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Committee on Agriculture

DECISION ON MEASURES CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE
EFFECTS OF THE REFORM PROGRAMME ON LEAST-DEVELOPED
AND NET FOOD-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL'S CONSULTATIONS WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND THE WORLD BANK

Note by the Secretariat

In response to the request made in this regard at the meeting of the Committee on Agriculture on 28-29 September 1995, the Director-General in his recent consultations with the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the World Bank raised a number of questions concerning their respective contributions to the follow-up under paragraph 5 of the Ministerial Decision of the Least -Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries. The questions raised by the Director-General were as follows:

- (i) Whether the IMF/World Bank could envisage giving net-food importing developing countries some degree of priority in access to existing facilities;
- (ii) whether any softening of conditionality could be envisaged in the case of net food importers that face Uruguay Round-related problems;
- (iii) what are prospects for establishing any new facilities with the specific objective of assisting net food importers in coping with such adjustment problems;
- (iv) in which ways could the WTO assist any efforts in the part of the IMF/World Bank to be forthcoming in this matter.

The President of the World Bank's response to these questions are set out in the attachment hereto and are for consideration in the context of the Committee's monitoring of the follow-up to the Decision at the next meeting of the Committee on 20-21 November 1995. The IMF's response to these questions would as appropriate be made available prior to or at the meeting of the Committee. The IMF and the World Bank have been invited to be represented as observers for the discussion on the subject at the November meeting of the Committee.

ATTACHMENT

The World Bank's Contribution to Follow-up on the Uruguay Round Decision
on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the
Reform Programme on Least-Developed and
Net Food-Importing Countries

Response to Mr. Ruggiero's Questions

The World Bank is attentive to the problems of the Net Food-Importers, monitoring their situation both in the context of world grain markets and through its regular country dialogue. It recognizes that increases in world food prices both raise the financing needs on net-food importing countries and create new opportunities for investment that will contribute to their longer-term development. It is important to note, however, that, based on analysis conducted within the Bank, the WTO and other organizations, the Bank believes that the impact of the Uruguay Round on world food prices will be very small, especially relative to their normal fluctuations.¹

Given the small size of the shock and the Bank's substantial headroom above current IBRD loans outstanding, it seems clear that the Bank will be in a position to meet any conceivable demand generated by the Round for loans on IBRD terms. Its ability to assist the poorest countries on concessional terms, on the other hand, will depend upon the willingness of member governments to replenish IDA. Unless donor countries maintain support for IDA, the Bank's ability to assist poor countries facing serious adjustment pressures from food price rises, or any other causes, will be severely diminished.

The Bank's responses to the four specific questions posed by Mr. Ruggiero are as follows:

- (i) In general, the priority that a country receives for World Bank lending is determined by its overall need and the contribution that the Bank can make to its long-term development. These are assessed paying regard to both country-specific and global factors. For example, if as a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round a country were to undertake a sound liberalization of its agricultural or trade policies, and if it required assistance in dealing with the resulting transition costs, support would be forthcoming because of the contribution of liberalization to development.
- (ii) The conditionality associated with World Bank lending is designed to facilitate the successful outcome and high development impact of the project or policy reform in question. Thus relaxing or waiving conditionality is more likely to hinder than to help economic and social development. Conditionality is central to achieving effective adjustment, and the Bank should lend only against sound projects and effective adjustment programmes.
- (iii) The range of facilities available from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Food Program is summarized in the appended paper on "Coping with Rising World Grain Prices". Given this range, it does not seem necessary to establish a special Uruguay Round adjustment facility. Even though there may be important impacts of the Round on particular net food-importing countries, these will become evident in the context of the Bank's ongoing dialogues with member countries and the

¹The recent sharp increases in world grain prices are not due to the Uruguay Round, deriving instead, from factors such as crop failures and low stock levels.

total borrowing needs they give rise to are likely to be very small relative to the potential lending of the international financial institutions. Moreover, any funds allocated to such a special facility would necessarily be subtracted from those available for the countries with the greatest overall need.

- (iv) The World Bank welcomes dialogue with the WTO on identifying areas in which they can be of assistance to Bank member countries. In terms of immediate cooperation, it places particular value on the collaborative research currently being discussed by staff of the Bank and the WTO Secretariat on the implications of the Uruguay Round for Africa - a region where net-food importing problems loom particularly large.

COPING WITH RISING WORLD GRAIN PRICES²

World grain prices have risen sharply over the last several months and further price increases are possible because of low world stocks and poor growing conditions in several major producing regions. High prices are expected to last for the next year and possibly the next two years. The price increases will significantly raise import costs for many countries. For example, the cost of wheat imports in 1995 would rise by 60 per cent from 1994 levels based on recent price increases and lower export subsidies from major exporters. This note discusses issues and options to assist countries to deal with the situation.

Introduction

An unusual combination of events have come together to make grain prices rise sharply this year. These events include: (i) the lowest level of world grain stocks relative to consumption since 1974; (ii) higher fertilizer prices during the recent planting season in the northern hemisphere which will reduce yields; and (iii) a poor start to the growing season in the United States, China, and Russia. This situation occurs at a time when a drought has reduced food production by nearly one third in some countries in Southern Africa; many of the Republics of the FSU are relying on food aid to offset collapsing food production; and food aid availability is declining.

Wheat prices have increased from \$3.42/bushel in March to a recent high of \$4.85 for December futures, an increase of 43 per cent. Corn futures prices have increased from \$2.55/bushel in March to \$3.00. Rice prices have increased by \$40/ton in just the last month due to strong demand and low rice stocks for export in Asia. Further price increases can be expected if the growing conditions do not dramatically improve. Current price increases will lead to higher import costs for many countries and higher prices will also reduce the availability of export subsidies from major exporters. For example, the f.o.b. price of US wheat has increased from \$140/ton in March 1994 to \$159/ton in June 1995 and the US export subsidy has declined from \$49/ton to \$14/ton.

This note is intended to provide information about programmes available from the IMF, the World Bank and the World Food Programme to deal with a sharp rise in grain prices such as we are now experiencing. These facilities should be relied upon to assist countries to cope with rising grain import costs rather than allowing countries to pursue policies which can cause longer term damage to investment programmes and economic growth, such as export restrictions, or to allow hunger and malnutrition to increase.

Which countries will be most affected

Nearly all developing countries import grain and will be affected. At this stage the price increases have been largest in wheat and those countries who import wheat will be most affected. However, maize and rice prices have also begun to increase and are expected to continue increasing. Beyond the general increase in import costs, those countries which also have production problems will be severely affected. (FAO's estimates of import requirements for individual countries are attached to this document.)

²Technical staffs from the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB) have formed an informal coordinating committee to monitor the situation. This note was prepared by Hans Binswanger (AGRDR) and Donald Mitchell (IECCP) under the direction of Alex McCalla (AGRDR). Numerous staff from the WB, IMF, FAO and WEP commented or contributed to this note, but any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

The early warning systems of FAO and USDA indicate that countries in Southern Africa and Northern Africa have severe problems this year. The most severe production problems are in Southern Africa where widespread drought has adversely affected food crop production according to FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions. The aggregate 1995 cereal output in the 11 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) member countries is estimated to be about one third below the previous year's harvest and 20 per cent below normal. Production in Northern Africa is also poor with the winter grain crop now being harvested expected to be sharply below average in Morocco and Tunisia, while Algeria expects an above normal crop and Egypt expects to harvest a record crop. Morocco has been hit by the worst drought in decades according to FAO.

Policies to ensure food access of the poor during a spike

Poor consumers spend over 70 per cent of their income on food in many low income countries. In such countries, it is appropriate to partially insulate the poor from the international food price rises or compensate their purchasing power to ensure access to food and prevent hunger. Appropriate domestic mechanisms could include employment generation programmes or well targeted food subsidies for the poor. Government held food stocks could be released into the market in order to limit price rises and the government could partially finance imports. Food availability can also be increased via additional concessional imports or food aid. Unfortunately a commodity boom often reduces the quantity of food aid available. Where prices of other tradeable foods which are important to the poor, such as sugar, are protected, trade could be liberalized to reduce domestic prices and provide a compensating increase in purchasing power. If such options and programmes are not used, countries are likely to resort to more drastic means, such as export restrictions, or subsidization of food prices with adverse macroeconomic consequences.

Care must be taken in short-term food price spikes to make sure that both purchasing power of the poor and the food supply are increased simultaneously. If purchasing power alone is increased (e.g. through food stamps), then food prices will inflate and the consumption effect will be minimal. If food supply alone is increased (through commercial imports or monetized food aid), prices may not rise but the poor will still lack the purchasing power to buy the food.

Food aid

Food aid is available to help some countries which suffer a severe drought or other problems which create a food import requirement. However, the quantities of food aid are not sufficient to meet the import needs of many countries. In 1994, only 5 per cent of world grain imports were shipped as food aid. Among developing countries, food aid provided 11 per cent of grain imports. Most of the food aid is being used for refugee and emergency relief, which reduces food aid available to help countries experiencing droughts or countries with greater than normal need due to rising world market prices.

Food aid is distributed through bilateral and multilateral channels, with bilateral deliveries typically accounting for about two thirds of food aid and the remaining deliveries through multilateral channels. The World Food Programme accounts for most of the food aid delivered through multilateral channels. In 1994, the World Food Programme delivered 4.0 million tons, of which 1.5 million tons were procured in developing countries. The WFP also handles the shipment of food for many bilateral donors on a contract basis. The availability of food aid this year and for the foreseeable future is expected to decline due to budget reductions of the major donors.

IMF assistance in the event of a cereal price shock

The IMF is the lead organization in providing balance-of-payments financing, including increases in the cost of cereal imports. The IMF has two basic modes of providing financial assistance to member countries in the event they experience balance-of-payments difficulties resulting from a rise in international cereals prices: (a) the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) and (b) Fund arrangements.

Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF)

The CCFF is a special facility that provides financial assistance to members experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties arising from shortfalls in export receipts or excess cereal import costs. Recent purchases under the cereal element of the CCFF have been made by Algeria, Moldova, and South Africa. The "response time" from a case involving a CCFF purchase request could be as quick as two or three months and a purchase can be in anticipation of a projected excess in cereal import costs.

To qualify for compensatory financing, the excess in cereal import costs must be temporary, largely beyond the control of the member, and result in a need for balance-of-payments financing. The allowable amount of a purchase request under the CCFF is the lesser of the compensable cereal import cost excess and the applicable access limit under the facility. The compensable excess is the amount by which the value of cereal imports in the "excess year" exceeds the arithmetic average of the value of cereal imports for the five-year period centred on the excess year. Access limits under the facility vary depending on whether the member's balance-of-payments difficulties extend beyond the source of the shock and whether the member has a satisfactory record of cooperation with the Fund. If the member's balance-of-payments position is satisfactory apart from the excess cereal import costs, access under the cereal element is up to 65 per cent of the member's quota. If the member's balance-of-payment difficulties extend beyond the excess cereal import costs, access is limited to 15-35 per cent of quota, depending on the member's record of cooperation with the Fund and the strength of the member's economic policies.

Repurchase terms and charges under the CCFF are the same as those under the credit tranches: Repurchases are due 3¼ to 5 years after a purchase is made, and the rate of charge is equal to the rate of charge on the Fund's general resources, currently about 5 per cent per annum. Purchases under the CCFF are additional to resources available under Fund arrangements.

Fund arrangements

Balance-of-payments assistance can also be provided under stand-by or extended arrangements and, for low income countries, under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which provides resources on concessional terms. Fund arrangements can provide for flexibility in the case of un-anticipated external terms of trade shocks, such as higher prices for cereal imports, through the inclusion of a contingency mechanism and/or through augmentation of access under an arrangement.

Contingency mechanisms normally provide for a combination of financing and adjustment in policies in the event of unanticipated exogenous developments. For example, in the case of higher-than-programmed import costs owing to a sharp rise in world cereals prices, a programme could allow for automatic adjustment in programme targets to accommodate all or some proportion of the increased import costs. The Fund's Executive Board has stressed the importance of greater use of contingency mechanisms to protect programmes against adverse shocks (as well as to preserve some of the gains of favourable shocks). Since 1990, such mechanisms have been included in 10 ESAF arrangements. Of these, Lesotho had a contingency mechanism related to cereal import costs.

The Fund also stands ready to consider augmenting access order fund arrangements on a timely basis, when appropriate, to help countries meet adverse exogenous shocks. In such a case, the country authorities and the Fund would reassess the adjustment and financing needs as the programme unfolds, either at the time of a mid-term review or at the request of the member. In reviewing access, the availability of additional donor financing (including food aid) to cope with the shocks is taken into account. Thus far, there have been seven cases of augmentation access under ESAF arrangements, including for Mozambique in 1992 related to maize imports.

World Bank assistance with food availability

The Bank can also assist in increasing the financing capacity of countries to import foods, but its role is usually a subsidiary one to the IMF. The Bank has been able to facilitate overcoming food shortages or high food prices in a number of ways. This is not outside its mandate, especially not in cases where a country needs to import food because of a specific combination of events, and where failure to do so can derail hard-won improvements in macroeconomic management and sectoral policies.

The most common bank action in the face of food shortages caused by drought has been to modify project expenditures in order to facilitate a country's capacity to deal with a drought. In this case, the government and the Bank agree to reallocate funds in existing projects to finance actions needed to respond to the drought. In most cases, this does not include direct purchase of food, but since the funds are often in foreign exchange, which is fungible, governments are often able to indirectly use the funds to finance food. More often the funds are used to finance transport, storage, spare parts, water supply or other uses important to the movement or utilization of food. Examples of this were common in the Bank's response to the Southern Africa drought in 1992.

Economic Recovery Loans (ERLs) often come after the event, but are usually used to finance transport, seeds, fertilizer, etc., which facilitate the capacity of the country or affected farmers to prepare for the following year's crop. Such loans or credits have been used in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. They were used during the 1974 and 1985 droughts in the Sahel and Horn of Africa.

The sizeable Economic Recovery Credit for Zimbabwe, as a part of the Bank's response to the 1992 drought (\$200 million, combined with other funds reallocations to total roughly \$350 million) was used to deal with multiple elements of the response to the drought. Probably the major contributions of the Bank's total financing for that operation, however, was that is provided balance-of-payment support (at least indirectly) that enabled the government to do many things, including import food that were not an explicit part of the project. In fact, a major motivation for the Bank's action was to sustain the structural adjustment programme that was just starting.

A very important benefit of Bank actions has not been the direct elements financed, but the indirect element of providing balance-of-payments support, which enables countries to import food, medicine and other essentials, which are often driven out by the loss of exports and need for emergency imports, which characterize drought periods or international food price spikes.

Also, the Bank could structure many of its projects, especially in agriculture and in drought-prone areas, so that they could be expanded or modified to help the project area cope with the drought. There could be specific project components that would only be activated in case of droughts. This would enable a country to begin to act at the early stages of the drought and stay with the local communities throughout the drought. Most of our projects tend to be wiped out, or seriously set back by droughts (Sudan is an example).

Finally, an important action the Bank can take in the future is to build drought planning into its country strategies in countries where droughts are relatively frequent. In such cases, the Bank should

have a clear policy about what preparation it will support before these events occur, what it will do in the case of droughts of different magnitudes, and what it will do for recovery. At present, most Bank concern is with the latter. Droughts are treated as an unexpected event which they are not in many drought-prone countries. In fact, growth projections for such countries should consider the impact of droughts.

World Food Programme assistance

The World Food Programme, the food aid arm of the United Nations, responds to emergency needs caused by food price hikes or other disruptions in food supply and access. WFP works to combat acute hunger by organizing fast delivery of relief food to people affected by natural or human disasters and promotes long-term development in poorest countries by supplying targeted food aid in support of activities to enhance human resources and physical infrastructure.

To prevent hunger and starvation, WFP stands ready to identify needs, and in collaboration with host governments and other agencies, to help supply food to distressed populations at the outset of an emergency. This can be achieved through the distribution of emergency food rations to targeted populations, implementation of supplementary feeding programmes, assistance in drawing down emergency food reserves, and/or in the form of (food) wages transferred to participants of labour-intensive work projects.

WFP also devotes equal attention to the importance of laying the foundation for longer-term development, by fostering conditions for human and capital asset enhancement during and after major emergencies. In many countries, the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced people is dependent on WFP assistance. Labour-intensive work programmes support the reconstruction of infrastructure, the restoration of basic services and training activities that promote greater food security and self-reliance.

Donor coordination

An important contribution in times of impending emergency, such as the drought in Southern Africa in 1992-93 is the willingness of institutions, such as the World Bank, WFP, FAO, SADAC, USAID and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to move quickly and to coordinate their efforts. In the face of the impending 1992 drought in Southern Africa, all of these agencies sent early assessment teams to the Southern Africa region to assess the situation, determine the nature of the food and financial resources necessitated by the drought, to analyse the logistical problems and capabilities of the affected countries, and to organize timely donor meetings to ensure the projects were in place and that the needed resources were available.

As a result of their joint efforts - which reflected a willingness by countries and agencies to shorten and coordinate their individual actions in an effort to match the regional problem with an appropriate response - more than 10 million tons of additional food and over \$800 million in financial resources were put in place in advance of the worst impacts of the drought. As a result, the 1992 drought, while it had serious adverse effects on Southern Africa, did not result in famine. Few if any lives were lost as a direct result of the drought.

The importance of early and effective coordination is as much attitudinal as it is process. Agencies need to reinforce existing processes by quick and accurate assessments and a willingness to subordinate processes and procedures to the need for early and effective actions. In the case of the South African drought, the World Bank was prepared to put its staff and financial resources at the service of higher coordinated responses and to support and advise the actions of others.

Contacts

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Estimated Import Requirements of Cereals: Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries¹ (thousand tons)
(a) Estimates for 1994/95 or 1995

Country	Marketing year	1993/94 or 1994			1994/95 or 1995			
		Actual imports			Total import requirements (excluding re-exports)	Import position		
		Commercial purchases	Food aid	Total commercial and aid		Total commercial and aid	Food aid allocated committed or shipped	Commercial purchases
AFRICA		18,229.3	4,309.7	22,539.0	20,750	18,845.7	3,150.8	15,714.9
<u>Northern Africa</u>		19,777.0	325.9	11,102.9	10,605	10,698.2	226.4	10,471.8
Egypt	July/June	7,921.2	181.7	8,102.9	8,505	8,598.2	158.8	8,439.4
Morocco	July/June	2,855.8	144.2	3,000.0	2,100	2,100.0	67.6	2,032.4
Eastern Africa		2,299.5	2,173.8	4,473.3	2,859	2,129.9	1,235.5	893.5
Burundi	Jan./Dec.	29.9	96.0	125.9	46	12.9	12.9	0.0
Comoros	Jan./Dec.	36.9	6.1	43.0	44	4.6	2.3	2.3
Djibouti	Jan./Dec.	113.8	10.6	124.4	82	20.9	8.9	12.0
Eritrea	Jan./Dec.	33.0	287.2	370.2	50	29.6	29.6	0.0
Ethiopia ²	Jan./Dec.	53.0	925.1	976.1	964	495.9	495.8	0.1
Kenya	July/June	1,365.8	300.4	1,666.2	290	586.6	156.1	430.5
Rwanda	Jan./Dec.	0.0	199.4	199.4	131	220.7	220.7	0.0
Somalia	July/June	34.1	88.8	122.1	295	136.7	66.4	70.3
Sudan	Nov./Oct.	445.4	219.2	664.6	475	137.0	55.4	81.6
Tanzania	June/May	118.6	19.3	137.9	435	434.8	145.9	288.9
Uganda	Jan./Dec.	19.0	24.5	43.5	47	49.3	41.5	7.8
<u>Southern Africa</u>		1,031.9	952.2	1,984.1	2,651	2,710.7	973.8	1,736.9
Angola	April/Mar.	59.9	193.1	253.0	560	560.0	296.7	263.3
Lesotho	April/Mar.	214.3	28.1	242.4	204	204.0	32.0	172.0
Madagascar	Jan./Dec.	81.4	33.2	114.6	178	200.4	23.4	177.6
Malawi	April/Mar.	84.3	160.8	245.1	493	492.0	279.0	212.3
Mozambique	May/April	109.7	437.8	547.5	600	600.0	324.2	275.8
Swaziland	May/April	47.1	22.0	69.1	76	76.0	8.7	67.3
Zambia	May/April	2.9	8.8	11.7	390	390.0	3.9	386.1
Zimbabwe	April/Mar.	432.3	68.4	500.7	150	188.3	5.2	183.1
<u>Western Africa</u>		3,470.2	744.9	4,215.1	4,092	2,869.5	607.6	2,261.9
<i>Coastal Countries</i>		2,330.4	502.1	2,832.5	2,693	2,251.7	357.0	1,894.7

(cont' d)

Country	Marketing year	1993/94 or 1994			1994/95 or 1995			
		Actual imports			Total import requirements (excluding re-exports)	Import position		
		Commercial purchases	Food aid	Total commercial and aid		Total commercial and aid	Food aid allocated committed or shipped	Commercial purchases
Benin	Jan./Dec.	80.5	17.4	97.9	96	98.5	12.3	86.2
Côte d'Ivoire	July/June	332.8	47.6	380.4	500	500.0	62.3	437.7
Ghana	Oct./Sept.	169.6	141.6	311.2	275	274.5	91.8	182.7
Guinea	Jan./Dec.	121.4	85.6	207.0	182	14.1	0.0	14.1
Liberia	Jan./Dec.	31.4	168.4	199.8	240	176.0	165.0	11.0
Nigeria	July/June	1,383.4	0.0	1,383.4	1,100	1,100.0	0.0	1,100.0
Sierra Leone	Jan./Dec.	125.1	34.0	159.1	172	44.4	22.5	21.9
Togo	Jan./Dec.	86.2	7.5	93.7	128	44.2	3.1	41.1
<i>Sahellian countries</i>		1,139.8	242.8	1,382.6	1,399	617.8	250.6	367.2
Burkina Faso	Nov./Oct.	122.6	35.5	158.1	110	52.0	42.5	9.5
Cape Verde	Jan./Dec.	24.9	64.0	88.9	90	88.3	83.4	4.9
Chad	Nov./Oct.	78.7	13.2	91.9	50	25.9	22.7	3.2
Gambia	Nov./Oct.	69.0	5.5	74.5	74	19.2	4.0	15.2
Guinea Bissau	Jan./Dec.	49.1	3.9	53.0	65	12.0	6.3	5.7
Mali	Nov./Oct.	62.5	23.6	86.1	60	13.2	11.8	1.4
Mauritania	Nov./Oct.	161.4	46.3	207.7	190	127.4	45.8	81.6
Niger	Nov./Oct.	84.5	24.0	108.5	90	41.2	18.6	22.6
Senegal	Nov./Oct.	487.1	26.8	513.9	670	238.6	15.5	223.1
<u>Central Africa</u>		650.7	112.9	763.6	543	458.3	107.5	350.8
Cameroon	July/June	370.7	2.7	373.4	210	210.0	2.9	207.1
Central African Rep.	Sept./Aug	33.8	1.2	35.0	30	11.3	0.8	10.5
Congo	July/June	86.7	1.7	88.4	90	90.0	33.9	56.1
Eq. Guinea	Jan./Dec.	7.2	2.8	10.0	11	3.3	3.3	0.0
Sao Tome	Jan./Dec.	1.8	8.4	10.2	12	4.7	2.5	2.2
Zaire	Jan./Dec.	150.5	96.1	246.6	190	139.0	64.1	74.9
ASIA		28,856.7	1,879.1	30,735.8	41,833	41,633.0	2,074.1	39,558.9
Afghanistan	July/June	1,015.4	64.6	1,080.0	1,150	1,150.0	151.7	998.3
Bangladesh	July/June	545.9	654.1	1,200.0	2,411	2,411.0	963.8	1,447.2
Bhutan	July/June	29.0	1.0	30.0	32	32.2	0.2	32.0
Cambodia	Jan./Dec.	150.2	29.8	180.0	200	69.9	64.0	5.9

(cont'd)

Country	Marketing year	1993/94 or 1994			1994/95 or 1995			
		Actual imports			Total import requirements (excluding re-exports)	Import position		
		Commercial purchases	Food aid	Total commercial and aid		Total commercial and aid	Food aid allocated committed or shipped	Commercial purchases
China ³	July/June	14,144.8	119.2	14,264.0	23,000	23,003.2	224.0	22,779.2
India	July/June	266.8	295.2	562.0	150	177.0	96.0	79.0
Indonesia	April/Mar.	3,012.4	97.5	3,109.9	3,940	5,215.0	32.2	5,182.8
Jordan	July/June	1,345.1	220.9	1,566.0	1,717	1,717.0	128.8	1,588.2
Lao	Jan./Dec.	193.7	12.3	206.0	70	0.8	0.8	0.0
Maldives	Jan./Dec.	49.9	1.4	51.3	36	4.4	0.0	4.4
Mongolia	Oct./Sept.	0.0	25.0	25.0	140	12.7	11.7	1.0
Nepal	July/June	52.5	14.5	67.0	137	137.0	14.7	122.3
Pakistan ⁴	May/April	2,215.0	0.0	2,215.0	2,500	2,500.0	21.8	2,478.2
Philippines	July/June	2,278.0	45.8	2,323.8	2,500	2,526.7	108.7	2,418.0
Sri Lanka	Jan./Dec.	853.8	209.8	1,063.6	1,200	651.5	141.1	510.4
Syria	July/June	932.8	59.4	992.2	690	690.0	45.4	644.6
Yemen	Jan./Dec.	1,771.4	28.6	1,800.0	1,960	1,334.6	67.2	1,267.4
CENTRAL AMERICA		2,325.3	680.7	2,806.0	3,085	2,628.3	272.6	2,355.7
Dominican Rep.	Jan./Dec.	1,156.8	1.7	1,158.5	868	499.0	2.5	496.5
El Salvador	Aug./July	283.1	80.4	363.5	477	363.5	18.0	345.5
Guatemala	July/June	211.5	299.6	511.1	588	593.8	108.0	485.8
Haiti	July/June	146.0	112.2	258.2	402	412.7	39.0	373.7
Honduras	July/June	223.8	124.7	348.5	513	514.0	95.4	418.6
Nicaragua	July/June	104.1	62.1	166.2	237	245.3	9.7	235.6
SOUTH AMERICA		2,960.8	253.5	3,214.3	2,587.7	1,275.8	163.0	1,112.8
Bolivia	July/June	144.2	198.3	342.5	329	335.0	145.6	189.4
Colombia	Jan./Dec.	2,205.4	42.6	2,248.0	1,798	758.6	0.0	758.6
Ecuador	Jan./Dec.	611.2	12.6	623.8	460	182.2	17.4	164.8
Oceania		330.0	0.0	330.0	27.4	17.0	0.0	17.0
Kiribati	Jan./Dec.	7.0	0.0	7.0	7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Papua New Guinea	Jan./Dec.	278.9	0.0	278.9	223	14.2	0.0	14.2
Samoa	Jan./Dec.	15.0	0.0	15.0	15	0.2	0.0	2.5
Solomon Isl.	Jan./Dec.	19.0	0.0	19.0	19	2.5	0.0	2.5
Tuvalu	Jan./Dec.	1.0	0.0	1.0	1	0.0	0.0	0.0

(cont'd)

Country	Marketing year	1993/94 or 1994			1994/95 or 1995			
		Actual imports			Total import requirements (excluding re-exports)	Import position		
		Commercial purchases	Food aid	Total commercial and aid		Total commercial and aid	Food aid allocated committed or shipped	Commercial purchases
Vanuatu	Jan./Dec.	9.1	0.0	9.1	9	0.1	0.0	0.1
Europe/ CIS ^{5/6}		7,667.0	1,752.0	9,419.0	7,056	7,098.0	2,136.0	4,962.0
Armenia	July/June	182.0	258.0	440.0	477	477.0	463.0	14.0
Albania	July/June	0.0	472.0	472.0	310	310.0	34.0	276.0
Azerbaijan	July/June	681.0	47.0	728.0	670	670.0	366.0	304.0
Georgia	July/June	377.0	478.0	855.0	722	722.0	677.0	45.0
Kyrgyz. Rep.	July/June	275.0	163.0	440.0	333	333.0	124.0	209.0
Lithuania	July/June	136.0	0.0	136.0	25	25.0	0.0	25.0
Moldova	July/June	188.0	110.0	298.0	435	477.0	252.0	225.0
Macedonia, FYR	July/June	160.0	50.0	210.0	240	240.0	46.0	194.0
Romania	July/June	1,326.0	0.0	1,226.0	260	260.0	0.0	260.0
Tajikistan	July/June	717.0	83.0	800.0	409	409.0	124.0	285.0
Turkmenistan	July/June	682.0	89.0	771.0	570	570.0	50.0	520.0
Uzbekistan	July/June	2,943.0	0.0	2,943.0	2,605	2,605.0	0.0	2,605.0
TOTAL		60,169.1	8,875.0	69,044.1	75,585	71,517.8	7,796.5	63,721.3

Source: FAO.

¹Includes food deficit countries with per capita income below the level used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA assistance (i.e. US\$1,345 in 1993), which is in accordance with the guidelines and criteria agreed to by the CFA should be given priority in the allocation of food aid.

²Includes refugee needs.

³Includes import requirements of Taiwan Province.

⁴Excludes Afghan refugee requirements.

⁵Classified as LIFD countries as of January 1995.

⁶Data include insurance between the Republics.

Estimated Import Requirements of Cereals: Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries¹ (thousand tons)
(b) 1995/96 Estimates for LIFD Countries Which Have
Entered the 1995/96 Marketing Year

Country	Marketing year	1994/95 or 1995			1995/96			
		Actual imports			Total import requirements (excluding re-exports)	Import position		
		Commercial purchases	Food aid	Total commercial and aid		Total commercial and aid	Food aid allocated committed or shipped	Commercial purchases
AFRICA		14,729.0	1,601.3	16,330.3	17,675	667.6	515.9	151.7
<u>Northern Africa</u>		19,471.8	226.4	10,698.2	11,760	84.8	84.8	0.0
Egypt	July/June	8,439.4	158.8	8,593.2	7,750	84.8	84.8	0.0
Morocco	July/June	2,032.4	67.6	2,100.0	4,010	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Eastern Africa</u>		719.4	302.0	1,021.4	1,184	12.2	12.2	0.0
Kenya	July/June	430.5	156.1	586.6	1,075	8.2	8.2	0.0
Tanzania	June/May	288.9	145.9	434.8	109	4.0	4.0	0.0
<u>Southern Africa</u>		1,736.9	973.8	2,710.7	276.1	512.7	361.0	151.7
Angola	April/Mar.	263.3	296.7	560.0	560	115.7	109.1	6.6
Lesotho	April/Mar.	172.0	32.0	204.0	297	1.0	1.0	0.0
Madagascar	April/Mar.	177.0	23.4	200.4	146	13.5	13.5	0.0
Malawi	April/Mar.	212.3	279.7	492.0	180	100.2	92.3	7.9
Mozambique	May/April	275.8	324.2	600.0	446	116.9	111.6	5.3
Swaziland	May/April	67.3	8.7	76.0	93	6.9	0.0	6.9
Zambia	May/April	386.1	3.9	390.0	589	24.5	24.5	0.0
Zimbabwe	April/Mar.	183.1	5.2	188.3	450	134.0	9.0	125.0
<u>Western Africa</u>		1,537.7	62.3	1,600.0	1,600	36.1	36.1	0.0
<i>Coastal Countries</i>		1,537.7	62.3	1,600.0	1,600	36.1	36.1	0.0
Côte d'Ivoire	July/June	437.7	62.3	500.0	500	36.1	36.1	0.0
Nigeria	July/June	1,100.0	0.0	1,100.0	1,100	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Central Africa</u>		263.2	36.8	300.0	370	21.8	21.8	0.0
Cameroon	July/June	207.1	2.9	210.0	280	0.0	0.0	0.0
Congo	July/June	56.1	33.9	90.0	90	21.8	21.8	0.0
ASIA		37,769.8	1,789.3	39,559.1	37,349	3,129.0	620.0	2,509.0
Afghanistan	July/June	998.3	151.7	1,150.0	1,250	252.1	2.1	250.0
Bangladesh	July/June	1,447.2	963.8	2,411.0	2,050	0.0	0.0	0.0

(cont'd)

Country	Marketing year	1994/95 or 1995			1995/96			
		Actual imports			Total import requirements (excluding re-exports)	Import position		
		Commercial purchases	Food aid	Total commercial and aid		Total commercial and aid	Food aid allocated committed or shipped	Commercial purchases
Bhutan	July/June	32.0	0.2	32.2	32	0.0	0.0	0.0
China ³	July/June	22,779.2	224.0	23,003.2	21,175	1,613.5	91.3	1,522.2
India	July/June	79.0	98.0	177.0	150	268.9	268.9	0.0
Indonesia	April/Mar.	5,182.8	32.2	5,215.0	5,735	281.1	14.5	266.6
Jordan	July/June	1,588.2	128.3	1,717.0	1,610	385.2	115.0	270.2
Nepal	July/June	122.3	14.7	137.0	137	7.3	7.3	0.0
Pakistan ⁴	May/April	2,478.2	21.8	2,500.0	2,200	104.2	104.2	0.0
Philippines	July/June	2,418.0	108.7	2,526.7	2,400	211.2	11.2	200.0
Syria	July/June	644.6	45.4	690.0	610	5.5	5.5	0.0
CENTRAL AMERICA		1,513.7	252.1	1,765.8	1,466	378.5	378.5	0.0
Guatemala	July/June	485.8	108.0	593.8	540	119.0	119.0	0.0
Haiti	July/June	373.7	39.0	412.7	401	95.2	95.2	0.0
Honduras	July/June	418.6	95.4	514.0	350	99.6	99.6	0.0
Nicaragua	July/June	235.6	9.7	245.3	175	64.7	64.7	0.0
SOUTH AMERICA		189.4	145.6	335.0	300	82.7	82.7	0.0
Bolivia	July/June	189.4	145.6	335.6	300	82.7	82.7	0.0
EUROPE/ CIS ^{5/6}		4,962.0	2,136.0	7,098.0	6,615	154.0	154.0	0.0
Armenia	July/June	14.0	463.0	477.0	450	0.0	0.0	0.0
Albania	July/June	276.0	34.0	310.0	310	0.0	0.0	0.0
Azerbaijan	July/June	304.0	366.0	670.0	663	4.0	4.0	0.0
Georgia	July/June	45.0	677.0	722.0	560	2.0	2.0	0.0
Kyrgyz. Rep.	July/June	209.0	124.0	333.0	352	58.0	58.0	0.0
Lithuania	July/June	25.0	0.0	25.0	30	0.0	0.0	0.0
Moldova	July/June	225.0	252.0	477.0	155	52.0	52.0	0.0
Macedonia, FYR	July/June	194.0	46.0	240.0	240	0.0	0.0	0.0
Romania	July/June	260.0	0.0	260.0	260	0.0	0.0	0.0

(cont'd)

Country	Marketing year	1994/95 or 1995			1995/96			
		Actual imports			Total import requirements (excluding re-exports)	Import position		
		Commercial purchases	Food aid	Total commercial and aid		Total commercial and aid	Food aid allocated committed or shipped	Commercial purchases
Tajikistan	July/June	285.0	124.0	409.0	590	38.0	38.0	0.0
Turkmenistan	July/June	520.0	50.0	570.0	500	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uzbekistan	July/June	2,605.0	0.0	2,605.0	2,505	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL		59,163.9	5,924.3	65,088.2	63,453	4,411.8	1,751.1	2,660.7

Source: FAO.

¹Includes food deficit countries with per capita income below the level used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA assistance (i.e. US\$1,345 in 1993), which is in accordance with the guidelines and criteria agreed to by the CFA should be given priority in the allocation of food aid.

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