crisis had been caused by multiple inter-related factors, including the COVID-19 pandemic. The situation had been exacerbated by the conflict in Ukraine and its various implications, including the adoption of measures by several countries that had seriously worsened the effects of the global food and energy crises, particularly for developing countries. Brazil noted that agriculture supply chains had suffered the most through protectionism and distortions, hence required a commitment to avoid barriers which prevent food and agricultural products and inputs reaching deficit regions harming food security in those regions. Noting that precision agriculture, biotechnology, crop livestock forest integration, fertilizers and pesticides were necessary conditions for increased productivity and efficient use of natural resources, Brazil argued in favour of sustainable intensification of agricultural production, making all technological tools available to producers. Despite a general trend of stagnating agricultural productivity, Brazil considered it unusual that some Members would be unwilling to adopt practices and technologies that were essential for enhancing agricultural productivity, and, even worse, would rather seek to unjustifiably limit the tools available to producers. Underlining that the effects of forcing unjustified interruptions in the use of pesticides could be traumatic, Brazil referred to the case of one Member mentioned in the WFP report as a cautionary tale to the entire Membership.

3.30. New Zealand thanked the FAO, IICA, WB, WFP, IGC and IMF for their reports and their reminders of the sense of urgency. New Zealand expressed its rising concern over the state of global food security and the fact that the NFIDC's food import bill for 2022 was projected to increase to more than USD 148 billion, as noted by the FAO. New Zealand referred to sobering contextual challenges mentioned by observer organizations, including Russia's war in Ukraine which was exacerbating food prices and market volatility alongside climatic challenges, that all have lasting consequences for global food production. The observers' reports also highlighted the important role governments must play to develop the right policies for long-term resilience in agricultural production, including trade policies to help facilitate trade and lessen the impact of the global food crisis. New Zealand expressed its appreciation to observers for pointing out the target areas for governmental interventions, particularly the need to address trade restrictions, minimize distortions and increase investments in research and development and technological transfer. New Zealand shared the need to enable small agricultural producers, particularly those in developing countries, to participate fairly in global trade and ensure adequate policy tools to help improve agricultural productivity and resilience in light of those challenges. New Zealand looked forward to continued collaboration with the observer international organizations to inform the Committee's debates, including under the food security work programme.

3.31. Australia thanked observer organizations for reminding the Committee about global food security challenges. It noted that some of the figures presented, including on the growing food import bill and 349 million acutely food insecure individuals in 2022 as estimated by the WFP, were alarming.

3.32. The United Kingdom thanked observer organizations for their reports and added that access to reliable data and key market developments, including for staple foods such as grains, rice, and oilseeds, was critical in ensuring open and predictable trade. This was even more important in the current context of global food security challenges. The United Kingdom regretted the figures highlighted by the WFP and the FAO regarding higher food import bills, chronic hunger and the growing gap between the current situation and the zero-hunger target of the UN SDGs. The United Kingdom expressed its commitment in supporting the WFP's vital work, including upholding the MC12 decision to exempt WFP's humanitarian purchases from export restrictions, and welcomed the WFP intention to provide periodic data to the CoA on the implementation of that Decision. It looked forward to contribution by observer organizations to the thematic discussions under the LDC-NFIDC work programme, which, *inter alia*, sought to further improve coordination with those organizations. The United Kingdom expressed its support for the policy recommendations outlined by the FAO on building longer-term resilience, increasing market transparency, refraining from imposing export restrictions, and enhancing longer term productivity.

3.33. Egypt thanked the observer international organizations for the valuable presentations which had all underscored the significance of the current food security challenge and its implications on the most vulnerable, namely the LDCs and NFIDCs. It agreed with the statement made by the World Bank concerning the need to build resilience in LDCs and NFIDCs as well as the need to mobilize financial resources in those countries towards building that resilience; however, the details of modalities on how to build that resilience were yet to be agreed. Egypt commended the work done by the WFP and echoed its call to enhance domestic food systems and increase local production in recipient countries. Egypt also thanked the IMF for the establishment of the Food Shock Window and considered the initiative to be closely linked to discussions under the work programme. Egypt supported the statement by New Zealand on the need to ensure adequate policy tools to enhance productivity, especially in developing country Members. It noted the importance of the report provided by the FAO, especially on the food import bills of LDCs and NFIDCs which could usefully feed into discussions under the work programme. Egypt also expressed support for the FAO recommendations with respect to 'Food Import Financing Facility' (FIFF) and looked forward to discussions on it under the work programme. Egypt invited all observer organizations to provide inputs and reports to contribute to thematic deliberations under the work programme.

3.34. Uruguay thanked international organizations for providing an overview of the current global food security situation, including on prices and possible mechanisms to deal with the current challenge through international cooperation. It echoed the comments made by Brazil on the importance of smooth flow of trade in agricultural products, food, and feed and to ensure that countries could meet their food needs while avoiding the imposition of unnecessary trade barriers. Uruguay also recalled paragraph 7 of the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity in which Members reaffirmed the disciplines on export competition under the Agreement on Agriculture and the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, especially those on international food aid. Uruguay also recalled the importance Members attached to the need for improved transparency of international food aid in the discussions on the CoA work programme under paragraph 8 of the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity. It specifically referred to the Secretariat document in RD/AG/94<sup>21</sup> which underlined that the available information on international food aid through Members' agriculture notifications would not allow the Secretariat to put together a comparable data series on annual global food aid shipments. In the same vein, Uruguay recalled the references in the Secretariat note to the discontinuation of the WFP's International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) and the current absence of a reliable data source on international food aid quantities supplied by countries. Bearing in mind the interest expressed by several delegations regarding the monitoring of global food aid trends, Uruguay wondered whether the INTERFAIS or a similar monitoring mechanism could be established to enable effective monitoring of global food aid flows.

3.35. India thanked the observer organizations for their highly informative presentations. India also expressed interest to the World Bank statement on the Global Alliance for Food Security and asked

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<sup>21</sup> A slightly revision version, incorporating Members' comments on the original room document, was later circulated in G/AG/W/227.

whether the Bank was supporting that initiative only through the Secretariat or it also entailed a deeper working relationship with governments. India welcomed the WFP's responses to the questions it had raised in the previous Committee meeting and also for including information on the implementation of the MC12 Decision on WFP in its latest statement. India noted that it would be helpful if the WFP could inform the Committee about the number of countries that had applied export restrictions on the WFP purchases post-MC12.

3.36. The United States noted its concern about the food security crisis the world was facing which was exacerbated by Russia's war in Ukraine, climate change and high global food prices. The United States noted that food prices had been negatively impacted by other unilateral policy decisions taken by Members that undermined global food security such as export restrictions which had repeatedly been shown to contribute to global price inflation. The United States expressed its commitment to help food reach those who are most in need by promoting open and predictable markets and helping build a more resilient agricultural sector and agricultural trading system that could mitigate market volatilities. As the largest single donor of humanitarian and long-term food security development assistance, the United States was mobilizing billions of dollars in additional funding for humanitarian organizations who were at the frontlines of responding to the food security crisis. The United States welcomed the work undertaken by international organizations in providing timely and objective data, information and outlook that could inform decision-making, policy design and the work of the Committee, including with respect to the work programme regarding food insecurity faced by NFIDCs and LDCs. The United States also encouraged all Members, in a position to do so, to increase their humanitarian assistance especially to critical organizations such as the WFP for it to continue its mission.

3.37. The European Union thanked international organizations for their submissions and presentations. The EU was particularly struck by the WFP's estimate of 349 million acutely food insecure people in 2022 and noted that the alarming data presented to the Committee clearly linked the discussion under this item with the previous agenda item related to the work programme on food insecurity. The EU noted that it was stepping up support to help those who had been most affected by the rising food insecurity globally. A new humanitarian aid package of EUR 210 million would be provided in 15 countries to meet their growing needs bringing the EU's overall support for global food security up to EUR 8 billion between 2020 and 2024. The EU also stated that factual and non-political interventions by international organizations and the factual data on production, consumption and trade in agricultural staple commodities clearly underpinned the reasons behind the current crisis. These international organizations pinpointed the importance of transparency and drew the Committee's attention to the destructive results of export restrictions. The WFP pointed to the conflict being the top driver of food insecurity, followed by climate shocks and rising prices. The European Union highlighted that the conflict resulting from the Russian Federation's unjustified aggression in Ukraine had been disrupting global trade, pushing up transport costs, and limiting farmers' access to agricultural inputs. It also noted that the knock-off effects of the current situation on upcoming harvests might reverberate around the world, induce hunger, and compromise the livelihood of LDCs and NFIDCs in particular. In this context, the prolongation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative as a mitigating factor was welcome. The European Union supported the intervention by Uruguay on food aid monitoring noting that there were important elements to discuss in the working group. The EU looked forward to close cooperation with international organizations in the CoA working group on food insecurity.

3.38. China noted that submissions and interventions by international organizations had broadened Members' understanding of the current crisis and enriched their understanding of the concept of food security. China stated that food security was composed of three important pillars, namely i) production capacity of different Members; ii) open, predictable, and stable international trade; and iii) public stockholdings to support food security in emergencies. China expressed appreciation for the research by international organizations about repurposing agricultural support. China acknowledged that the use of fertilizers and pesticides might have detrimental impacts on the environment. China added that Members needed to find a framework and a formula to reduce those detrimental elements and simultaneously advocated for a balanced approach to an optimum use of fertilizers and pesticides. China considered that applying a sudden reduction in the use of pesticides and fertilizers would reduce food production capacities substantially, causing a serious food security situation. China suggested to rely on science and new technologies in agriculture while also considering the impact of climate change and other factors. China looked forward to international organizations' active contribution to the CoA work programme; it suggested that those organizations

study the asymmetries in the existing Agreement on Agriculture and determine the elements needed to level the playing field to enable consensus among Members in the agriculture negotiations.

3.39. Switzerland noted that the presentations and reports by international organizations highlighted the critical and alarming situation worldwide and particularly in certain developing countries with regards to the prevalence of chronic hunger and of undernourishment and echoed other Members' concerns regarding the situation. Switzerland noted that only a handful of Members had submitted Table NF:1 notifications for the year 2021. Switzerland stated that NF notifications provide valuable information, including about food aid to LDCs and NFIDCs, which was particularly relevant given the current food insecurity situation.

3.40. Türkiye thanked the observer organizations for their important work and reports and noted that international diplomacy and Member governments' role had assumed critical importance in times of crisis. Turkey referred to its efforts to foster the Black Sea Grain Deal to stabilize and secure movement of food in the region and hoped that the initiative would enable a resolution of other political issues. Türkiye also looked forward to achieving results in the CoA for the benefit of countries facing food security difficulties.

3.41. The Russian Federation appreciated the analytical support and inputs provided by observer organisations to the Committee's discussions on food security. The Russian Federation noted that its donations of fertilizers to vulnerable economies were facilitated by the WFP while part of shipments remained blocked at EU ports. The Russian Federation informed the Committee about its humanitarian assistance to countries in need recalling that the WFP had delivered Russian food donations to Armenia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Lebanon, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mali, Nicaragua, Palestine, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Yemen, and Sudan. The Russian Federation questioned the attribution of the current global food market developments highlighted by the WFP and FAO to the conflict in Ukraine. It noted that those developments were rather caused, fully or partially, by restrictive measures imposed illegally by some WTO Members against the Russian Federation. Increased transportation costs and lack of access to inputs originated exclusively from those restrictions which substantially led to the destruction of supply chains, increased prices, and triggered food, fuel, and fertilizer shortages. Regarding FAO's report as regards to global fertilizer trade as well as the joint FAO-WTO [mapping](#) exercise of November 2022, the Russian Federation noted that the reports attributed inflationary pressure on the prices of energy, agricultural products and fertilizers to the conflict in Ukraine but avoided a mention of the unilateral coercive restrictions by certain Members against Russian suppliers. The Russian Federation referred to the IFPRI's analysis which noted that soaring fertilizer prices were driven by a confluence of factors, including increasing demand, surging costs of production and supply disruptions caused by sanctions and export restrictions. Growth in prices for energy resources had resulted in an increase in the prices of fertilizers and other agricultural products following some countries' decision to reject receiving Russian hydrocarbons. Rising natural gas prices in Europe, which were ten times higher than those prevailing last year and seven to ten times higher than in other parts of the world, had led to widespread production cutbacks in ammonia which was an important input for nitrogen-based fertilizers. As a result, up to 70% of the European fertilizer production capacity had been curtailed. With natural gas prices falling, some producers were able to restart production in October, however a significant portion of the European capacity was still on hold as the European Union had decided to significantly reduce gas purchases from the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation added that actions against the Russian Federation were detrimental to all consumers worldwide as reduced fertilizer production in the EU would have to be compensated via enhanced European imports to the detriment of other markets and fuelling inflationary prices. The Russian Federation did not accept that there were no restrictions on its exports of fertilizers; personal sanctions on owners and chief executives, blocking of accounts and payment systems, logistical bottlenecks through prohibition on access to roads and seaports, insurance issues, restrictions on purchases of equipment and access to support and services had negatively impacted the supply of Russian Fertilizers. The Russian Federation stated that in the period between March and July 2022, there was a decrease of 14% in its exports of fertilizers compared to the corresponding period in 2021, and added that the Eurostat reported more than 30% decrease in Russian fertilizer shipments to the EU. The Russian Federation underlined that conduct of international trade under the WTO rules without unilateral import restrictions should be the basis for ensuring global accessibility and affordability of food and fertilizers. It also invited international organizations to make an objective assessment of the fundamental drivers of the unfolding crisis to enable appropriate trade policy decisions by governments.

3.42. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela thanked international organizations for their presentations and shared their concerns on the state of agricultural trade and its effect on food security. Venezuela referred to the FAO's call for open food and fertilizer markets in line with the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity and urged countries to avoid imposing new restrictions on exports and remove, as much as possible, such existing restrictions in line with the appropriate disciplines of the WTO. Venezuela argued against unilateral coercive measures which were being used as a political weapon and had affected the food security of vulnerable countries. Venezuela stated that it had been a victim of trade restrictions and embargoes which had directly affected 7 million families, sabotaged its agricultural inputs and fertilizer sector, and significantly impacted its foreign trade. Venezuela stated that the questions by the Russian Federation under Article 18.6, which it had co-sponsored, regarding measures by some countries to prevent the access of Russian ships to their ports, including ships which had changed flag after 24 February 2022, were purely technical; however, the responses provided by the concerned Members were purely political in nature. Venezuela hoped that the topic would be discussed in a technical and objective manner to address the existing asymmetries in the trade of food and inputs and to foster policies to achieve the 'Zero Hunger' objective of the 2030 UN SDG agenda.

3.43. Canada expressed appreciation to international organizations for providing evidence-based inputs to the Committee's discussions. It emphasized how a conflict could disrupt supply chains and necessitate the need for humanitarian assistance. Canada echoed the points raised by Brazil regarding the supply-side of agricultural trade and production and underlined the role of innovative technical advancements and biotechnology as well as pesticides in enabling some major grains exporters to feed the international market. Canada also encouraged international organizations to generate facts and evidence to emphasize the positive role of supply-side parameters.

3.44. Nicaragua thanked the observer organizations for their reports on the food security situation. Nicaragua noted that while there were various causes to the current situation, the Committee's mandate was to look at measures affecting trade in agriculture, and accordingly it had co-sponsored Russian Federation's questions regarding the prohibitions maintained by the European Union, Norway, and Iceland on access to their ports for ships registered under the Russian flag, including ships which had changed flag after 24 February 2022. Nicaragua asked for technical responses to those questions from the concerned delegations and noted that the issue did not only affect the Russian Federation but also other Members, including small and vulnerable economies such as Nicaragua and other developing countries, by causing disruption in supply chains and compromising their developmental and food security goals. Nicaragua urged the Committee to look at the issue from a trade and development perspective and to not dwell on aspects which fell outside the competence of the Committee and the WTO.

3.45. Nigeria thanked international organizations for their presentations which shed light on the severity of the current food security difficulties. It opined that the food security crisis was largely a result of concentration in global export markets leading to heavy dependence of most developing countries on limited sources of food supply and hence making them highly vulnerable and aggravating their food and livelihood insecurity. Nigeria noted that many developing countries had shifted from being food producers and exporters to currently being net food importers. Nigeria argued that this was the reason for their continued call for the delivery of results in the WTO that would unlock the productive capacities of developing countries, especially LDCs and NFIDCs. Nigeria added that the competitiveness of those developing countries was being eroded due to the imbalance in the Agreement of Agriculture under the domestic support pillar, and therefore it was necessary to level the playing field and to offer them the policy space to unlock their productive capacity.

3.46. The Republic of Korea noted that the contributions of international organizations would assist in the development of the CoA work programme for LDCs and NFIDCs. It emphasized the importance of the continuation of the Black Sea Grain initiative by referring to the almost immediate impact of the initiative on wheat prices as quoted by the IGC. The Republic of Korea also urged international organizations to present their analysis and perspectives in the context of possible future food crises.

3.47. The delegate from Brazil thanked all delegations for their kind remarks on the completion of his term in Geneva. He noted his regret to not getting the opportunity to receive and examine China's domestic support notifications during his tenure in Geneva. He also referred to the question Brazil had posed to the Secretariat at the September CoA meeting on the latter's involvement in the French-led Food and Agriculture Mission (FARM) initiative. The Secretariat had informed the



delegation of Brazil bilaterally that the Secretariat's interaction with Members on their national measures and initiatives did not entail a review of the substantive provisions of those initiatives; this was the prerogative of Members collectively and of relevant bodies.

3.48. The Chairperson thanked all international organizations for their presentations and the spirit of cooperation to support Members' deliberations in the Committee and looked forward to their continued collaboration, including in the context of the ongoing CoA work programme.

### **3.2.6 Implementation of other Ministerial Decisions**

3.49. Paraguay, on behalf of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand, the United States and Uruguay, provided an update regarding their request to India for consultations under paragraph 6 of the Bali Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes. The request originally was for those consultations to take place in a plurilateral setting as the requesting Members had shared the same questions and concerns. At the request of India, it was later agreed for those consultations to take place on a bilateral basis. Paraguay also informed the Committee that the initial bilateral consultations between India and requesting Members, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Paraguay, Thailand, the United States and Uruguay, would be conducted during the week of the November Committee meeting. Paraguay noted that the Bali Decision created an interim exception to some domestic support rules for developing country Members, provided certain conditions were met, including the fulfilment of transparency obligations. Paraguay noted that India's latest DS:1 notification showed support for rice of nearly USD 7 billion under Art. 6.4 of the AoA. India also accounted for 44.7% of total world rice exports according to the latest Secretariat report under G/AG/W/32/Rev.21. Paraguay also noted that Members must ensure that 'stocks procured under such programmes do not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other Members'. India had invoked the Bali peace clause three times for its support provided to rice in 2018, 2019 and 2020. The intent behind the request for consultations was to determine further details regarding that support and how India's PSH programme operated. The questions asked by Members for the consultation process were based on questions previously asked in the Committee for which responses provided were not deemed adequate by requesting Members. Paraguay noted that the questions posed to India requested information on the support it provided to its rice sector, including national level payments, and other information required by the Bali Decision. Paraguay thanked India for agreeing to hold bilateral consultations and looked forward to fruitful exchanges.

3.50. Regarding the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, the Chairperson stated that as was announced at the June CoA meeting, the testing of the first module of the Export Competition Questionnaire IT tool project (ECQ project) comprising on-line submissions had taken place in July 2022 with a group of interested Members. A similar small group testing exercise for the second module of the on-line reporting function had taken place in October 2022. The testing exercise had provided very useful feedback to the Secretariat. The Chairperson added that the Secretariat would proceed with the final technical adjustments to launch the next project phase in December which would allow Members to use the online ECQ tool for the submission of their replies to the questionnaire on a full-scale test basis. The Chairperson stated that videos would be made available on the AG IMS to explain how to use the new tool as soon as it was operational. The Secretariat would keep Members informed of the next steps and would provide necessary support to them for the use of the tool. Finally, the Chairperson noted that it would circulate the export competition questionnaire in the coming weeks to initiate the preparations for the 2023 annual dedicated discussions on export competition.

### **3.3 Chair report on the informal meeting of 21 November- Other issues**

3.51. During the informal meeting of 21 November, the Committee continued its deliberations on enhancing transparency and the Committee's review process including the transparency requirements in the areas of export competition and export restrictions. At the formal meeting, the Chairperson provided an oral report on the discussions, which is contained in Annex 2 to this report.

### **3.4 Implementation Related Issues**

3.52. The Chairperson noted that in the Doha Ministerial Decision on implementation-related issues and concerns, the Committee had been asked to follow up on three issues: (i) development of

disciplines to govern the provision of export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes in accordance with Article 10.2; (ii) examination of the possible means of improving the effectiveness of the implementation of the Marrakesh NFIDC Decision; and (iii) continued review of the administration of TRQs and the submission of addenda to Table MA:1 Notifications on tariff rate quota regimes.

3.53. The Chairperson stated that one of the implementation-related matter under this agenda was to examine the means for improving the effectiveness of the implementation of the Marrakesh NFIDC Decision. This had an obvious overlap with the task assigned to the Committee at MC12 under paragraph 8 of the Declaration on Emergency Response to Food Insecurity. The Chairperson suggested to organize discussions on this sub-agenda under the discussions on Para 8 work programme. Concerning the other two sub-items under this agenda dealing with export finance and TRQ administration, the Chairperson noted that these were regularly discussed in detail under the implementation of the Nairobi Export Competition Decision and the Bali Decision on TRQ respectively. The Chairperson stated that for several CoA meetings, including at this November meeting, there were no interventions under this agenda item. The Chairperson invited Members to reflect on how to address the issue of duplication and overlapping agenda items of the Committee for an efficient conduct of meetings.

### 3.5 Annual report to the Council for Trade in Goods

3.54. The Chairperson noted that as per regular practice, a brief factual report on the activities of the Committee in 2022 would be provided to the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG). Accordingly, the Chairperson would submit a factual report, on his own responsibility, reflecting the activities of the Committee. A draft of the report was circulated to Members as a room document.<sup>22</sup> The Chairperson also noted that the draft report would be updated to reflect discussions from the November meeting as well as any comments from Members on the draft.<sup>23</sup>

3.55. The Chairperson added that the Chairperson of the CTG had requested the Chairs of its subsidiary bodies, including the Committee on Agriculture, to prepare factual reports on two issues, namely, (i) the WTO response to the COVID-19 Pandemic and (ii) the current functioning of the Committees.<sup>24</sup> Concerning the first, the Chairperson stated that the intention was to understand how the various bodies had to adjust their work to address pandemic-related issues and challenges. The Chairperson noted that the Committee did an impressive job to continue carrying out its functions during the COVID-19 pandemic, both in terms of the process, starting from a special meeting that the committee held in June 2020 as well as efforts towards enhanced transparency to enable a review of Members' measures taken in response to the pandemic. The Chairperson stated that the second report concerned the current functioning of the Committees, which was one of the issues that Members would like to discuss under WTO reform. Here again, the Chairperson noted that the Committee had a successful story to report especially on the effective digital tools that underpin its work, and which have added transparency and efficiency to the Committee's functions. In that regard, the Chairperson referred to the Secretariat document G/AG/GEN/206 containing detailed background on the digital tools and the Committee's documentation practices. The Chairperson stated that since improving transparency and efficiency of the work of the Committee was an ongoing task, the Committee would deliberate on these matters in 2023. The Chairperson stated that he would prepare those reports requested by the CTG Chair, in consultation with the Secretariat.<sup>25</sup>

### 3.6 Other Business

#### 3.6.1 Renewal of *ad hoc* observer status to IICA

3.56. The Chairperson recalled that at its March 2012 meeting, the Committee had agreed to invite the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) to its regular meetings as an *ad hoc* observer on an annual basis to expedite procedures unless the issue was to be specifically

<sup>22</sup> RD/AG/98 circulated on 18 November 2022.

<sup>23</sup> The final report was circulated on 24 November 2022 in document G/L/1446.

<sup>24</sup> JOB/CTG/18.

<sup>25</sup> The draft reports on "WTO response to the pandemic" and "current functioning of the Committee on Agriculture" were shared with Members for comments as RD/AG/101 and RD/AG/102, respectively. Final reports, incorporating Members' comments were later circulated as documents G/L/1469-G/AG/W/228 on WTO response to the pandemic, and G/L/1470-G/AG/W/229 on current functioning of the Committee on Agriculture.

placed on the agenda by a Member in the intervening meetings. IICA had accordingly been invited to participate in the Committee regular meetings since 2012.

3.57. The Committee agreed to invite IICA as an *ad hoc* observer to participate in the formal meetings of the Committee in 2023.

### **3.6.2 Joint statement by a group of Members on the EU's Proposal for regulation on deforestation-free products**

3.58. Indonesia referred to a letter that it, together with 13 other Members, had sent to the head of the European Parliament, the European Council, and the European Commission on 27 July 2022 expressing concerns with the European Union (EU) proposal for a regulation on deforestation-free products.<sup>26</sup> Indonesia considered that the proposal would create new trade barriers by imposing additional controls and measures and would also negatively impact smallholder producers in developing countries. Indonesia added that the proposed regulation posed a significant challenge to WTO rules and appeared to contain elements which were discriminatory in terms of product coverage and national treatment. Indonesia strongly believed that free trade helped rather than hinder the promotion of sustainable development goals and considered it imperative that regulatory objectives be achieved through a non-trade-restrictive approach.

3.59. Paraguay noted that the transition towards more sustainable production should be gradual and be determined by countries in line with their developmental needs. Such a transition should additionally respect local realities, including social, economic, and environmental characteristics, of different regions. Paraguay argued that Members should implement environmental measures in line with internationally established standards and norms particularly those of the WTO for measures impacting international trade. Paraguay noted some Members achieved their current level of development and industrialization while employing environmentally harmful means and posed climate change related challenges to other countries who otherwise had contributed only marginally to environmental degradation. Expecting those latter countries to employ the same measures to combat climate change without any assistance was against the international legal principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR). Paraguay added that unlike in the EU, producers in Paraguay did not benefit from subsidies; the cost of adapting to the proposed EU measures for its producers were significant and would come out of their income. Countries which contributed the least to climate change were made to bear the burden of compliance; Paraguay wondered how that situation would reconcile with the CBDR and the three pillars of sustainable development. Paraguay alluded to the existing implementational uncertainties related to matters like risk assessment, compliance procedures, country classification under the draft EU regulation and urged the EU to provide details of all those practical matters. Paraguay did not approve the EU's decision to abandon multilateral collaboration and rather adopt unilateral measures and urged the EU to proceed through negotiations and cooperation to achieve environmental objectives.

3.60. Malaysia expressed concerns and disappointment on the unilateral decision introduced by the European Union and urged them to broaden their consultations and engagement with affected countries in an open and inclusive manner.

3.61. While recognizing that the EU's deforestation proposal was provisional, Argentina expressed several systemic concerns with the measure as currently drafted. Argentina noted that its concerns did not relate to the objective of the measure, which were shared virtually by all Members, but rather with regards to its markedly restrictive and protectionist nature and the potential conflict with the balance in other international fora. Argentina referred to available studies showing substantial internal deforestation within the EU territory equivalent to 90% while simultaneously driving global deforestation to further its own economic development fuelling demands by many developing countries for the EU to respect the CBDR. Argentina pointed out that whilst due diligence was a commonplace mechanism in the environment and human right laws, insistence on due diligence from all, independent of the prevailing conditions on the level of protection, seemed excessive. Costly administrative requirements on trading operations, demanding requests for information, excessive penalties for infractions could constitute a disincentive for the diversification of sources of supply for trading operators. Argentina stated that categorizing countries according to the risk they presented in fulfilling the legislation could lead to arbitrary discrimination against companies, sectors, or countries. Argentina stated than an evaluation of the original proposal from

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<sup>26</sup> The letter was later circulated as G/AG/GEN/213.

the EU Commission in line with the amendments put forward by the Council and the Parliament would in principle strengthen the potentially protectionist nature of this initiative. The additional requirements put through by member States and private operators alongside the possibility of unilaterally extending the scope of the measure to additional production sectors in the future created a great deal of uncertainty and concern.

3.62. Guatemala pointed out that all countries had a responsibility to address deforestation, however, it believed that the EU's initiative was restrictive and affected developing countries' interests.

3.63. Brazil noted that the joint letter was a testimony to multiple Members' concerns regarding the proposed legislation. Brazil noted that the evolving drafts of the regulation had included increasingly protectionist and discriminatory elements. It argued against the extra-territoriality of measures which ignored local realities, needs and policies. Brazil referred to figures quoted earlier by the EU in response to question [ID 103006](#) on increasing forest cover in the EU, and noted that the ABC Plan in Brazil had helped recover 26.8 million hectares of degraded pastureland from 2010 to 2020, an area bigger than the territory of the United Kingdom. Brazil stated that the recovery of degraded pastureland produced benefits in all three pillars of sustainable development, generated income, employment, allowed for carbon capture, and food production among other benefits. Brazil underlined economic activities in developing countries needed to be profitable for the concerned producers to also embrace environmentally sustainable practices and Brazil's ABC Plan did precisely that.

3.64. Côte d'Ivoire expressed concern with the European Union's draft regulation on deforestation stating that the legislation did not consider the realities of individual countries suffering from climate change and deforestation. The proposed regulation could be counter-productive to its stated objective and could hamper developing countries' market access to the EU for products such as coffee, palm oil and wood. Côte d'Ivoire called on the EU to respect the principle of the CBDR and to continue its dialogue and consultations with potentially impacted partners. Côte d'Ivoire referred to several concerns included in the joint letter, including on the scope of the measure, the selection criteria for products, definitions involved, the cost and operability of the geo-localization elements; further, the unilateral nature of the deforestation measure and potentially discriminatory criteria could be in conflict with WTO rules. Côte d'Ivoire stated that the objective of protecting the environment could actually be defeated, as small producers in developing countries, in the absence of sufficient resources to undertake additional tasks, would be negatively impacted, compromising their ability to compete in the EU market. The draft regulation addressed only the environmental pillar of sustainability but could create imbalance regarding the other two pillars of sustainable development of society, and economic development which were highly relevant for small producers. Côte d'Ivoire argued for a balance between the three pillars in all sustainability-driven measures and for considering the interest of small producers who were already affected by the crisis. Côte d'Ivoire preferred an approach which entailed consultations with trading partners, and technical and financial assistance to those affected.

3.65. Colombia expressed its concern on the extra-territorial nature of the EU's draft deforestation policy. Colombia pointed out that many Members had more than 50% primary forest coverage making them vulnerable to illegal activities. It noted that combatting deforestation was very costly and difficult especially in tropical and humid countries, which had different realities compared to European countries. Any deforestation measure should consider the relevant geographical and social aspects of concerned countries.

3.66. The European Union thanked intervening Members and expressed its openness to discuss any matter relating to its legislation or draft legislation. The European Union stated that it did not find in Members' interventions a clear link to the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, which would have been relevant for the attention of the Committee on Agriculture. The European Union requested a copy of the written statements so that these could be reviewed and potentially sent to a more appropriate Committee.

3.67. The Chairperson encouraged Members to avoid detailed substantive discussions under "Other Business".

### **3.6.3 Dates of regular meetings in 2023**

3.68. The Secretariat informed the Committee that four meetings were scheduled for 2023, in March, June, September, and November.<sup>27</sup> The dates of all those meetings would uniformly be 27 and 28 of relevant months with the exception of the November meeting which had been scheduled for 27-29 November, given the usually long agenda for that meeting.

3.69. The next (104<sup>th</sup>) regular meeting of the Committee on Agriculture will accordingly be held on 27-28 March 2023. On that basis, the reminder airgram will be issued on 24 February 2023 and the convening airgram will be distributed to Members on Friday 17 March 2023.

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<sup>27</sup> The schedule of meetings in 2023 was later circulated in G/AG/GEN/212.

**ANNEX 1**

Annex 1 includes the full list of questions raised under the various agenda items of the Committee. Members' responses and follow-up exchanges (if applicable) can be accessed through the AG-IMS (<http://agims.wto.org/>) by selecting the function "Search Q&A Submitted Since 1995" and inputting the ID number of the question concerned. This information can also be accessed directly by clicking on the relevant hyperlinks in the last column ("ID number") of tables 1-4 below. Question IDs where replies were yet to be submitted into the AG-IMS as of 12 January 2023 have been identified with the symbol "\*". Members are invited to submit outstanding replies through the AG-IMS at the earliest opportunity.

**Table 1- Specific Implementation Matters (Article 18.6)**

| Specific Implementation Matter  | Question by  | ID Number               |
|---|--|-------------------------|
| Argentina's currency controls and import licensing rules  | United States of America   | <a href="#">103012</a>  |
| Argentina's foreign exchange regime to facilitate soy exports   | European Union   | <a href="#">103041</a>  |
| Argentina's foreign exchange regime to facilitate soy exports   | United States of America   | <a href="#">103013</a>  |
| Argentina's export restrictions   | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, European Union  | <a href="#">103048</a>  |
| Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture-related services | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103078</a>  |
| Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Import duties in excess of the bound rates applied on agricultural goods                      | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103061</a>  |
| European Union, Canada, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Japan - Prohibitions and restrictions on agricultural machinery supplies                                | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103070</a>  |
| Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture-related services | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103079</a>  |
| Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Import duties in excess of the bound rates applied on agricultural goods                      | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103062</a>  |
| Canada's Special Milk Class Scheme  | New Zealand  | <a href="#">103130</a>  |
| Canada's compensation for farmers after trade concessions   | India  | <a href="#">103135</a>  |
| Canada's review of the TRQ system   | United Kingdom   | <a href="#">103086</a>  |
| China's grain subsidies   | Australia  | <a href="#">103087*</a> |
| China's recent agricultural policy modifications  | Brazil   | <a href="#">103004*</a> |
| China's pork reserve programme  | United States of America, Canada, Australia                      | <a href="#">103015*</a> |
| China's pork reserve programme  | United States of America, Canada, Australia                      | <a href="#">103016*</a> |
| China's pork reserve programme  | United States of America, Canada, Australia                      | <a href="#">103017*</a> |
| China's swine support   | United States of America, Canada, Brazil, Australia              | <a href="#">103014*</a> |
| China's Export Restrictions on corn starch  | European Union   | <a href="#">103042*</a> |
| China's export restriction on corn starch   | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan                               | <a href="#">103051*</a> |
| China's cotton reserves purchasing system   | United States of America   | <a href="#">103019*</a> |
| China's cotton reserves purchasing system   | United States of America   | <a href="#">103020*</a> |
| China's cotton reserves purchasing system   | United States of America   | <a href="#">103021*</a> |
| China's cotton reserves purchasing system   | United States of America   | <a href="#">103022*</a> |
| China's Cotton Policies   | United States of America   | <a href="#">103018*</a> |
| Ecuador's new milk law  | United States of America, New Zealand, Australia, European Union | <a href="#">103023</a>  |
| Egypt's Export Prohibitions on Agricultural Products  | Switzerland, United Kingdom                                      | <a href="#">103088*</a> |



| Specific Implementation Matter  | Question by   | ID Number              |
|---|---|------------------------|
| European Union, Canada, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Japan - Prohibitions and restrictions on agricultural machinery supplies                                | Russian Federation  | <a href="#">103069</a> |
| European Union, Iceland, Norway - Prohibitions on road freight transport  | Russian Federation  | <a href="#">103075</a> |
| Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture-related services | Russian Federation  | <a href="#">103080</a> |
| European Union, Norway, Iceland - Prohibitions on access to ports   | Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of  | <a href="#">103066</a> |
| EU's Temporary Framework for State Aid  | Brazil  | <a href="#">103089</a> |
| EU's Blue Box programmes  | India   | <a href="#">103136</a> |
| France - "European Food and Agricultural Resilience Mission" initiative   | Brazil, Paraguay  | <a href="#">103005</a> |
| EU's Deforestation and Forest Degradation Strategy  | Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay   | <a href="#">103006</a> |
| European Union, Canada, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Japan - Prohibitions and restrictions on agricultural machinery supplies                                | Russian Federation  | <a href="#">103071</a> |
| European Union, Iceland, Norway - Prohibitions on road freight transport  | Russian Federation  | <a href="#">103076</a> |
| Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture-related services | Russian Federation  | <a href="#">103081</a> |
| European Union, Norway, Iceland - Prohibitions on access to ports   | Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of  | <a href="#">103068</a> |
| India's dairy subsidies   | Australia   | <a href="#">103090</a> |
| India's food security policies  | United States of America, Japan, Paraguay, New Zealand  | <a href="#">103027</a> |
| India's export restriction on sugar   | Australia   | <a href="#">103091</a> |
| India's public stockholding   | United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union          | <a href="#">103025</a> |
| India's public stockpiling  | United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Ukraine, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union | <a href="#">103026</a> |
| India's other support for rice  | United States of America, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union          | <a href="#">103029</a> |
| India's export restrictions on wheat  | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ukraine, European Union  | <a href="#">103060</a> |
| India's export restrictions on wheat  | Australia   | <a href="#">103092</a> |
| India's price support   | United States of America, Paraguay, Australia   | <a href="#">103024</a> |
| India's export restriction measures on rice   | United States of America, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Paraguay, Australia, New Zealand, European Union        | <a href="#">103028</a> |
| Indonesia's stockholding programmes   | Canada  | <a href="#">103093</a> |
| European Union, Canada, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Japan - prohibitions and restrictions on agricultural machinery supplies                                | Russian Federation  | <a href="#">103074</a> |
| Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture-related services | Russian Federation  | <a href="#">103082</a> |
| Japan's stockpiles of skim milk powder  | Australia   | <a href="#">103094</a> |
| Korea's tariff policies   | New Zealand   | <a href="#">103124</a> |
| Korea's zero tariff quotas  | Australia   | <a href="#">103095</a> |
| Malaysia's chicken and egg subsidies and export restrictions for chicken  | Australia   | <a href="#">103096</a> |
| Mexico's ban on exports of agricultural products  | European Union  | <a href="#">103043</a> |
| Mexico's ban on exports of agricultural products  | Switzerland   | <a href="#">103097</a> |

| Specific Implementation Matter  | Question by  | ID Number               |
|---|--|-------------------------|
| Mexico's ban on exports of agricultural products  | United States of America   | <a href="#">103030</a>  |
| Morocco's export restriction of chickpea (Licence exportation pois chiches)   | European Union   | <a href="#">103044*</a> |
| Canada, European Union, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Japan -Prohibitions and restrictions on agricultural machinery supplies                                 | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103073</a>  |
| Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Unites States - Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture-related services | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103083</a>  |
| Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Import duties in excess of the bound rates applied on agricultural goods                      | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103063</a>  |
| European Union, Canada, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Japan -prohibitions and restrictions on agricultural machinery supplies                                 | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103072</a>  |
| European Union, Iceland, Norway -Prohibitions on road freight transport   | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103077</a>  |
| European Union, Norway, Iceland -Prohibitions on access to ports  | Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of | <a href="#">103067</a>  |
| South Africa's poultry TRQ administration   | Uruguay  | <a href="#">103045*</a> |
| Thailand's Paddy Pledging Scheme  | India  | <a href="#">103137*</a> |
| Türkiye's stone fruit support   | Australia  | <a href="#">103098</a>  |
| Türkiye's export restrictions on agricultural products  | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, European Union  | <a href="#">103054</a>  |
| Türkiye's freight support   | United States of America, Brazil, Australia                      | <a href="#">103031</a>  |
| Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Unites States - Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture-related services | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103084</a>  |
| Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Import duties in excess of the bound rates applied on agricultural goods                      | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103064</a>  |
| U.S. Inflation Reduction Act 2022   | Australia  | <a href="#">103100</a>  |
| Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Unites States - Restrictions on agricultural and agriculture-related services | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103085</a>  |
| Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States - Import duties in excess of the bound rates applied on agricultural goods                      | Russian Federation   | <a href="#">103065</a>  |
| U.S. expanded insurance coverage for soybean and grain sorghum  | Brazil   | <a href="#">103002</a>  |
| U.S. corn support   | China  | <a href="#">103049</a>  |
| U.S. fertilizers  | European Union   | <a href="#">103053</a>  |
| U.S. biofuel infrastructure grants  | European Union   | <a href="#">103055</a>  |
| U.S. Urban Agriculture and Innovative Production  | India  | <a href="#">103138</a>  |
| U.S. Farm Bill 2023   | India  | <a href="#">103139</a>  |
| U.S. American Rescue Plan Act   | Australia  | <a href="#">103099</a>  |
| United States' soybean programmes   | China  | <a href="#">103046</a>  |
| United States' soybean programmes   | China  | <a href="#">103047</a>  |
| U.S. funding for environmental action   | New Zealand  | <a href="#">103107</a>  |

**Table 2- Questions raised in connection with individual notifications**

| Document Symbol                      | Question by                         | Answer by                | Notification Format                                      | Keywords   | ID Number               |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--|--|-------------------------|
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/CHN/57</a>        | Australia                           | China                    | MA:2 - Imports under TQs                                 | Tariff quota fill  | <a href="#">103101*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/CHN/57</a>        | Paraguay                            | China                    | MA:2 - Imports under TQs                                 | Tariff quota fill  | <a href="#">103102*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/CHN/57</a>        | Thailand                            | China                    | MA:2 - Imports under TQs                                 | Other  | <a href="#">103103*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/ISL/65</a>        | Paraguay                            | Iceland                  | MA:2 - Imports under TQs                                 | Tariff quota fill  | <a href="#">103104</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/ISL/66</a>        | New Zealand                         | Iceland                  | MA:2 - Imports under TQs                                 | Tariff quota fill  | <a href="#">103105</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MYS/54</a>        | Brazil                              | Malaysia                 | MA:2 - Imports under TQs                                 | Tariff quota fill  | <a href="#">103003*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/162</a>       | Brazil, Argentina                   | United States of America | MA:2 - Imports under TQs                                 | Tariff quota fill  | <a href="#">103001</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/AUS/129/Rev.1</a> | India                               | Australia                | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Non-product-specific AMS   | <a href="#">103140</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/AUS/142</a>       | United States of America            | Australia                | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Other product-specific AMS/EMS   | <a href="#">103032</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/CAN/151</a>       | India                               | Canada                   | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Market price support   | <a href="#">103106</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/EU/79</a>         | Australia                           | European Union           | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Other product-specific AMS/EMS   | <a href="#">103108</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/GEO/28</a>        | United States of America            | Georgia                  | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103034*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/GEO/28</a>        | United States of America            | Georgia                  | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | General services: infrastructural services   | <a href="#">103033*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/JPN/277</a>       | India                               | Japan                    | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Public stockholding for food security purposes                                     | <a href="#">103141</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MYS/53</a>        | United States of America, Australia | Malaysia                 | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103035*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MYS/53</a>        | United States of America, Australia | Malaysia                 | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103036*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MEX/56</a>        | Australia                           | Mexico                   | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103109</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MEX/56</a>        | Canada                              | Mexico                   | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103110</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MEX/56</a>        | Japan                               | Mexico                   | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103112</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MEX/56</a>        | New Zealand                         | Mexico                   | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103113</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MEX/56</a>        | United States of America            | Mexico                   | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Direct payments: structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids | <a href="#">103037</a>  |

| Document Symbol                      | Question by              | Answer by                | Notification Format                                      | Keywords   | ID Number               |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|--|-------------------------|
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MEX/56</a>        | United States of America | Mexico                   | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Direct payments: structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids | <a href="#">103039</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MEX/56</a>        | United States of America | Mexico                   | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Input subsidies available to low-income or resource-poor producers                 | <a href="#">103038</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/NZL/132</a>       | India                    | New Zealand              | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | General services: pest and disease control   | <a href="#">103142</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/PAK/17/Corr.1</a> | European Union           | Pakistan                 | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Public stockholding for food security purposes                                     | <a href="#">103114*</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/PRY/34</a>        | India                    | Paraguay                 | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Domestic food aid  | <a href="#">103143</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/PHL/85</a>        | Japan                    | Philippines              | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Input subsidies available to low-income or resource-poor producers                 | <a href="#">103115</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/RUS/37</a>        | Brazil                   | Russian Federation       | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Direct payments: other   | <a href="#">103007</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/RUS/37</a>        | Thailand                 | Russian Federation       | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Direct payments: other   | <a href="#">103117</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/RUS/37</a>        | Paraguay                 | Russian Federation       | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Other product-specific AMS/EMS   | <a href="#">103116</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/GBR/11</a>        | European Union           | United Kingdom           | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Market price support: Eligible production  | <a href="#">103050</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/157</a>       | Canada                   | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103118</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/157</a>       | Canada                   | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Other product-specific AMS/EMS   | <a href="#">103119</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>       | Australia                | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)   | <a href="#">103122</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>       | New Zealand, Paraguay    | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Annex 2 (Green Box)  | <a href="#">103131</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>       | Australia                | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | General services: infrastructural services   | <a href="#">103120</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>       | Australia                | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Domestic food aid  | <a href="#">103121</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>       | Brazil, Paraguay         | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Domestic food aid  | <a href="#">103009</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>       | Japan                    | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Domestic food aid  | <a href="#">103126</a>  |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>       | New Zealand              | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Domestic food aid  | <a href="#">103132</a>  |

| Document Symbol                     | Question by  | Answer by                | Notification Format                                      | Keywords   | ID Number              |
|-------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|--|--|------------------------|
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | European Union                                     | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Direct payments: payments under environmental programmes | <a href="#">103056</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | European Union                                     | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Current Total AMS (Amber Box)                            | <a href="#">103052</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | New Zealand  | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Current Total AMS (Amber Box)                            | <a href="#">103133</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | Brazil   | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Market price support: Eligible production                | <a href="#">103010</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | Australia  | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Other product-specific AMS/EMS                           | <a href="#">103123</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | Australia  | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Other product-specific AMS/EMS                           | <a href="#">103125</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | New Zealand  | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Other product-specific AMS/EMS                           | <a href="#">103144</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | European Union                                     | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Non-product-specific AMS                                 | <a href="#">103057</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | Brazil   | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Classification of measures                               | <a href="#">103008</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/USA/166</a>      | New Zealand  | United States of America | DS:1 - Exempt and non-exempt support - Current total AMS | Classification of measures                               | <a href="#">103134</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/BRA/68</a>       | India  | Brazil                   | DS:2 - New or modified DS                                | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)               | <a href="#">103145</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/GBR/14</a>       | Brazil, Paraguay                                   | United Kingdom           | DS:2 - New or modified DS                                | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)               | <a href="#">103011</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/GBR/14</a>       | European Union                                     | United Kingdom           | DS:2 - New or modified DS                                | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)               | <a href="#">103059</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/GBR/14</a>       | India  | United Kingdom           | DS:2 - New or modified DS                                | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)               | <a href="#">103146</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/GBR/14</a>       | United States of America                           | United Kingdom           | DS:2 - New or modified DS                                | Transparency issues (including Table DS:2)               | <a href="#">103040</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/GBR/4</a>        | Australia  | United Kingdom           | DS:2 - New or modified DS                                | Classification of measures                               | <a href="#">103127</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/EU/77/Rev.2</a>  | Paraguay   | European Union           | ER:1 - Export restrictions                               | Timely notification                                      | <a href="#">103147</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/MYS/52/Add.1</a> | United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, European Union | Malaysia                 | ER:1 - Export restrictions                               | Importing Members' food security                         | <a href="#">103058</a> |
| <a href="#">G/AG/N/JPN/269</a>      | Australia  | Japan                    | NF:1 - NFIDC Decision                                    | NFIDC  | <a href="#">103128</a> |

**Table 3 - Questions raised under agenda item "Overdue notifications"**

| Question by | Answer by | ID Number               |
|-------------|-----------|-------------------------|
| India       | Uruguay   | <a href="#">103111*</a> |



**ANNEX 2****CHAIR REPORT ON THE INFORMAL MEETING ON 'ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY  
AND THE COA REVIEW PROCESS' OF 21 NOVEMBER****(AGENDA ITEM 2.C)**

During yesterday's informal meeting Members discussed two topics related to transparency and the work of this committee.

Under the **first topic**, Members continued their engagement on a Domestic Support Database based on a joint submission by a group of Members in document RD/AG/92. In light of the discussions on this matter at the June and September Informal Committee meetings, I suggested that the Secretariat could prepare a methodological note on the proposed database with the details of technical elements required for its construction so as to encourage practical discussions on the matter to make progress. The Secretariat in that methodological note would also explain the existing structure of the AG-IMS reports under the domestic support pillar and the current status in terms of the accuracy/functioning of such reports.

Several Members pointed out the inadequacies and factual discrepancies in the existing AG-IMS domestic support database and supported my idea for a methodological note on the proposed database to be prepared by the Secretariat to kickstart discussions on the proposed database. Simultaneously, some other Members preferred to first undertake an informed stock-taking of the existing Secretariat database to in order to appreciate what additionality or upgrade would need to be considered in order for it to cater to Members' needs. At the end, there was a convergence around the idea that the Secretariat should organize a working session on the existing AG-IMS database prior to the next Committee meeting in March 2023. One Member, who is also a cosponsor of RD/AG/92 indicated that it might present its existing domestic support database to enable a comparative appreciation of what currently exists and what is potentially targeted to be accomplished.

The Secretariat expressed willingness to organize a working session on the existing AG-IMS database in the coming period. The Secretariat also clarified that it had been working over the last several months on the AG-IMS domestic support reporting functions which was not yet ready for use. To avoid any additional confusion, the Secretariat would disable this function until work on these reports had been finalized.

On the **second topic**, the European Union presented its submission on "transparency in the areas of export competition and export restriction". The EU referred to the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity and highlighted that enhanced transparency of trade policies had gained increased importance in the context of the current global crisis. The EU proposed to initially target the areas of Export restrictions and Prohibitions, Export Competition and International Food aid to improve and streamline the respective transparency obligations while also reducing administrative burden for notifying governments. In the areas of export competition including international food aid, the EU presented a number of concrete ideas to streamline the existing ES notification requirements following the adoption of the Nairobi Decision on export competition while not lessening or losing the existing level of transparency. The EU also underlined the need for improving transparency of export restriction, *inter alia*, by clarifying the existing transparency requirements and deadlines especially during the current global situation when export restrictions were high on the global political agenda. The EU also alluded to the need for examining the linkage in the functions of the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on Market Access in respect of transparency of export restrictions.

Several Members supported the EU's ideas and objectives to improve transparency, including in the area of export restrictions, and expressed willingness to participate in the technical discussions. Some of them also shared the view that proposed simplification and streamlining of export subsidy notifications should not lead to loss of important information. Simultaneously, some other Members didn't share the priority accorded to only select agricultural topics for improving transparency; these Members in turn also emphasized the need for enhanced transparency in the domestic support and market access pillars. Referring to the earlier discussions in the CoASS, one Member didn't support singling out transparency as a separate pillar for targeted discussions; similarly, a question was raised whether the regular Committee had the authority and mandate to enhance the existing

transparency requirements. One Member cautioned that discussions should not lead to creating additional transparency burden for developing countries.

I indicated at the end that the issue of enhanced transparency and improved notification compliance will continue to be on the agenda of the next informal CoA meeting.

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